From Will to Control

 

 

 

In the early nineteenth century, there was a great romantic fashion for the  “will” in the moral, or ideological sphere. The will seemed like a way out of the dry materialism and sensualism of the 18th century philosophes.Conveniently, it also had a hero – Napoleon.

However, a curious thing happened as the century went by.  In the sphere of psychology, the will gradually lost any status it had as a psychological object. In the old rational psychology, it was one of the faculties of the intellect. But as psychologists began to measure things, experiment, and consider psychology as an adjunct of the entire biological system, it became clear that the will was a superfluous entity. I raise my arm, and by no train of introspection, and by no degree on  any measuring device, is there an intermediate moment where I will to raise my arm.

At the end of the century, two philosophers – Nietzsche and William James – both took these findings at face value. Nietzsche took the absence of any psychological entity called the will to mock the notion of both those who argued for the free will and those who argued for determinism, in as much as the latter still used this archaic psychological devise. James, with his own sly Yankee wit, also went through the introspective stages that make us see that the will is a conjuring trick.

Yet these two philosophers are associated with the will – the will to power and the will to belief. How did they reconcile these moral insights with their psychological ones? Well, in Nietzsche’s case, the will moved outside the psyche. The psyche, in fact, becomes a manifestation of a will that is unanchored to a self at all. James, on the other hand, creeps close to the admission that the will, being a good thing to believe in, is acceptable at least in moral terms.  In other words, both take the will as a supreme fiction.

In the twentieth century, in the psychological sphere, the will was replaced by a cybernetic model of the psyche, one that emphasized control and coordination. The old questions surrounding the will were simply no longer relevant. This image not only provides psychology with its paradigm – it penetrated, to an extent, into the public consciousness. Into, that is, our moral speech. It is impossible to imagine Jane Austin characters speaking about being out of control or in control. They wouldn’t say it, and they wouldn’t understand it if it was said to them. But this has become a reliable part of ordinary speech for those in the twentieth and twenty first century.

However, it is a part of speech that is not entirely coherent with the will ideology, which still exists, and which still influences the way we speak of ourselves and of the polis. It is easy to see why. We all have the experience of doing things we don’t want to do. I have work to do and it is late, but instead of going to bed, I do the work. And the moment of doing something that is not immediately desirable – over something that is immediately desireable – gives me the impression that I will myself to do this over my circumstances. It is easy to think of a computer – say Hal in 2001 – doing what it “wants” to do. But it is much more difficult thinking of it in a will situation – doing what it doesn’t want to do.

This concept in the moral sphere is, I think, slowly changing. It isn’t rare for a driver, or a computer user, to speak of a machine ‘not wanting’ to do something. Being ‘coaxed” into doing something. Of course, at the bottom of this are the lines of routine that one imagines define the machine – are the machine in the machine, so to speak. There’s no ghost in there.  All I’m saying is that the dialectic between the moral image and the cognitive image might well produce an inflection decisively away from the will.

Control without will, control without purpose – artificial unintelligence in a nutshell.

the metaphysics of the address

 

