Sunday, March 09, 2025

My review of Anna Burns Milkman, 2019

 

Anna Burns’ Milkman and the role of the proper name in all histories, sacred or profane

The Emergency...British soldiers stop a man trying to carry his baby through a barbed-wire barricade on the Catholic Falls Road area of Belfast. (Photo by James Jackson/Getty Images)

Burns begins her novel with an utter spoiler of a sentence that pretty much states the case:

The day Somebody McSomebody put a gun to my breast and called me a cat and threatened to shoot me was the same day the milkman died. He had been shot by one of the state hit squads and I did not care about the shooting of this man. 

Fleshed out, this means that the novel follows a parallel between the events that befall the narrator as she is sexually stalked by a reputed IRA honcho and the events that have befallen Belfast itself in the years of the “troubles”, especially in her Ardoyne neighborhood in Belfast, which is Catholic and working class.  But here I run into a wee problem, because even if I could sum up the book like this, I would have to admit the fact that nowhere does the book mention Belfast or Northern Ireland or the British or  the IRA. All those names are blocked, all those names are not here. Somebody McSomebody is here, but his name is not here. The milkman is here, but his name, at least so far as the narrator knows at this point, is not here. As we will soon discover, the narrator’s name is not here either. This is not a minor detail, this is not something we can read over, if we want to read. So our first order of business to ask the question: why have the names fallen off the map of the territory covered in this novel? Why does Burns give herself the difficult task of creating a story out of a seeming  bonfire of proper names?

The Emergency…British soldiers stop a man trying to carry his baby through a barbed-wire barricade on the Catholic Falls Road area of Belfast. (Photo by James Jackson/Getty Images)

To answer this question in part, back up for a moment – consider  the role of the proper name in all histories, sacred or profane. The proper name seems to be unique to human communication, although who knows what goes on among dolphins. Presumably at some point they were invented, just as making fire was invented. One could even say the human comes about with the proper name. Tarzan, even, seems to have a sense of proper names – because if he didn’t, the whole me Tarzan – you Jane schtick wouldn’t make sense. You might be able to train your dog to respond to the sound of its name, but your dog is never going to use or mention your name, or even in the cells of its poochy consciousness think of you with relation to your proper name. All of which makes proper names fascinating to the philosopher, because what is going on here? Why do we need names?

Anna Burns narrator is called variously “middle sister”, “maybe-girlfriend,” “daughter”, etc. Her friends and relatives are similarly dubbed by what Bertrand Russell called “denoting phrases” – and even those with proper names, we quickly learn, don’t bear real proper names, but names denoting the fact that they seem like the type of person who might bear a particular kind of proper name – for example, something very English sounding. Except that, to continue with this and show what semantic quicksand lies within the story of Burns’s novel so that the reader, as well as the characters within the novel, never know whether the next step is going to completely suck them down, Britain and England are not dubbed with their proper names either – they are invariably “over the water” or “the state”. And even Ireland or Northern Ireland or Belfast is not dubbed with its proper name, so that it becomes a linguistic shift – a “here”, a “there”, a “this side of the street”, a “region”, an “our community” and “their community”, gaining its semantic sense from the speakers position within a semantic web (which is technically known in linguistics as a shifter). So for instance when we read that a couple who lives near the narrator’s “maybe-boyfriend” is named Nigel and Jason, we are not to think that they are “really” named Nigel and Jason. The reason that they are named Nigel and Jason is that they have been collecting, for anthropological reasons, names that were “banned” in the “community” – itself unnamed, but obviously the Catholic side of Northern Ireland – which is such a peculiar thing to do that it seems like the kind of thing people over the water might do, and over the water, as is well known, Nigel and Jason are common first names.  Maybe-girlfriend raps out a list of illegitimate names:

The banned names were: Nigel, Jason, Jasper, Lance, Percival, Wilbur, Wilfred, Peregrine, Norman, Alf, Reginald, Cedric, Ernest, George, Harvey, Arnold, Wilberine, Tristram, Clive, Eustace, Auberon, Felix, Peverill, Winston, Godfrey, Hector, with Hubert, a cousin of Hector, also not allowed. Nor was Lambert or Lawrence or Howard or the other Laurence or Lionel or Randolph because Randolph was like Cyril which was like Lamont which was like Meredith, Harold, Algernon and Beverley. Myles too, was not allowed. Nor was Evelyn, or Ivor, or Mortimer, or Keith, or Rodney or Roger or Earl of Rupert or Willard or Simon or Sir Mary or Zebedee or Quentin, though maybe now Quentin owing to the filmmaker making good in America that time. Or Albert. Or Troy. Or Barclay. Or Eric. Or Marcus. Or Sefton. Or Marmaduke. Or Greville. Or Edgar because all those names were not allowed. Clifford was another name not allowed. Lesley wasn’t either. Peverill was banned twice.

Names, as one can see, that are all male: over and above the politics of the right name and the wrong name are the politics that decrees that women’s names don’t or at least shouldn’t have such power because women themselves shouldn’t have such power, that is, political power.

“The banned names were understood to have become infused with the energy, the power of history, the age-old conflict, enjoinments and resisted impositions as laid down long ago in this county by that country, with the original nationality of the name not now in the running at all.”

