All the little Kissingers and Trump's war with Iran

 One of the more curious tax-exempt institutions in the U.S. is the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which naturally and Orwellianly embraces every beautiful war the U.S. has ever fought. It is a much more reputable org than, say, the Fifa Peace Award committee, but I prefer the latter – at least its obsequiousness is not buried under the rhetoric of a thousand “position papers”.

Naturally, Karim Sadjadpour, the Endowment’s Iran expert, has been pounding the drum for war with Iran ever since he discovered this is the kind of stuff that gets you interviewed on CNN and published in the Atlantic Monthly (a magazine that proves, every month, that it is edited by a former Israeli military prison guard).

In January of this year, Sadjadpour’s article on Trump’s opportunity in Iran was not noted enough – there is so much to note, after all!

The article took note (we note) of the riots in Iran, dubbing them, of course, a revolution (in other countries the U.S. does not like, riots are always a revolution; in the U.S., they are instances of looting by an immoral and “dark” underclass, which prove the need for an ever more militarized police!).

And then Sadjadpour pulled out the rhetoric for which peacelovin’ institutions are universally known: “Trump now confronts a fateful choice. He can make good on his promise [of hurting Iran] and face the always unpredictable consequences of military action [which is how the Carnegie Endowment for International peace describes the crushing of the bones, the deskinning of the bodies, the incineration of buildings, and the mass pain brought on by bullets, bombs, and our wondrous array of chemical devices RG] or he can face the shame of having given false encouragement to freedom fighters…”

Kudos to that last phrase. The idea that Trump has any capacity for shame whatsoever is laughable. So laughable that we can see how brilliant its use is here – our great president, embodying humanity itself, can have shame on a Mount Rushmore level! Sycophancy is a high art -in spite of the televised cabinet meetings in which Trump’s ministers routinely compete to reach their tongues ever higher up his rectum – it can be done much more subtly! And here we see a masterly touch. Trump is being given the Eisenhower presidential treatment. He is so PRESIDENTIAL that his shame, his potential shame if he doesn’t crush some bones, strip the skin off some bodies, incinerate some buildings, and in general smash faces into jelly on a large scale, will penetrate even his adorable orange hide! He'll have to talk gravely about it in his presidential library, perhaps seated on his gold toilet!

We can see where this is going. Whatever. The important thing, here, is that Sadjadpour has not shamed himself by continuing a mouselike existence as an expert, but has seized the opportunity of career advancement that will put him in the running for the next Democrat wanting to prove his hawk bonifieds! Like the Kagans and Kenneth Pollack in the Iraq war, Sadjadpour is going to be the go-to “intellectual” for the Abundance set, the liberal hawk in the liberal hawk magazine!

It is a brilliant move. However, it does not get you everything. Ask Kenneth Pollack. In fact, ask anybody below 25 who Kenneth Pollack was – you will draw a blank. At one time, though, he was the powerful anecdote to wishy washy libs who did not want to invade Iraq – the non-muscular ones.

Ah, all the little Kissingers!

I’m expecting great things from Sadjadpour.

anecdote and essay

 Mood tugs at the essay with a stronger hand than it does at other genres. Poetry has all its armored prosody to protect it; fiction has narrative, the monograph has method. But the essay absorbs proof, rhetoric and story into what is eventually, what is inevitably, whim. Which is, itself, not one thing but one thing and another. The wind bloweth where it listeth, said God in an essayistic mood.

The wind, though, is, to our human vision at least, a shapeless thing. For an essay to give shape, to shape its reason to exist, it needs technique. You don’t need a weather man to have weather, but if you are a weatherman, you need some way of depicting and even predicting the weather.

Benjamin, I think, has a certain genius for the essay, and for that moment in which the essay makes its strong play for the readers attention: I am talking about the anchoring anecdote. The essayist is most at home, is a citizen even, of literary culture – a culture of books, pictures, music and gossip. I think Benjamin learned the power of the anchoring anecdote from reading Kafka. That at least is my sense. Kafka’s anecdotes have a certain judicial quality, as though they were really decisions handed down by some supreme, invisible court. And so it is with Benjamin’s best anecdotes.

For instance, this one, from a brief essay on Robert Walser. Benjamin’s take on Walser is that even if Walser’s claim that he never changed a sentence is not, technically, true, it is a key to Walser’s manic stroller style. Manic, but quietly manic – a simple inability to stop, so that it goes past its point and into the fields, so to speak.