In the tale of Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves, the thieves from the cave that Ali Baba steals from send a spy into the city to discover who the robber was and where he lives. By a clever device, the spy finds Ali Baba’s house and leaves a mark on it. Ali Baba, however, employs a clever maid, Marjaneh, who discovers the mark and, suspecting some skullduggery, takes a piece of chalk and marks other houses, thus bedeviling the band of thieves when they come to town.  This happens a couple of times until the robber captain comes to town and, instead of marking the house, “examined and observed it so carefully” that it was impossible for him to mistake it.
As we know, the clever Marjaneh will thwart the thief captain at every turn. The story has another meaning, however, in Anton Tantner’s Die Hausnummer: Eine Geschichte von Ordnung und Unordnung – The house number: a history of order and disorder: here it throws a light into the premodern era of the city, where direction did not depend on addresses or housenumbers, but on acquaintance, appearance and landmarks, much the same way fishing craft navigated a shore.
Tantner’s book, along with Deidre Mask’s The Address Book, which features a chapter on him, are on the bookshelves of all right thinking address-freaks.   Tantner is faithful to the Foucaultian creed of genealogy – there is no one source for these affordances of contemporary life. The housenumber appears sometimes in early modernity as a sort of score for the height of a house, sometimes an inventory number for the house as property, and only in the 18^th century as a direction mark, a reference.  In  Vienna, where Tratner lives, the address was discussed by the town council in 1754, where it was touted as a guide that would help police find the “disreputable and the dangerous” – but it was voted down. The council feared popular unrest. The populace that was considered disreputable and dangerous by those in power knew exactly what the address was all about.
Ali Baba’s story itself was likely written in the 18^th century by Antoine Galland, the translator of the One Thousand and one nights, who might have heard a core story somewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean. After Galland created the Ali Baba story and his translation became famous, the story was fed back, one might say, to its source, and Ali Baba reappears in collections of these tales in India and Egypt.
Galland died at an auberge, the Cerceau D’or, on the corner of Rue des Sept Voies and Rue des Chiens, on February 17, 1715. The auberge had no address, literally: the Rue des Sept Voies was renamed Rue Valette in the 19^th century, which is when a wing of the Bibliotheque Saint Genevieve was built there, obliterating Rue des Chiens. One biographer, describing the auberge, writes that it was on the left or the even-numbered side of the street – a necessary anachronism for us, who come after the Chief Thief in Ali Baba’s tale.
The address system in the 18^th century was the object of many a speculator’s reflections. Among others, Choderlos De Laclos (the author of Dangerous Liaisons) published a scheme for numbering the houses in Paris. But the turning point was, naturally, the municipal code published under Napoleon. Before, house numbers had been considered as a substitute for house signs. But the 1805 code treated addresses with regard to both to the system of streets and the places on the street – places that could contain a house, or a shop, or various hotels, courtyards, apartments, etc. In this way, it made navigation easier and the place less personal – or less, shall we say, feudal.
By such strokes the old family patterns were broken. By such strokes it was possible to find, tax and raid the inhabitant.  
However, the drama of the address does not end there. Even now, the idea of distributing an address on the internet can cause an upset. Doxxing has become part of our vocabulary. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the great doxx-ers were the newspapers.  The bread and butter policing story – the theft, the murder, the assault, etc. –  included addresses. When a rich man or woman died, where they died and even how much the property was worth was part of the story. The address, to me, has a siren power – I think of them as calling out, in their own sonic language, to their own communities. It strikes me that it is no coincidence that the abolished auberge where Galland died was possibly the same auberge, under a different name, that three hundred years before welcomed Erasmus when he came to Paris. And I think of what Borges might have made of the historical fact that a famous library, much visited by foreign students, is figuratively built on top of the death bed of the translator of the One Thousand and One nights – one of whose nights, at least, was written by him from errant memories of a story muttered by an old Turkish dervish.
 
 
 
 
 

chatter in the moral vacuum - Gaza and us

 The whole discussion of whether Trump or Biden will be "worse for Palestinians", mounted by privileged Americans who have not lost their legs to a U.S. supplied bomb, or all of their children, or all of their children and their sister's children and their brother's children

It shows zero empathy, zero heart, zero hesitation, in the face of moral atrocity, to chatter. Twittering the concentration camp - this is a sort of moral insantity.

As well, it shows an absense of any sense that Middle Eastern things spill into the "West". It will be a miracle if there isn't a "terrorist" attack before Nov. 6. And I am sure the death and destruction will be met with the chatter-point: it would be worse under Trump.

It is worse and worse now. The least we owe to the child with the amputated leg, the homeless family, the starving street, camp, city, is to feel something for them. Once that human bond is erased, chatter fills the void. It is a symptom of the only disconnect of the connected society.

Gaza will matter more and more: remembering against the current of idiocy

 Another day, another headline on Al Jazeera - "Israel’s war on Gaza live: Overnight air attacks kill 11 in the enclave" and another NYT turning a blind eye, no headline whatsoever. Imagine the headlines if Russia attacked a hospital in Kyev.