We are only really beginning with the politics of the name, however, when we enumerate which names are and are not allowed, and which gender’s names are politically charged and which one’s are not, for the levels of non-naming are multifold and the the quicksand is deep. It is not simply in the “community” that the name has become a fatal object of conflict: even in the narrator’s own family, names have been stripped off, torn out, left unvocalized. The process was started, paradoxically, by the paterfamilias, the usual legal guardian and carrier of the name, the male namer whose family name is carried by the son and the daughter, who in this case – as in so many in his domestic life – flips the role, becoming the unnamer even as he is, himself, unnamed, abandoning our primogenitor Adam’s perogative in the name business. Which is the point at which we hit our own family unnames, such as Mom and Dad, which are the ultimate psychoanalytically charged shifters since my correct use of “Mom”, for instance, is directed towards a woman who bears another, legal name, and can’t be arbitrarily transferred to other women who have not either borne me or exist as my step-mother.  Except in cases where for one reason or another a woman has become a “Mom” to people outside of the legal and/or biological relationship of motherhood, which is an exception that proves the rule that the rules all have exceptions in a language, as language is, among other things, a huge swap meet.

But to return to middle sister’s Da:

He saw me though, even if unsure which daughter I was. That, of course, could have had nothing to do with dying, because da, when he’d lived, always had been in a state of distraction, spending overlong hours reading papers, watching the news, ears to radios, out in the street, taking in, then talking out, the latest political strife with likeminded neighbours. He was that type, the type who let nothing in except it had to be the political problems. If not the political problems – then any war, anywhere, any predator, any victim. He’d spend lots of time too, with these neighbours who were of the exact fixation and boxed-off aberration as him. As for the names of us offspring, never could he remember them, not without running through a chronological list in his head. While doing this, he’d include his sons’ names even if searching for the name of a daughter. And vice versa. Sooner or later, by running through, he’d hit on the correct one at last. Even that though, became too much and so, after a bit, he dropped the mental catalogue, opting instead for ‘son’ or ‘daughter’ which was easier. And he was right. It was easier which was how the rest of us came to substitute ‘brother’ and ‘sister’ and so on ourselves.

This primal scene of unnaming, this negation of the mythic impulse (an impulse that depends so crucially on naming that one mythographic theory in ancient times was that myths were created to explain names), gives us our orienting disorienting points to make it across a narrative that expands in all directions like some crazy banyan tree. So if, instead of substituting names for denoting phrases as if I knew, beforehand, where all this was happening and who it was happening to, the story in its own terms would go something like this:

Middle sister, who seems to be 18, comes from a functionally dysfunctional family in an unnamed community where the social forces in conflict consist broadly of the renouncers of the state and their forces versus the defenders of the state and their forces, with the defenders of the state coming from outside the community – the paramilitaries from the other side of the street – or over the water – the soldiers and spies and hit squads – plus the police, and the renouncers consisting of paramilitaries, gangsters, the community opinion at large, and the spies and killers and rapists which may or may not be operating on their own or in connection with others. Being functionally dysfunctional in this neighborhood means taking a certain number of casualties – a renouncer son shot and killed, another disappeared, a daughter who the renouncers have threatened to kill if she ever comes back to the community (sister’s crime is to have married an enemy). Middle sister’s survival technique consists of keeping her head down, or in a book – she reads nineteenth century novels while walking to work.  Keeping a book up as a shield allows her, she thinks, to disappear, instead of being thought bananas or in some way so marginalized that she became a matter of unease for those in the community. As well, she has a maybe-boyfriend in another region that she has not told her mother about, or her sisters or brothers-in-law. So this is the state of play of Middle Sister’s life in the community and way of keeping alive and unmolested in the community with its overt downgrading of women and frank thrusting of second class citizenship, if that, upon women when the Milkman, driving a large white van (from which, it is Middle Sister’s theory, his nickname Milkman came from) stops and offers her a ride. In offering her a ride and making a few remarks that show that he knows where she lives, he knows her habits, he knows her routes, he makes it obvious that he has been stalking her and, by the very fact of stalking, claiming her, which reflects on his position in the community as both a respected paramilitary boss and a gangster like figure who seizes what he wants.  That simple, sinister offer starts off a general rumor and unraveling of Middle Sister’s life. On the one hand, it is obvious that the sinister Milkman is pursuing her for sexual reasons, even grooming her to become his whore, in spite of the fact that he is married, older, and a paramilitary of high and mighty violence; and on the other hand, the rumor mill starts that she has indeed accepted his offer and become his whore, as though the offer itself was irresistible,  a conclusion that is agreed to by the rumor that  her mother, her mother’s friends, and even the girl gang girlfriends of other paramilitaries have decided to believe about middle sister. To fight this rumor means, however, expressing to other people the facts of the rumor, which might have sinister consequences for, if not middle sister, then maybe-boyfriend, since making it too clear that she is refusing the Milkman would make all too clear what she suspects about the Milkman and his kind, an opinion that is both bound to bring down sexist contempt as well as the suspicion that middle sister is, like her first sister, the one who has fled, an enemy of the community. The social rules here are as complex, and take as much tact, as the rules in a Henry James novel, with the difference that if the community’s way of doing things had been applied by Milly Theale in Wings of the Dove, she would have simply blasted Kate Croy and Merton Densher in the face with a throw-away .38 snub-nose before the end of it.  

