The early twentieth century was the heyday of both
colonialism and the anthropological obsession
with ritual, with observations of “native peoples” flooding into the
metropoles. Rituals seemed both omnipresent and irrational; thus, they provided
a tempting form and object for the modernist author.
But what was a ritual? And how was it different from any
other step by step organization of activity? Marcel Mauss, in an essay on
prayer, puts the onus on the organizing irrationality of the ritual:
“It isn’t after the nature of acts and their real effects
that it is possible to distinguish the two orders of fact. From this point of
view, all that it is possible to say about rituals is that they cannot produce
the results one attributes to them. According to this way of judging, one can’t
distinguish rituals from erroneous practices. One knows, however, that an
erroneous practice is not a ritual. Thus, it is not in considering the
efficacity in itself, but the manner in which the efficacity is conceived that
we can discover the specific difference. Thus, in the case of technique, the
effect produced is supposed to arise entirely from the effective mechanical
labor. And this besides has right on its side (a bon droit), for the effort of
civilization has precisely consisted in reserving to industrial techniques and
the science on which they repose that useful value that one attributed in the
past to rituals and religious notions. On the contrary, in the case of a ritual
practice, other causes completely are supposed to intervene, to which is wholly
imputed the expected result. Between the movements that constitute the sacrifice
and those that solidly construct the house that the former is supposed to
insure, there is not even from the point of view of the sacrificer any
mechanical link. The efficacity lent to the ritual has nothing in common with
the efficacity proper to the acts which are materially accomplished. It is
represented mentally as completely sui generis, for one consideres that it
comes entirely from special forces that the ritual has the property of putting
in play. Thus even if the effect actually produced would result in fact in
executed movements, there would be a ritual if the believer attributed it to
other causes. Thus the absorption of toxic substances produces physiologically
a state of ecstasy, and yet it is a ritual for those who impute this state not
to its true causes, but to special influences.”
The notion of efficiency, here, silently displaces an older
notion of necessity – of the play of necessity and chance. The efficiency of
the mechanical acts (if we can, for a moment, separate out the mechanical from
the efficient) consists in the fact that the first step in the routine is
necessary for and necessitates the second step. The measure of its efficiency
is in the narrowing or the elimination of alternatives and options for the
second step, and so on. Putting together the pieces that make an Ikea table, we
follow instructions that spatialize the temporal arrangement and unroll it as a
series of attachments and adjustments of the various (but sorted) bits and
parts. Even so, it is not uncommon to find the term ritual attached to certain
routines, as for instance in sales, or in driving, or making a meal. What this
shows, to the anthropologist trying to make sense of ritual, is that it can
attach itself, parasitically, to the technical acts that produce a given
commodity or service.
Victor Turner, in Dramas, Fields and Metaphors, returns to
the ritual as it was conceived by the turn of the century anthropologists – and
in particular, Van Genep’s notion of a rite de passage:
“Van Gennep demonstrated that many types of rituals, notably
initiation rites, have three distinguishable stages, of varying relative
duration within and among cultures, which he described as (1) separation, (2) margin
or limen, and (3) reaggregation. Sometimes he simply called these:
“preliminal,” “liminal,” and “postliminal.” He had noticed that rituals are
often performed, in societies at all levels of social complexity, when
individuals or groups are culturally defined as undergoing a change of state or
status.”
Is this three stage process a sort of routine within the
ritual? Or is it that within every routine, from the assembly line to the
salesman’s coffee break, the subject, that sensitive object, tends towards
ritual? Tends, that is, as something earlier, something primitive.
Did I mention the colonial shadow that falls over this
discussion?
Turner’s first interest, as a college student, was
literature. He changed to anthropology, and did field work with his wife,
Edith, in Africa, and observed ritual there – then began to theorize about comparative
symbology during the Cold War period of the fifties and sixties, when ritualism
as a universal dissolvent was past its fad expiration date. What Turner got
from Genep was a way of talking about the symbolic structure of ritual without
grounding it in some appeal to our lost pieties – the reactionary move of a
certain group of modernists. That use of ritual was timely – it was absorbed
into the fascination with identity that came out of the civil rights movements.
It carried into identity remnants of a
rhetoric that was once about the sacred.
We are entering, I think, in what I would call, ludicrously
and awkwardly, a post-identity moment. I wonder how ritual and routine will be
reconfigured within those parameters.
2 comments:
re ritual, there's the old standby that hasn't gone away - sacrifice. a fine old word and ritual which is basically killing - in the name of .... one can go with identity or post-identity, but that ritual goes on and on don't you think?
- Sophie
The mixture of ritual and routine has been generated by war as much as it was generated by industry. Martyrs, or victims, or casualties - and the persistence of the military hero - seem to lag, in some way, what we see happening in, for example, Gaza.
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