The media in the US is not only not doing its job by, well, reporting. It is also failing its job of alerting. It is as if everything we have learned about the Middle East over the twenty years has been poured into the memory hole. To think that, by the election in November, with 60 000 Gaza dead to gaze at, there will be no response by paramilitaries and "terrorists" from the Middle East is crazy. We've all seen this before - for instance, Francois Hollande sending French planes to bomb DAECH sites as if we lived in 1900, and DAECH inspired men can't find guns and entry into the Eurosphere.

How did that turn out?

Are we doomed to another round of this idiocy? The end game of neo-colonialism is being staged as a series of bloody massacres modeled on Whak-a-Mole, and the intelligentsia is more involved with figuring out who Prince William is cheating with than a mass murder that has everything to do with the end of the world order as we know it. But those outside of Gaza think that if they are silent enough, everything will turn out to be fine. Ifnoring the consequences of, say, cutting off a food supply to a small area with two million people for two weeks, three weeks, for weeks won't lead to anything... unsightly.

The future is unfolding before us.

The clock is ticking: murder and re-murder in Gaza

 I am generally hoping for a Democratic party victory in the House and Senate, but I am passing on voting for Biden. There are 31,000 corpses and counting that count against him. Whatever happens in November, we are set for that body count to soar to 60, 80 or more, and if, as now seems likely, the U.S. does nothing to stop the attack on Rafah, we might get a Palestine-rein Gaza by Christmas. Meanwhile, on of the Ministers of Fuck-all in Netanyahu's Cabient is distributing 100,000 guns to settlers in the West Bank.

Joseph Roth, in Paris and dying in 1939, corresponded with his friend Stefan Zweig about the leader of the Zionist movement, Chaim Weizmann. Roth saw in Zionism the same blind natinalism and racism as he saw in Germany. Roth, who wrote a great book about Eastern European Jews - and was one himself - defended the view that that the bestiality of Hitlerism was in its attack on humanity itself, under which the attack on Jews should be judged: "If I am, as well, concerned to protect the Jews, it is only in so far as they constitute the the most directly threatened avant-garde of humanity."

Roth was a man who went from the Left to the Right, from sympathy for the Russian revolution to nostalgia for the Austro-Hungarian empire. He is no sure guide to politics. But I think he expresses something very true here: we honor in every murdered person the image of humanity murdered. Six million or more Jews worked to death, gassed, tortured and otherwise extinguished by the Nazis were each of them a victim of a crime, and that individuality gets rather blurred by the easy use of the term genocide. Justice, at the extremes, is either a form of mourning or it is nothing. And if we murder in turn to "revenge" that person, we take a heavy risk - the risk of defiling that person's memory with the blood we pile upon it.

Hamas, on October 9, murdered 1200 some people. Netanyahu's government, since October 9, have re-murdered these people by murdering 30000 others, making a blood sacrifice that will forever stain those who did it and those who abetted it. We are at the beginning of the starvation and the murders of thousands in Rafah. Those who pretend the U.S. is helpless here are fooling themselves. Worse - I don't think they have any concern with yesterday's victims if they are brown, or Islamic. Meanwhile, the people under the various U.S. allied Middle Eastern dictatorships stew. The clock is ticking.

The query letter gag: an American tale

 

The “sell your novel tool-kit.” The “How to write Irresistable Query Letters”. The “50 Successful Query Letters”.

The flourishing subgenre of advice books for writers is flourishing. It is flourishing way out of sight of literary scholars, even those, like Mark McGurl, who have noticed that this is the Amazon era in his book, Everything and Less.

I have a difficult relationship, an impassioned relationship, a nightmare relationship with the query letter. I feel about it much as Romeo and Juliet felt about arranged marriages – I want to eliminate the middle man, the annoying and deadly dud and dummy that gets in the way between my hot little texts and the functionaries of magazines, newspapers and publishing houses.

At the moment, I am arranging six of my real unreal stories in a book form, and pondering sending them out to some small press. It is migraine work – and like a migraine, it is an obsessive pain.

As a therapy, I have thought about the query letter as a historic artifact. One that somehow emerged, in early capitalism, from the wreck of the patronage system. At one time, among the Atlantic hopping bourgeoisie, there was such a thing as a letter of introduction. The spritely Yankee, released into the Old World, would be supplied with them. The young English earl’s son would have them in his trunk as he crossed the Channel and hazarded the Continent.