The forward flow of the action here is marked, then, by the meetings with the Milkman, meetings that eerily never flesh out the Milkman, who is very fleshly while remaining very shadowy. He does nothing in the book that is more overtly violent than to show up, open his van door, and invite Middle Sister in. Show up again and again in the narrator’s path. Show up again and again in the community’s judgement that she is involved with the Milkman, that she is having sex with the Milkman, that she is the girlfriend of the Milkman, that she is the whore of the Milkman, that she is so connected to the Milkman that it might be dangerous for people to be in line before her at, say, a chip shop, or dangerous to take her money for food, which puts her in situations she so resents that sometimes she wishes she were really the girlfriend of the Milkman and that he would kill these people who think she is the girlfriend of the Milkman. It is enough that somehow, because of his desire for her, she is marked as his in the community’s mind, with all the bad mojo that this transfers to her and her every act. No denial on her part lifts the spell that is never spelled out by anyone, since to actually talk about the killings committed by a presumed renouncer boss in the community is to betray, on some obscure level, the community, and thus bring down on oneself the wrath of the renouncers in their various degrees and forms, who are semi-legitimately defending the community from the murderous soldiers and the murderous friends of the soldiers and the State.   Around each event in going forward in this terrible progress through the somewhat impalpable medium of a community perception that transforms as nothing else does the narrator’s subjective being into a symbolic object determined by others, there arise explanations and side stories that go backwards and forwards in time, all of which abut in or spring forward from various forms of grotesque violence.

2.

Burns has as strong a sense of the grotesque as that which marked Flannery O’Connor’s work, even though they work from different premises towards their conclusions. It is interesting to compare them.

 O’Connor founded her misfit vision on Pauline grounds: we see now, but as in a mirror, darkly.  

Whenever I’m asked why Southern writers particularly have a penchant for writing about freaks, I say it is because we are still able to recognize one. To be able to recognize a freak, you have to have some conception of the whole man, and in the South the general conception of man is still, in the main, theological.

The Christ ravaged and violently racist South of O’Connor’s experience and art, (along with its coeval New South of businesses and Babbitry),  was seen through the lens of her marginality as a Catholic; however, she never doubted that she was part of the whole.

Burns is as conversant with inversion and upside-downness as O’Connor, but she absolutely doubts that there such a thing as a whole man, or that the theological is anything more than a dodge, or that to be a part of a community will ever protect one from being a victim of the community. The fragile aids of literature, friendship, love, and family are not founded in any absolute. Maturity consists in understanding this, but maturity might not help you survive, which has a way of deflating the value of maturity in communities where survival is at a premium.

In her first book, No Bones, the sound track is up very loud and styling, and the names are all there, as are the dates, which are assigned to every chapter, going from 1969, the year of the first riots in Belfast, to 1994, the year of the cease fire. The novel traces, in short story-like chapters, the development of Amelia Lovett, from the time she was nine and collected her first lovely fat black rubber bullets as the British soldiers came to the Ardoyne neighborhood and shot them at rioters to her release from an English mental asylum and her decision to let her numerous dead bury their own dead in the last chapters of the book, a sadly typical trajectory of Irish exile in England. The book is chock-a-block with horrors: the year when Deerhunter made Russian roulette popular among Amelia’s boy classmates; the year her brother Mick and his wife Mena decided to rape Amelia; the year they killed Mick; the year she was actually raped by the Bronagh McCabe, a woman of such a monstrous and fascinating outline that she almost carries away the book. The novel is overwhelming, and, one feels, a little out of control, a debut effort that has so much to get rid of that we can sometimes feel a little left out as readers, as though this were the author’s own cathartic overload, a narrative bulimia.  

Milkman is structured much more carefully, and does without the surrealist touches that blur the dividing line between fantasy and reality in No Bones;  but it is as militantly grotesque. There are scenes in it that I want to tell other people about, the way I like to refer, in my mind, to certain of the scenes in O’Connor’s short stories – the Misfit who kills the Grandmother, the Bible Salesman who runs off with the artificial leg of the secular, spoiled daughter of a good Christian woman, etc. What Yeats called his Circus Animals – star attractions that transcend the scenes in which they have a logical place and point, acquiring an emblematic aura.  When Burns turns to the grotesque, the trigger warnings come out, although they are weak tea when it comes to a place where real triggers are being squeezed without any warning at all. I think one of the central scenes that sums up not only of the community’s troubles in the novel but of the troubles of all the occupied, low intensity warfare places (Baghdad, Beirut, Ferguson Missouri, Belfast) is the mass canicide staged by the state soldiers. Like many things in Burns’ work, the event references a reality: the British army really did engage in a considerable amount of dog-murder, particularly in the Ballymurphy section of Belfast in the early 1970s, when dirty tricks undertaken by the British soldiers and their allies and their spies were at their height. The riff goes on for pages, beginning with a quote from the movie Rear Window from a woman who finds her dog poisoned:

 ‘Which one of you did it? … couldn’t imagine … so low you’d kill a little helpless friendly … only thing in this whole neighbourhood who liked anybody. Did you kill him because he liked you, just because he liked you?’

To the narrator, this explanation seems like the most natural one in the world. Of course, in the movie we find out that the dog’s poisoning is a clue to a murder, but the narrator has, by this time, witnessed dog murder on the mass scale.

As for myself, it seemed to me, at nine years old, that there were so many of these dogs that the district could never have contained the overrun of them, that the soldiers must have bussed in extra, but once the locals started to identify and to claim them, they claimed all of them, every single one. Also to my child eyes, and to those of third brother who was standing beside me, it seemed the heads of all these dogs, amidst this huge stack of dogs, were missing. We thought they’d been beheaded. ‘Mammy! The heads! They took the heads! Where are the heads?’ we cried. ‘Where’s Lassie, mammy? Where’s daddy? Have the brothers found Lassie? Where’s daddy? Where’s Lassie?’ And we tugged at her coat, then third brother began to cry. His crying set me off, then the both of us set off all the other children. Then the last surviving dog began to howl as well. There were many of us that day, many children, and we huddled and clung to our adults. So at first there was the silence, then there was our crying, then, at the sound of our crying, the adults galvanised themselves into action and set their shock aside. They began to deal with the massacre, with the males – young men, older men, renouncers, non-renouncers – beginning to wade through the slimy, pelty mass. They disentangled the heavy sogginess and the swampiness to differentiate one body from another body, passing each through and along the chain to whoever had come to claim it, was waiting for it, to bring it home on go-carts, in prams, in wheelbarrows, in supermarket trolleys or, more often, bundled up as something that used to be alive in their arms.