This inability to stop is curiously paired with the inability to start. Both moments require a decisiveness that the stroller is afraid of, shy of. Not wanting to make a fuss. And to illustrate this, Benjamin tells an anecdote:

“This story is told about Arnold Bröcklin, his son Carlo, and Gottfried Keller. One day they were sitting at their usual table at the café. Their table was famous for the way, among these comrades, they were unspeaking and closed off. So here, again, the three sat together in silence. After a certain amount of time had crawled by, the young Bröcklin said, “it’s hot.” And, after fifteen more minutes of silence, the older said: “and no wind.” Keller, for his part, sat there for a piece. Then he rose up and said: “I don’t drink with chatterboxes.” This peasant shame of talk, which is underlined by the excentric punchline, is Walser’s thing.”

That anecdote opens up, to me, a whole line of inquiry, stretching from Swiss peasants to Robert Wilson’s legendary play, The Life and Times of Joseph Stalin, a seven act, twelve hour piece in which, or so I’ve read, one of the characters advances by very slow footsteps from the wing to the center of the stage, which takes twenty minutes, stands there as though about to speak, and then, doesn’t, and then makes his way to the other wing of the stage, taking twenty minutes.

Slowness, silence, a certain terrific glue that seals in the human product: these are the anecdotal partners of Blake’s book, Proverbs of Heaven and Hell. Proverbs slowed down to the barest, syllabic beat.

A historiette of the police-lineup

 

“There is no available records of when line-ups were first introduced for police work.” – Historical Dictionary of American Criminal Justice

1. At first, at first the line-up was something different than what you think of, now, when you think of police lineup.

2. The first mention of a police lineup in the New York Times is on February 6, 1914. Headline: Police Line-Up Plan is resumed.” However, the referent here doesn’t look like our police line-up.

“The original line-up was born of the days when the Central Office Squad was a big squad and where the cells at headquarters were always full. Prioners arrested for everything from burglary to assault, who were still behind bars at break of day, were taken to the platform in the big basement room and there to be exhibited to the assembled detectives.”

The line up here is related to “calling the roll”, a procedure I remember from elementary school, and that existed and exists in many forms in many places. One of the memories of concentration camp survivors is the dangerous and eliminationist roll calls in the camps: inventory merged with murder.

As the police in the cities had more and more cases to process, the inventory of the arrested or simply taken in was a way of exerting control. But notice – notice the “exhibition” function. This was the future.

3. The NYT story states that the police line-up was only of those on hand in the Station. It was, then, independent of the fact that a mug was taken in. But it soon became joined with it. In the 20s and 30s, the police line-up was composed not only of perps or suspects at hand, but of those with records, those released from jail, those who were not particularly charged with anything. It was the exhibition that counted.

4. In an early talkie from 1930, For the Defence, starring William Powell, we have a movie capture of what the lineup was like. We know that the movie was realistic in as much as other reports – for instance, a story in Colliers in 1933 – tells essentially the same tale. In the Collliers story, which was about the NYC police department, were are told that the lineups had a master of ceremonies, assistant police inspector John J. Sullivan. Much like the inspector in the Powell flic, Sullivan’s voice was that of an auctioneer. On a stage with a stark white background upon which lines were printed (to represent height), a group of suspects or convicts would be assembled. The one to the right of the inspector would move forward, away from the group, and the inspector would read the name, identifying characteristics, and crime sheet of the given individual. As in the movie, this would provoke banter from the livelier cons. This drama was too good to confine to the detective world – it was a spectacle that many journalists, and those who were connected to the police and could acquire a ticket, also watched. What seems, in the movie, to be the kind of dialogue that was spewed out by screenwriters of the Ben Hecht variety – snappy comebacks, urban snarls, tough guy in jokes – was the word of the street, in all actuality.

5. These lineups lasted a long time. One catches glimpses of them even in the fifties. It was, penologists lamented, a tough thing for a guy trying to go straight to go to a new town and find himself herded down to the station and having his record read out. It made it hard to go straight, to find a sweetheart and a job, to make a stake, to put down roots.

6. This first kind of lineup was paralleled, in the 1930s, by the line-up as we vaguely think of it. In a story in Harper’s monthly in 1935 by Joseph F. Dinneen (Murder in Massachussetts), the lineup is described as a “modern police institution”. “It is considered good evidence to have a victim pick out of a line of average men the person suspected of the crime. The line-up is usually made up of plain clothes men, inspectors, the janitor, salesmen trying to interest the department in traffic devices, telephone repairmen, any person in the corridor who does not mind devoting ten or twenty minutes to an interesting experience in the public interest… As a reporter I have been pressed into service a number of times.”

