There is a certain kind of book that doesn’t have a genre label per se; it falls somewhere between the essay and the treatise; like the the essay, it concentrates on some line of thought aroused by a situation or an idea, although it claims the right to break off at any moment and diverge into some other topic; like the treatise, it is unafraid of abstraction and generalization, although it is wary of universals and likes to consider difference as a positive moment, an unassimilable energy. Some of its authors call their books novels, others fragments, others reflections. Often, the authors are not the collectors of the totality of the book – a job that devolves on the editors. The fragments of classical texts produced, in the literary culture of the seventeenth century, a paradigm for the moralist who first seized on this diffuse genre. Pascal’s Pensees, for instance, are often considered to be a sketch for a book that Pascal meant someday to write – but what if Pascal intended to produce exactly this fragmentary text? Other instances: the Scratch books of Lichtenberg, Rozanov’s Fallen Leaves, Pessoa’s various Books of Disquiet, Ludwig Hohl’s Notizen, Nietzsche’s extensive Nachlass.
A leading theme, here, is the scratching, the hastily scribble gloss, the note one finds in one’s pocket and throws out. Man is a thinking reed – a reed broken off and filled with ink. Waste paper is paper that has been used and lost its use, and perhaps aggressively wadded up. Every wadded up piece of paper is a shadow of a clenched fist, after all. It is paper on the way to the waste paper basket, carrying words that have lost their use. That is the social situation of these books – they are caught somewhere between the desk and the garbage. At least, in the imagination.
The waste book has a strong relation with the philosophical novel – and certain of the latter, such as Paul Valery’s M. Teste, go over the line. Perhaps the reason is that ideas in themselves – ideas in their natural setting – have as limited a place in modern life as mice have in modern homes. They are an accidental, corner feature of life. Even in jobs like research scientist or professor, “having ideas” is not in the job description – at best, creativity squeezes in there, but playing well with others, getting good grades, and producing acres of watertreading non-waste articles for journals is what counts.
Ideas are for losers. Or they are viewed, in the 101 classroom, as emanations of heads. Heads having ideas, which often “influence” other heads having ideas, discuss in 400 words or less.
A mostly forgotten waste book by Antonio Machado, with the title Juan Mairena, should be better known in the Angophone world. Ben Belitt translated it back in 1963, but that edition has long gone out of print. The French edition is published by Anatolia: editions du rocher, who also publish the translations of Rozanov.
Juan Mairena is one of Machado’s “complementaries”. As Pessoa’s critics have pointed out, Machado’s “heteronyms” – Mairena and his teacher, Abel Martin – don’t have the rowdy independence of Pessoa’s personas. But Belitt’s notion that they cast light on Machado as a poet, a light he could not cast in his own name, is a good one. In his foreword, Machado writes that Mairena was “a poet, philosopher and rhetorician, born in Seville in 1865 and buried in Casariego de Tapia in 1909” A nineteenth century man, although is conversations, notes and lectures are evidently saturated with Machado’s own experience after 1909, including his stint attending the lectures of Bergson in Paris in 1910.
Here’s a translation of the French translation of one of Juan de Mairena’s entries. This entry, with its Alice in Wonderland logic, expresses the spirit of the waste book, as opposed to the fictions and factions of the other literary branches.
“One says that there is no rule without an exception. Is that really the case? Myself, I don’t dare affirm it. In any case, if that confirmation contains a partial truth, it must be a truth of fact, the reason for which can’t be fully satisfied. Every exception, one adds, confirms the rule. This does not seem so evident; however, it is more acceptable, from the logical point of view. For if all exceptions belong to a rule, if there is an exception, there is a rule, and he who thinks exception thinks of a rule. This already constitutes a truth of reason, that is to say, a truism, a simple tautology which teaches us nothing. We can’t be satisfied with stopping here. So, let’s be more subtle…
1. If every exception confirms the rule, a rule without an exception would be a non-confirmed rule, although by no means a non-rule.
2. A rule with exceptions will always be stronger than a rule without exceptions, which will lack an exception to have itself confirmed.
3. A rule will be more of a rule the richer it is in exceptions.
4. The ideal rule will be composed of nothing but exceptions.”
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