The slaughtered dogs here are not simply symbols of a breakdown in human ties, but a questioning of whether symbols are enough, of whether, like proper names, at certain moments of violence and terror we simply dispense with them. Whether the old latin tag about “man being wolf to man’ fits for ‘man being wolf to wolves’ and finally for ‘man being wolf to dogs’. Whether, at the end of this deductive labyrinth, we will find any kindness left.

 

3.

In 2010, Carolyn Dean wrote an article about styles of reporting or memorializing atrocity in the 20th century for History and Theory. Entitled Minimalism and Victim Testimony, it detected, in the first post-war generation of memoirs from Holocaust survivors, and historians of the Holocaust, a horror of excess, or emotion. Rather, to bear sufficient witness, one had to avoid all exhibitions of emotion, which would lead to the sort of kitsch that dishonors the victims. The bones of this aesthetic are laid down before the camps, in the great books about World War I, where all the rhetoric of Victorian moralizing seemed inadequate and somewhat criminal when applied to the trenches. 

Minimalism in its varieties is a sophisticated style characterized by aesthetic and emotive restraint. It originated in the 1960s and was most prominent in visual art and sculpture that emphasized the sheer contingency of the art-object by reducing it to “what you see.” Eventually minimalism simply described any aesthetic form marked by anti-sentimental austerity, and it is this now generic usage of the term to which I refer. Minimalist narratives resist hyperbole in order to avoid the potential conversion of suffering into kitsch, voyeurism, or sublimity by following a dictum the writer W. G. Sebald attributes to Walter Benjamin: “I think Benjamin at one point says that there is no point in exaggerating the already horrific.” Even when not explicitly minimalist, some of the most nuanced Holocaust representation is anti-sentimental, refusing affective identification in order to undermine the restoration of the wholeness or “feel-good” qualities of redemptive narratives that often encourage sentimental over-identification with victims or the narcissistic appropriation of their experience. Experimental efforts by writers such as Charlotte Delbo and Aharon Appelfeld stress silence and use various devices to undercut affective over-identifications with victims. Delbo, for example, uses a lyrical but graphic account of the ever-incomplete effort to wash herself in Auschwitz, a passage whose elegance distances the reader sufficiently to render her experience imaginable and yet unsettling.

The minimalist style in testimony, as Dean also observes, has now become itself a historical object, one subject to criticism. Why, after all, is kitsch, the creation of emotional effects that are disproportionate  to the quality of the representation, so much to be feared, when one of the casualties of atrocity is a full emotional response? As the stock of our atrocities accumulate, they seem to count against the results of emotional restraint as a stylistic choice, and the prestige of minimalism has declined to the point where it is not even, sometimes, recognized by the contemporary reader, who confuses it with minimalization. This is unfair, a judgment doled out by an ignorant posterity – but containing some grain of truth, perhaps, in as much as the minimalist response refuses to consider its own stylization. Burns approach to her subject matter, her embrace of a grotesque aesthetic even as she plays with identity-transforming language, shows that the dualism between minimalism and, for lack of a better word, melodrama now seems like a false narrowing of options. There are many lessons one can take from Milkman, all of them dark. As a novelist, however, she does show us one thing: there are more detours to get us to the heart of darkness than are dreamt of by realists, or by holders-of-the-line. And most likely we will have to go down all of them if we dream of “redeeming” the victim without endlessly recycling punishment and reprisal until climate change does us part.

Thursday, March 06, 2025

Mussolini's rhetoric, Trump's threat

 

In 1963, Jean-Pierre Faye (who latter became known for his reading of the fascist unconscious in Heidegger), published an article that extended the front, so to speak, of Cold War politics. Entitled Totalitarian Language, Fascist and Nazi, Faye tried to turn the discourse of totalitarianism, heavily influenced in that period by Arendt, in a historicist direction.

The assumption, in 1963, was that “totalitarian” was always a denigrating term. It came, so to speak, outside of totalitarian ensembles, and illuminated them critically. This was the liberal dogma.

But Faye found this move historically false. As he shows, the term did not originate outside of fascism as a term of critique, but rather inside it.

In fact, in Italy, as he puts it in a sidenote, totalitaria originated in commerce as a term to describe representatives of stockholders at business meetings. The 100 percent of stockholders were the totalitaria represented. In the political context, however, it appears first in a speech Mussolini gave at the Theater of Augustus in Rome on June 22, 1925, addressing the delegates of the Partito Nazionale Fascist. In Faye’s account, the discourse, as reported in the papers (with some variants) contained a key phrase: “what is called our ferocious totalitarian Will will be pursued with ever more ferocity!”

I should point out that, in what I call fascitude, the appropriation of fascist rhetoric and gestures, Mussolini’s speeches have definitely been culled by the speechwriters and consultants around Trump and Vance.  Trump has gone from the Vegas ratpack rhetoric of his campaign in 2016 to the dull thump thump thump that propels his aging masculinist oratory of today. His speeches now combine program and threat, in which the program exists, ultimately, only to carry out the threat: it is the death-drive as political legitimation, and it goes down like honey in the era best represented by a thousand zombie apocalypse films.

But I digress.