The persons who are not suspect are called fillers or foils. The hunt for foils becomes itself a matter of urban policing. In 1985, the NYT reported that the police would often pick up “black youth”, scaring them with the idea that they were suspects in some crime, but really only interested in filling out the foils at the station.

7. Foucault, in Surveiller et punir, took the panopticon, described by Bentham, as a sort of Platonic ideal come to earth – an assemblage for creating transparency to allow subordinates to be watched, even as the watchers were in an opaque position – one in which they would not be watched. A new hierarchy: the unwatchables and the watched – was being time released in France, in Great Britain, in the United States, etc. The police lineup participates, in part, in the panopticon. But it participates, as well, in theatre – the very kind of live theatre that was dying out there on the Great White Ways.

8. The line up in this form was, of course, a very attractive proposition for movies and television. In The Lineup, a CBS show that ran from 1954 to 1960, the crime and its investigation all crystalized in the lineup. The people in the lineup were shown walking down from the podium in the opening credits – with the familiar background, white with rays marking heights, creating the background screen. The show ran in France, and introduced the French to the “parade d’identification”.

In Parade Magazine in 1952, a feature ran with twelve photos, six of crooks, six of straights. I challenged the reader to identify the crooks. “There’s always a lingering suspicion – and hope – that you could tell a convict from somebody’s uncle.”

9. From a philosophical perspective, the splendour and misery of the correspondence idea of truth: there is the man who robbed, raped or murdered, and there is the witness who points a finger. Court case after court case muddies and modifies this idea. Eyewitness reports go into the laboratory, and one varies the scene and the time intervals. We check on the circumstances of the initial witnessing – partial as it may be – and the circumstances of the selecting the perp at the police station. As is often the case with police culture, there is the hidden struggle between what police do (find a solution to a case to make it go off the books and through the courts), and what we think they do (find the guilty party). The latter means, to the social whole, that the person who raped or murdered or defrauded will not do so again, at least while being punished. But the former is an actual job, with a job’s pragmatism, where a miss can be as good as a mile if you tart it up a bit, lead the witnesses, supress the contradictory details. And of course in the middle of this is the witness’s impression, an impression like the vast millionfold array of them day in, day out. An impression that, even initially, seems to be wearing away, like a chalk drawing in a downpour.

It must strike the philosophically trained that the gradual development of the line up room, with its screen, its fillers, its sociological diversity or lack thereof, and its witness has a certain resemblance to Plato’s myth of the cave. Are these shadows upon the wall? In particular, ingenuity has been devoted to making the witness see what the people in the lineup can’t see. One reason is evident: crimes are often committed in neighborhoods where the perp will know the witness, and sometimes the witness will believe, often with good reason, that testifying will get the witness in trouble. Put the witness in danger. It is part of policework to try to charm the witness out of this anxiety. The police, here, are often operating not to protect the witness, but the case – and the witness becomes an object of use. The transactionality of witnessing can be used by witnesses, can become a paraprofessional activity – hence the mouchard, the fink, the informer, the snitch. But witnesses who are not aware of the transactional nature of witnessing are dealing with perps, on the one hand, who are well aware of it, and cops, on the other, who are also well aware of it. Nobody is really for the witness, not one hundred percent. Even if the witness is a victim. Even, especially, if the witness is a victim.

10. It is out of such philosophical musings, and court cases that, since Miranda at least (Miranda claimed to be a victim of a skewed lineup), have shaped the space of the lineup. In 1974, after the Warren Court was well history and the Nixon court was busy giving police back their trans-constitutional powers, the NYT reported on a state of the art police lineup room in Queens: it had a video and audio component, to record everything that was said; it was a designated room instead of a room at random in the station, measuring 13 x 11 feet; and it had a one way glass through which the witnesses “may look at suspects” without the suspects looking at the witnesses. A utopia.

Meanwhile, out there in the wilderness, cameras and computers were dispensing with the unreliable eyes of witnesses. In a sense, the lineup was going back to one of its origins, in the array of photographs of perpetrators that the police would let victims and witnesses leaf through.

11. Just as the discipline of prisoners became the discipline of factory workers, I have long thought – from my experience in grocery lines, having to time to gaze at fashion magazine covers and leaf through Vanity Fairs – that the police line has become a secret iconographic norm for fashion models and selfies. The arrangement of people by size, skin color, hair color, the grouping together in an absurdly small space, the smiles, even (expressions on cue), am I not seeing these things through a two way glass?