Faye points to the reception of the speech. Le Popolo d’Italia of June 23 explained to its readers that “fascism will take up once again the march of Revolution, deciding upon the full, totalitarian and inexhorable conquest of all the powers and organs of the State.” In the even more fascist Idea nazionale, a phrase is used that Faye underlines: “la stressa affirmazine totalitarian” – which is “an affirmation that is a passion and faith before it is a political proposition.” The IN goes on to explain why this is incomprehensible to the centrists even more than it is to the socialists or people on the left: “because our adversaries – not the socialists, but the demo-liberals – are, as a result of their whole mentality, disposed not to be [in] themselves, but to welcome the words of the other, even if the word is destruction, as it is with the socialists.”

The question that keeps being asked today is whether Trump is a fascist. I don’t know – but I do know the centrist response to Trump is classically  ineffectual centrism, a legalistic mindset that can’t comprehend that a whole policy can be animated simply in order to carry out a threat. The threat, in other words, is the social psychological motive – the program is the afterthought. By this logic, ferocious totalitarianism, or Trump’s “swift and unrelenting” approach amount to the same kind of political formation.

TBC

Tuesday, March 04, 2025

Notes of an old cis- white man on identity and projection

 

                         


                                                       1

Benjamin, during the period in which he was working on Baroque Drama, jotted down some observations about identity and philosophy. “The principle of identity is expressed “a is a”, not “a remains a”. It does not express the equality of two spatially or temporally different stages of a. But also, it cannot express the identity in general of a spatial or temporal thing, then every such identification would presuppose identity. The ‘a’ whose identity is expressed in the relation of identity is thus something beyond space and time.” (GW VI 28)

Locke tried to make the transition from “is” to “remains” without an appeal to substance. In doing so, he released the power of identification – and the enigma of the process of identification. In a sense, Locke not only provides us with a code to the ideology of early capitalism, but also, unwittingly, with the dialectic that undermines it.

As Pierre Force has noted, Rousseau, in The Second Discourse, devises a new use for the term, identity – he makes it into a process of projection, and thus is the first to use  “identification” in the psychological sense that became part of the ordinary language of the second half of the twentieth century.

 

“Even should it be true that commiseration is only a feeling that puts us in the

position of him who suffers – a feeling that is obscure and lively in Savage man,

developed but weak in Civilized man – what would this idea matter to the truth

of what I say, except to give it more force? In fact, commiseration will be all the

more energetic as the Observing animal identifies himself more intimately with

the suffering animal. Now it is evident that this identification must have been

infinitely closer in the state of Nature than in the state of reasoning.”

 

The issue of personal identity travels to France by way of Locke’s translators and readers – such as Condillac. But Rousseau’s idea of an identifying self is a definite marker, an intersigne on the way to understanding character under capitalism. That is, to understanding how character can unfold itself in seemingly disparate semantic segments to occupy a certain space of symbols and capacities in those societies that we name by using a temporal adjective as a noun for a condition – modern – as if the modern had been hived off a world clock and existed in a new framework altogether. Personal identity is not only consistent with the Lockian principles of property and self-interest, but also with the kind of identification that, as Rousseau saw, makes the discourse of self-interest, in a sense, impossible. Rousseau’s discovery is made in spite of Locke, but we can see it working its way through that English plain prose as he comes to terms with the seemingly esoteric problems posed by imagining metempsychosis.  Just as selfishness can become an acid that so dissolves the self that one is left with an absolute Berkeleyian idealism, personal identity inevitably begins to pose the problem of the maker of persons, the cause, the projector. When the critics of modernity, operating under the unconscious conviction that they live in the modern, face this bifurcation, they tend to make a temporal move – to place those schemas of identification under the rubric of the pre-modern, as though the pre-modern was some head on, self evident phase before the modern – rather than the product of the later. But I propose that viewing the pre-modern as something generated within modernity, and not as a byproduct but as a shadow and double, an emergent and undeniable force in the matrix. 

2.

"Art of Projection (Projektionskunst) – the exhibition of a proportional extended visible image, which with the help of a magic lantern or of recent projection instruments is thrown as the magnification of certain objects on a white surface" - Meyer’s Conversation Lexicon of 1908


“We get behind the demons, as it were, when we recognize them as projections of hostile feelings, which the survivors cherish against the dead.”

“The process completes itself rather through a particular psychic mechanism, that we are used to calling “projection” in psychoanalysis. The hostility, of which one knows nothing and wants to know nothing, has been thrown out of the inner sphere of perceptions [inneren Wharnehmung] into the outer world, by which one releases its from one’s own person and shoves it off on another person. Not we, the survivors, are glad that we are free of the dead one; no, we mourn him, but he has, curiously enough, become an evil demon, to whom our bad luck is pleasing, and who seeks to bring us into the realm of death. The survivors must now defend themselves against the evil fiend…” – Freud (my translation)


Oh the monsters! Under the opera. Under the pornographic novel. Under the constitutions. And under the monsters, the great grind of life in the old order, on the great estates – taxes and labor duties without end in Hungary, Moldavia, Wallachia, Poland… Slavery in Santo Domingo., famine in Bengal…

Freud takes the term from Bleuler, seizes it in a leonine pounce. For here, on the surface, in the shimmer of everyday life of verbal slips, infantile dirty jokes, the herky jerky motion of trams, office politics and thick, thick drapes, here it is that you find the denials, the “I hate to say this”, the “I don’t mean to criticize” – the I don’t mean in general. The demiurge unconscious stirs. Is it awake or asleep?

For Freud, the demons are a projection-creation, and projection itself is the expression of ambivalence. Here, of course, everything seems clear. Locke’s blank sheet of the mind – that white surface - has now been extruded – a screen - as part of a technical process in which images are thrown against it and exaggerated in size. And if we were living in a world that was simply determined, this would suffice. But we are, always, living in a world that has been overdetermined.