12. The democratic crisis - the loss of faith in the experience of the people - has many dimensions. One of them is the gradual replacement of the twentieth century police line-up with the photo line-up, or facial recognition machinery - as if we need to cut ourselves out of our experience in order to achieve maximum control over our collectivities. The cases mount up.

Woman wrongly accused of carjacking loses lawsuit against Detroit police who used facial technology - CBS News, September 4, 2025

"Police put a file photo of Woodruff in a photo lineup after a gas station video from the scene was run through facial recognition technology. The carjacking victim picked Woodruff, who was among other women in the lineup."

That last sentence meant - among the women in the photo lineup generated by facial recognition machinery. So much for circumstances and alibis. Detroit - the city to which the movie ROBOCOP refers - has, like many police department, steamlined its grabs. And so they go out, under the mechanical order, and so they bring in, tasers in hand. So much, even, for the old repartee between police and thieves. Who knew that we could start feeling nostalgic for the older versions of the panopticon?

ICE and the cops: how communities should take back power

Cast your mind back to every Western you have ever seen. Most of them, I’d bet, featured or included a sheriff. The sheriff “kept the peace” but, if you think about it, never stopped a single wagon, carriage or horserider for speeding. Consequently, the sheriff never examined a single wagon, carriage or saddle bag for “contrabrand” material.

In Sara Seo’s Policing the Open Road, the burden of the narrative is on the legal construction that allowed police, around the Prohibition era, more power over the car than the Customs officer had over the incoming ship – that is, police were allowed to make reasonable searches of vehicles without a warrant, and with the standard of “reasonableness” amounting to: what the policeman says.

The interesting subtheme, here, is that policing followed technological and legal changes, which intersected with an already existing hierarchy that separated the respectable (white) people and the non-respectable (working class, black, immigrant) people.

“Certainly, traffic laws, like prohibition laws, established mala prohibita—acts that were wrong only by virtue of statute. No inherent sense of morality deemed, for example, driving at the speed of twenty-two miles per hour a per se evil like murder or theft.”

Prohibition and the policing of the automobile came together in court cases that started to allow a growing police force a greatly expanded amount of power not only to regulate the traffic, but to search cars on the instinct of the police.

The addition of police union power beginning with the Civil Rights era added to this police power. Even so, the police would not have become the community’s ruler instead of their servant if the political power of the unions had not been flexed to take the power directly away from local law.

A good example of how the system works is found in Ohio.

On August 12, 2017. 25-year-old Richard Hubbard III was pulled over on E 228th St. just before 10:30 a.m. for "a moving/traffic violation” by Michael Amiott. “Hubbard was ordered to exit the car and face away so he could be taken into custody. Police say Hubbard refused, and a violent struggle ensued. The video that was captured showed Amiott taking Hubbard to the ground, punching him multiple times.”

Thus far, a typical instance of the combo of race – Hubbard is black – the auto – Hubbard had committed a minor traffic infraction and had an expired license – and police authority – the taking into custody of a person without a licence is extraordinary. I speak from authority, having once been stopped by a policeman for a minor traffic infraction and then being told that I would get a major fine if I didn’t renew my license, which was out of date. At no point did the white policeman think that I was going to go down with him to the police station. Cause I’m white.

The video made Amiott’s action undeniable, although the police issued the standard pr piece about how Hubbard had violently resisted. It did not explain why Hubbard was taken into custody – this was, for the police, a simple norm. They get to decide who to take into custody. That power has been given to them when they were given untrammeled power over the streets.

In the next step in this drama, the town of Euclid reluctantly responded by suspending and then firing Michael Amiott. The mayor referenced further instances in Amiott’s record. Amiott’s case was then taken up by the Fraternal Order of Police, even though the Euclid police department is represented, technically, by another union. See this site for an indepth look at Euclid policing and race, including other violent incidences involving Amiott. (see all parts of Series 3)

In 1983, Ohio – like many Midwestern states with a strong union presence – instituted a collective bargaining law that outlawed strikes in favor of arbitration. The driver, at that time, was the fear of teacher strikes. But included in that law were all public employee unions – the police unions foremost.

Ohio was once the heartland of American industry, and consequently, of the factory worker unions that allowed the working class to negotiate with Capital. Some leftist economists have pointed to the benefits accruing to public employees from these laws. At the same time, there is a difference between teachers and cops – the arbitrators and judges have myriad links with the police.

A study by Mark Iris in 1998 of arbitration results in Chicago bears out the bias:

“A total of 328 disciplinary actions were decided by binding arbitration during that period [1990-1993]. In addition, under a new process started in July 1993, 205 disciplinary actions have been reviewed by arbitrators for nonbinding advisory opinions as of July 1995. These two distinct data sets demonstrate remarkably similar patterns of outcomes; collectively, the discipline imposed upon Chicago police officers is routinely cut in half by arbitrators. This pattern recurs despite an elaborate, lengthy review process and close scrutiny before the suspension of an officer is ordered.”

This result should not surprise us, given the larger history outlined by Seo: the abdication of a large degree of sovereignty to the police. In a 2016 article by Tylor Adams, “Factors in Police Misconduct Arbitration Outcomes: What Does It Take to Fire a Bad Cop?”, he summarizes other studies that show the same interventionist tendency. Although police chief, mayors, and the community may want Michael Amiott fired, he does not work at the will of the community: his fate depends on his union and his arbitrator.

Adams remarks that the reason for overturning suspension or firing is most often categorized as a Just cause mistake. “A principal reason why arbitrators overturn police discharges is a department's failure to prove just cause. The meaning of just cause is derived from principles of fundamental fairness that evolved over time through the decisions of arbitrators.” Adams does not question the circularity of this “evolution” through time: a biased system will become more and more biased as precedent is set.

What does this mean? It means that we are depending on the “reasonableness” of cops and the precedents set by police-biased arbitrators. It means that the community needs to take back power. If we dismantle the way the police operate, we have to dismantle and clean up the system of arbitration that is broken. A simple but effective tool is to take away the “just cause” rationality from arbitrators, and have the legislature spell out very what just cause is. I would think that process would weed out bias from racial and gender causes that might make a mayor fire a police officer; but it would not allow police judgment about the appropriate use of force to triumph over the community.

On poems

 

I like a poem that, at some point, I can say to myself. That moment of saying the poem to oneself is not all a poem is about, but without it, the poem has no skin, no place where the nerves end. Anatomical dolls are not our idea of beauty.

J.S. Mill, as we know from his Autobiography, was saved from the horrid erudition shoveled on his head by his pa by poetry – specifically, Wordsworth’s. He tried to define poetry in an interestingly wrong headed essay, making, among other distinctions, this one between poetry and fiction:

“Many of the greatest poems are in the form of fictitious narratives; and, in almost all good serious fictions, there is true poetry. But there is a radical distinction between the interest felt in a story as such, and the - excited by poetry; for the one is derived from incidence, the other from the representation of feeling. In one, the source of the emotion excited is the exhibition of a state or states of human sensibility; in the other of a series of states of mere outward circumstances. Now, all minds are capable of being affected more or less by representations of the latter kind, and or almost all, by those of the former; yet the two sources of interest correspond to two distinct and (as respects their greatest development) mutually exclusive characters of mind.

“At what age is the passion for a story, for almost any kind of story, merely as a story, the most intense? In childhood. But that also is the age at which poetry, even of the simplest description, is least relished and least understood; because the feelings with which it is especially conversant are yet undeveloped, and, not having been even in the slightest degree experienced, cannot be sympathized with. In what stage of the progress of society, again, is story-telling most valued, and the story-teller in greatest request and honor? In a rude state like that of the Tartars and Arabs at this day, and of almost all nations in the earliest ages. But, in this state of society, there is little poetry except ballads, which are mostly narrative, --that is, essentially stories,--and derive their principal interest from the incidents. Considered as poetry, they are of the lowest and most elementary kind: the feelings depicted, or rather indicated, are the simplest our nature has; such joys and griefs as the immediate pressure of some outward event excites in rude minds, which live wholly immersed in outward things, and have never, either from choice or a force they could not resist, turned themselves to the contemplation of the world within. Passing now from childhood, and from the childhood of society, to the grown-up men and women of this most grown-up and unchild-like age, the minds and hearts of greatest depth and elevation are commonly those which take greatest delight in poetry: the shallowest and emptiest, on the contrary, are, at all events, not those least addicted to novel-reading. This accords, too, with all analogous experience of human nature. The sort of persons whom not merely in books, but in their lives, we find perpetually engaged in hunting for excitement from without, are invariably those who do not possess, either in the vigor of their intellectual powers or in the depth of their sensibilities, that which would enable them to find ample excitement nearer home. The most idle and frivolous persons take a natural delight in fictitious narrative: the excitement it affords is of the kind which comes from without. Such persons are rarely lovers of poetry, though they may fancy themselves so because they relish novels in verse. But poetry, which is the delineation of the deeper and more secret workings of human emotion, is interesting only to those to whom it recalls what they have felt, or whose imagination it stirs up to conceive what they could feel, or what they might have been able to feel, had their outward circumstances been different.”