For in that world (and aren’t we working in Nemesis’ wake?) the living live with each other in a whisper of suppressed desires, hostilities, purposes, and purposive inattentions – knowing or suspecting what we claim we never knew or suspected, each about each. While one aspect of projection involves transmuting the satisfaction that one has survived the dead and their hostility, another aspect involves the denial that the formerly living loved one had definite moments of hostility, or definite moments of the wrong kind of love. Those evil eye fugues.

And what do we know about other people anyway? Freud notes that projection, in the narrow psychoanalytic sense, is part of a greater system of projection.

“The Projection of unconscious hostility by the tabu of the dead on the demons is only a single example out of a series of processes, to which must be attributed the greatest influence on the shaping of primitive spiritual life. In the above mentioned cases, projection serves to close a conflict of feelings; it finds a natural application in a number of psychological situations that lead to neurosis. But projection is not created as an instrument of defence, it also comes into play, where there is no conflict. The projection of inner perceptions (Wahrnehmungen) to the outside is a primitive mechanism that, for instance, also underlies our sense perceptions – and that thus, in the normal course of things, has the greates part in the shaping of our outer world. Under not yet satisfactorily fixed conditions, our inner perceptions of feeling and thought processes become sense perceptions projected outside, applied to the shaping of the outer world, while supposedly remaining in the inner world. This may hang together, genetically, with the fact that the function of attention originally was not turned to the inner world, but instead to the stream of stimuli from the outer world, and of endopsychic processes received only reports about the developments of pleasure and pain. Only with the development (Ausbildung) of an abstract thought language, through the tying together of the sense remnants of word ideas with inner processes, did these themselves become perceptible.”

The trope of the abstract being taken from, projecting, the material – that place where we begin the white mythology – is transformed, here, into a relation of the outer and the inner. Although the inner, Freud carefully notes, isn’t some counterprojection of the outer. If it becomes perceptible, it was operating before the moment of perceptibility.

3.

I was first made aware of my identity as a cis white man at some point in my fifties. Cis-, that transforming prefix, was, until this point, not something I had been called, or had called another.

The cis identity is a curious one. It is late to the identity table – identity by assignment of sex at birth was never a part of the identikit when I was born in 1957. And yet, isn’t the cis identity – the white male cis identity – the blank against which all identities define themselves in the present moment? The white  male cis has played a fundamental historical role: enslaver, colonizer, oppressor, capitalist roader. You don’t have to look back too far – in fact, you don’t have to look back at all. The men’s room that runs the U.S. at the moment, in all its shitty ignobility, is a caricature of the type.

And so: is this my identity? Or is this projection?

When I look at this as the identity that I can’t escape – when I look at it historically, not existentially  – I see a type that, at one time, was defined by two utopias – the one, an international of labor solidarity, and the other, an avant garde that dreamed of abolishing the dominant identities and identity itself, using as its tools critique and transgression. Those utopias are in bad shape today – the former the victim of neoliberalism and the latter ossified, by academia’s absorption of the avant-garde, into routines of griping.

Yet I don’t feel, somehow, existentially burdened by all this. I’m still the happy go lucky, Casper-the-ghost colored graphomaniac buzzing my way deathward and singing a happy song.

Identity? Projection? Identity as projection, projection from an identity, exteriority as a plot of interiority: anxieties that dog us on the path to the good, the true, and the beautiful. But I’m still of the opinion that this is the Dao, the path of all cis- trans- and bird and beast and flower, in spite of present circs.

Monday, March 03, 2025

Old Possum's idea of Order in London, 1919

 


In the positive sciences, the natural order (of chemicals, of physics, of life) is coordinate with and dependent upon certain principles or laws. The periodic table is a good example of something that might seem, at first, arbitrary – the existence of certain elements – but that can be arranged by reference to their increasing atomic number. Thus, one can find, looking at the atomic numbers, a gap, and that gap can actually be filled in.

But how is order, in this sense, to be transposed to literature?

T.S. Eliot, in a very famous passage from his essay, Tradition and the individual talent, imposed an order that lacks this underlying principle:

“The existing monuments form an ideal order among themselves, which is modified by the introduction of the new (the really new) work of art among them. The existing order is complete before the new work arrives; for order to persist after the supervention of novelty, the whole existing order must be, if ever so slightly, altered; and so the relations, proportions, values of each work of art toward the whole are readjusted; and this is conformity between the old and the new. Whoever has approved this idea of order, of the form of European, of English literature will not find it preposterous that the past should be altered by the present as much tradition and the individual talent as the present is directed by the past. And the poet who is aware of this will be aware of great difficulties and responsibilities.”

His search for the underlying principle led him, perhaps, to Anglican Christianity, or more broadly, to reverence. I might even agree with reverence and literature being connected by a sort of capillary network, but I am not reverent enough, perhaps, to see how this works.

I cannot put poems or fiction or essays together and see a gap and predict the way it will be filled – as the chemist can do with the periodic table. This is the positivist image that is affirmed, ever so gently, in finding the new work “supervening” on the persisting order.

One might say, then: the natural order is not the only viable example of “order”. One might also ask: what kind of order do the “monuments” of literature form? Does it look like a library? Is the order of literature no more than the LOC numbering system? Or are we simply dissolving the term ”order” into the concept of “system”?

I think Eliot is clearly not doing this. I think he would like the order to display literary value; to be, in fact, a kind of hierarchical social order. Yet such orders are imperfect models for literature – precisely because the literary text is “new”, and comes from an uncertain “family”.

In an essay on Curtius (who translated the Wasteland into German) and Eliot, Claus Uhlig speaks of Eliot’s “theoretical belief in the simultaneous interpenetration of times”, which is expressed not only in his 1919 essay but in the Four Quartets, where beginnings and ends are simultaneous – from a point of view that takes resurrection to be central to our temporal orientation to eternity.