This seems to me to get one of the main things right – the last sentence especially – but the main thing wrong, as well as the anthropology. Children love verse that tells no tale, but sounds funny or interesting, for one thing. Of course, Mill’s casual sense that the Europeans are adults and the others are children – though of course living, technically, at the same fucking time – is at the temporal center of the colonialist mindset. Mill, related on all sides to the Indian Office, couldn’t help himself. It is important to remember this way of looking at poetry when thinking about poetry in the 19^th and 20^th centuries, as poets sought to navigate the a-chrony of it all.

The main thing, though, is that Mill gets entangled in the distinction between emotion and incident without having a clear sense that these two are very interwoven. The idea that reality doesn’t care about your “feelings” is a shrew denial that, indeed, feelings are as real as rocks. This is a familiar and endlessly tugged against trap. I think it is just the wrong way to talk about poetry. Mill is not alone, of course – Eliot has expressed a similar notion, now and then, and the distinction has had a long and hale life that continues today. With nefarious consequences, insofar as it empties out what we can say when we talk about a poem. It de-motivates the poetic impulse.

Myself, I prefer to think of poems in terms of orientation, or maps. Pound's periplum. What does this mean?

Let me explain by way of an illustration. There is a story in Oliver Sacks The Man who Mistook Himself for a Hat. A music professor was examined by Sacks. The professor was, according to all tests, physically blind. The blindness was caused by the deterioration of the retina. Yet the man claimed to be able to see. In order to understand the case, Sacks went to the man’s home. And, indeed, he seemed to get around the house, and to say things about the house, which only a man with sight could similarly do and say. Or so Sacks thought. Then they had dinner, and Sacks noticed, during dinner, that the professor was “singing” the dinner to himself. He had a song, a sort of hum, that he used to orient himself to all the things on the table.

This is what poetry does, ideally, for me.

Centro-Scriptorium: a poem

 Centro-scriptorium

« … du centro-scriptorium, c'est-à-dire de l'endroit d'où partent les impulsions centro-motrices qui occasionnent l’écriture… »

The doobie is burnt to ash and mood

And within the centro-scriptorium

There’s a ghostly feeling of abandoned lab

A rush after we all looked up

And saw the mushroom cloud framed in the window.

The time that passes.

Subtitle dates mark the hiatus.

Ex-es, ghostly erections, squalor of nights

Strapped down. Unstapled wires sag from the ceiling.

Big themes in the algae frosted Aquarium.

Within the centro-scriptorium

Move, obscurely, the mother current lost

That volted me from girlhood to dame

And kept me going, ghostward

Ever ghostward.

-Karen Chamisso

Reading Andrew O'Hagan's Stay Classy, in the LRB, about Prince Andrew

 Victoria Hervey, Epstein friend, English MAGA supporter, was simply saying what the Epstein crime class believes when she responded to O'Hagan's request for a comment here:

"When I contacted Victoria Hervey to confirm that she had called Virginia Giuffre a ‘whore’, she doubled down on the comment. ‘It’s what anyone with a brain knows,’ she told me by email."

Compare this to Leon Black, the unprosecuted billionaire whose mystery doings, as outlined in Epstein's emails, prodded no investigation by either Trump or Biden's DOJ.

“I took it seriously,” Black said. “But I didn’t take it that seriously. I mean, he was with a 17-year-old prostitute, got prosecuted for it, and got put away for a year.”

Yeah, didn't take it that seriously. Why should he? Serious would mean Leon Black might be stripped of his billions and treated like a normal perp in a rape case: and in that milieu, Black's, Epstein's, Trump's, Clinton's - these things don't happen. It is more likely that a dog could talk than someone from the dog class, the waitress, the high school gilr (in a public school no less! A real tee hee for these guys), could actually retaliate via the mechanisms that theoretically exist to make everyone obey the law.

The deal is that as our belief in the impartiality of the law evaporates, as the law becomes a joke, so too does the inhibition against electing jokers. Too big to fail is the death knell of any even slightly "progressive" party. Gaza children too small to worry about as you sell their murderers bombs - middle class girls working a part time job in high school - businesses ignoring the law and the SEC never doing squat about it - all these things wrap the social up in a ball.

We can punch holes in that ball, but not by looking for some easy to hate target. No justice, no progress.