“Tradition is a matter of much wider significance. It cannot be inherited, and if you want it you must obtain it by great labour. It involves, in the first place, the historical sense, which we may call nearly indispensable to anyone who would continue to be a poet beyond his twenty-fifth year; and the historical sense involves a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence; the historical sense compels a man to write not merely with his own generation in his bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe from Homer and within it the whole of the literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order.”

The idea of the “simultaneous order” – an order charged by the consciousness of order – is very much of the age of newspaper, radio and the movies. I do not think Eliot referred to Gabriel Tarde in his prose – but Tarde, in the 1890s, was very interested, from a philosophical/sociological point of view, in how simultaneities are formed. In Opinion and Crowds, which was published in the Revue des Deux Mondes in 1901, Tarde wrote:

“When we submit, all unawares, to that invisible contagion of the public of which we form a part, we tend to explain it by the simple prestige of actuality. If today’s newspaper interests us to this point, it is because it only tells us the latest facts, and it would be the proximity of those facts, and not at all the simultaneity of their knowledge by us and others that impassions us by the report. But analyse this sensation of actuality that is so strange, the growing passion for which is one of the refined circumstances of civilized life. What is reputed to be the “news”: is it only what is taking place? No, it is everything that inspires a general interest in current events, even if it is an old fact. Everything about Napoleon has been in the news these last few years; everything fashionable is news.”

Eliot would probably have recoiled at the word fashionable; still, this idea of the simultaneous order seems cousin to what Tarde calls “public opinion” – a nineteenth century phrase, much as literature became, after de Stael’s essay, a way of talking about a vast collection of texts.

Tarde’s notion of a faculty of imitation at the heart of sociability – at the heart of all sociability, whether human or animal, whether of Greeks or of Honeybees – makes a move that is rather hidden in Eliot’s notion of order – that is, it describes the dynamic axis of order. One notices that order in Eliot’s early criticism is both the object of the critic’s work and is immanent in any literary product. These are otherwise two different domains. As an observation about culture, this confusion of domains creates large contradictions, but as a program for work, it creates a certain spirit in which the most radical work can go on.

This was a very fruitful idea for Eliot the poet – out of this idea, he derived the courage to write The Waste Land. And though, of course, the Waste Land quotes the great works, it weaves into those great works a cinematic montage technique, borrowing effects and rhythms from vaudeville, popular music, and nonsense poetry that makes the approach to the Waste Land from the “great works” a dead end – which, in one of the Possum’s more po-faced moves, he then blessed by giving us all a crossword puzzle of footnotes.

“How unpleasant to meet Mr. Eliot/ with his clothes of clerical cut”- in the guise of Dr. Jekyll. Meanwhile, his Mr. Hyde side was busy writing Sweeney Agonistes.

An important use of Eliot’s notion of order as a program, a method of working, crops up at about the same time as the essay on Tradition and the Individual Talent in Eliot’s essay, Ulysses, Order and Myth.

Someday I need to do a brief piece about the way in which Joyce was received by a number of writers – Katherine Mansfield and Virginia Woolf, for instance, both thumbs down, Djuna Barnes, thumbs up, Eliot and Pound and Lewis, etc. Joyce’s work as allergen/Gift.

Eliot states his case right away: “I hold this book to be the most important expression which the present age has found; it is a book to which we are all indebted, and from which none of us can escape.” Although I’m not a great fan of something as ambiguous as “the present age” being given an action to perform, I am all for Eliot’s sense. I too think Ulysses is inescapable. It is the minor, the incorrigibly philistine element in contemporary English writers like Martin Amis that bridles at Ulysses still. Sad for them.

Eliot’s essay, which appeared in the Dial, was, in part, a response to Richard Aldington’s dissing of Ulysses. Eliot is struck by Joyce’s taking up of the Odyssey as a sort of platform for his work, which seems entirely to skip over the very title of Balzac’s Human Comedy (hint hint). So much is in the Dr. Jekyll vein. But the Mr Hyde comes out at the end of this brief note on order as a method of organizing perception:

"It is a method for which the horoscope is auspicious. Psychology (such as it is, and whether our reaction to it be comic or serious), ethnology, and The Golden Bough have concurred to make possible what was impossible even a few years ago. Instead of narrative method, we may now use the mythical method. It is, I seriously believe, a step toward making the modern world possible for art, toward that order and form which Mr. Aldington so earnestly desires.""

Here we have the knot that ties together the clerical cut of the critic’s use of the term “order” (which Eliot pursued, followed by other pursuers, into the institutionalization of English in the academia) and the artist, that representative of the present age, that Mr. Hyde, also used (even in the lines of the Four Quartets and especially in Eliot’s drama). The Dr. Jekyll mode is aristocratic, but Hyde is demotic, newspaper driven and democratic to the end of his fingertips.

Friday, February 28, 2025

Guillevic: Cats

 Guillevic is rarely if ever compared to Marianne Moore. Moore collages, she is fascinated with the vast world of print, and thus her observations have that referential echo, always. Guillevic seems, on the contrary, to want his poem to be the first ever appearance of these words in this order on the page. Yet both look at objects and especially at animals and see a certain objective self-referentiality, that supposedly only human trait. The pathetic fallacy depends, of course, on picking on homo sapiens as the only thing with an organ that works out the wonder of the self, and thus the self’s reflection of the self, infinite vanity and embarrassment. But what if the pathetic fallacy is just this anthropo gigantism?

Guillevic has been translated into English by giants – Denise Levertov, Donald Justice, Seamus Heany. But if a wee little Facebook citizen is going to be scared of giants, he might as well just post cat pics and be done with it, infinitely. So, I’m thinking I’ll translate Guillevic’s Cats, which comes from the Mammifere collection from 1981. There is also Rats.
The cat looks
Blinded by its look.
*
Lights
Don’t wet
The cat.
He splashes enough
On himself.
*
The cat secretes silence,
Rejects those who soil
This netting
into their charivari
*
The trainer
Of oceans
According to his stare.
*
The cat is not
Without a semaphore.
He has his tail.
*
The cat
Rarely weeps.
He tries on a smile
From time to time.
*
This shusher
One could say
Sometimes
Likes to hear a conversation.
*
For certain people
The cat
Is sent against them
By the shadow.
*
Almost all cats
Seem satisfied
By their heritage.
*
The cat
Sits on the table
As if he had
Won for all times.
*
Only he is literate
In the quartz watch.
*
The cat
Doesn’t hurl himself against the laws
But gets around them.
*
The cat is not among those
Who like to be petted.
It pleases him
That you want to.
*
As if there were nothing
And suddenly a great flame
The explosion.
*
The universe
Of the cat.
The other universe.
*
The cat doesn’t care
To show his math
Save
To those who proclaim
The depths
Of his look.
*
The cat knows nothing
Of all the stuff
In the dictionaries.
But knows something
About what they are missing.
*
From what prehistoric era
Does the cat get his taste
For fish?
And what is the story
Of his need
For mice?
*
The glory
Of trapping a bird
In the city
Without leaving the apartment.
*
The cat
Traps the mice
To make himself a game
Of prolonged torture.
*
This cat
Does not bow
Except before the meals
Of an oriental prince.
*
The cat
Can’t be put to guard or spy
For others.
*
One does what one can
Says the popular wisdom.
Him, he can’t do much.
He reigns.
*
He is like that
Because he is
A cat.
Completely cat.
*
Go away my cat!
This possessive
Only engages me.
*
Funny how mystery
Is calming
When it presents
Day after day
By silence.
*
Escaped
From the cosmic shipwreck,
The cat
Licks itself.

Tomorrow the struggle! Notes on Rome

 

« Ther mafia is an invention of the communists » - Marcello Dell’Utri, senior advisor to Sergio Berlusconi. From Wikipedia: “Formerly a member of the Italian Parliament from 1996 to 2013 and of the European Parliament from 1999 to 2004, Dell'Utri was found guilty of tax fraudfalse accounting, and complicity in conspiracy with the Sicilian Mafia, also known as Cosa Nostra; the conviction for the last charge was upheld on 9 May 2014 by the Supreme Court of Cassation, the highest judicial court in Italy, which sentenced Dell'Utri to seven years in prison.”

Going to an Italy ruled by the fascist party seems timely. The last time I was in Rome (oh, I think I am so cooool to write “the last time I was in Rome”, like I’m a cosmopolitan diva) was in the buttend of the Berlusconi era, 2011. At that time, the air of neglect was over everything. I was shocked – Paris, whatever its vices, has been a well governed city in terms of the basics. Berlusconi’s associates notoriously pocketed public money, and the far right schtick, then as now, was to “cut” government entitlements – which is another term for rerouted state money to the wealthiest.

Berlusconi deserves a look now, especially, since the form of far-right policies and far-reaching corruption seems to have glommed onto Uncle Sam like some horrible poisonous squid. Berlusconi’s money, which channeled Mafia money, was the result of plummy real estate deals, sports and entertainment. Media – tv being freed from State constraint, which had forced a sad population to watch Soviet art cinema before, now could show an abundance of tits. But this turned out not to be the utopia that the wankers had been looking forward to, as the financial system in the EU imploded.

Italy was a lab for cold war malfeasance and neo-lib corruption after the fall of the Wall. Italy is our Id – and where the Id goes, the US follows.



Rome, it must be said, is full of projects. Our friends said the Catholic church had ponied up for some road repair. The shops and restaurants seemed to be booming. Neglect had been left behind, or at least a bit behind. Two weeks before we came to Rome, on the street where we were staying, a landslide had tossed a dozen apartment buildings in the street.

Same as it ever was, I suppose you could say. The residences in this part of Trastevere are, by the look of them, the products of the seventies and eighties – a time when cutting corners and constructing in areas that have been approved of by thoroughly bribed officials was the rule. Corruption haunts the homeowner, even if he has long forgotten his unfortunate coup de coeur for this or that fascist politico.

For our jaunt – five days – I took along Simonetta Greggio’s book Les Nouveaux monstres, which is the successor of Dolce Vita – both of them novels that combine telenovela plots (aristocratic decadents, mysterious priests) with an encyclopedia of Italian scandals. What better way to learn history than to peak at it between orgies and the impossibly beautiful romances of impossibly beautiful heiresses? Greggio was born in Padua, but writes in French. I am surprised that no enterprising editor has not had her books translated – this is beach lit with footnotes, and I’m here to say: what better thing to read on a train or airplane?

 

The New Monsters takes the story out of the heady years of lead into the dissolution of the Communist party and the triumph of anti-communism – which is, and was always going to be, the triumph of the most anti-communist, ie the fascists and the ultra-right. The Italian part of that history is a gaudy preview of coming attractions.

But I am not one who thinks the preview means that the coming attractions will actually arrive. I’m more optimistic than that. Rome, with its weather, food, and ordinary life, made me feel renewed. En avant!

from the ancien regime to hemingway

  In the Revue Critique of May 23, 1921, there was a brief notice about the death of Comte Greppi at Milan. He was more than one hundred yea...