This is the distant genealogy, no doubt, of the query letter. Myself, I would begin such a genealogy in America with the year 1920 and the founding of the magazine, Successful Writing, in the most ur-Midwestern of towns, Cincinnati, Ohio. In 1921, it changed to “Writer’s Digest”. The 1920s were in many ways a jump-scare decade – the jump was into a mass consumer society unleashed by the great credit pools that underlay WWI. The radical expansion of media – with movies and radio in the mix – presented a great opportunity for the writer, with whole staffs being stocked with them in Hollywood and Madison Ave.

Zachary Petit, who works at Writer’s Digest, began publishing bits of articles from its archives, beginning here: https://www.writersdigest.com/whats-new/vintage-quotes-from-f-scott-fitzgerald. Unsurprisingly, F. Scott Fitzgerald was the model of “successful writing” in the early twenties. He was a symbol of the mobility and ‘can-do’ that aligned the writer with the inventor and the entrepreneur. Fitzgerald utilized the  binary that was in place from the beginning – advice/rejection. The potential writer was always seeking advice (which is the kind of thing sought by readers of the love lorn columns as well: advice was an ambiguous economic editing, being a thing that was “given” even as its utility was measured by the market, which was dominated by sales), and due to his celebrity – here’s a man whose stories in Cosmopolitan or Vanity Fair were going straight into Hollywood production! – he was pursued by queries for advice.

“A letter from Robert L. Terry, of Revere, Massachusetts, was received by F. Scott Fitgerald, author of the Saturday Evening Post story which is to be done in pictures as “The Chorus Girl’s Romance.” Mr. Terry, a story writer, appealed to Mr. Fitgerald for assistance in the construction of a plot. Mr. Fitgerald replied: Dear Mr. Terry. Your letter was very vague as to what you wanted to know. Study Kipling and O’Henry, and work like Hell! I had 122 rejections slips before I sold a story.”

This banality of this exchange does not debar it from a much greater significance – it is like a founding document for a whole industry. For there are many Robert L. Terrys out there. We all have put down our words on paper, or on screen, and we all want advice from those who have sold their Chorus Girl’s Romance to the studio. Or advice from those who have surveyed the successful writer and have called up or emailed the mass of publishers and agents and know just what they want under the mythical transom. Putting advice giving on a paying basis is as natural, in the circumstances, as industrializing agriculture or installing networks of cut and paste machinery and calling it Artificial Intelligence.

We are all herded. And we have to “work like Hell!” for our meager pickings. Such is life among the  flubs and perpetual false starts of us functionaries in the sphere of circulation. No surplus value for you!

 

The philosopher as spy: the case of Alexandre Kojeve

In the Spring of 2019, the rightwing French journal, Commentaire, published a story about the philosopher, Alexandre Kojève, by Raymond Nart, a former officer with the DST, French Counter-intelligence. Commentaire, in the past, had published articles in praise of Kojève and even articles by Kojève. Kojève, after WWII, declared himself a “Sunday philosopher”, and had proceeded to devote most of his time to reconstructing France’s economy as an subminister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this post, Kojève became one of the great behind-the-scenes architects of France’s thirty glorious years, that experiment in dirigiste capitalism under the Bretton Woods system which finally came a header in the period of rampant inflation and the Oil crisis of the seventies. Notably, he helping to lay the foundation of the Common Market.

Nart’s article was entitled, ominously, Alexandre Kojevnikov dit Kojève. Scholars of the great Cold War Communist hunts will be delighted to learn that the old rhetorical maneuver of tearing away the legal name to reveal the old, Russian name spying behind it still lives. Nart has nothing new to say about Kojève’s famous Introduction to Reading Hegel, a series of lectures that he gave between 1933-1939 which were edited and published by Raymond Queneau in 1947. Nart’s attention, instead, is all on the Kojève who was giving the Soviets microfilm and packages of documents. What was in those documents, Nart regrets, we can only guess. But they must have been of value! Nart relies for his story on other documents, files that come from now defunct Eastern European and Soviet espionage agencies. Nart has used these sources before, in the 1990s, to claim that Charles Hernu, Mitterand’s first war minister, spied for the Soviets in the fifties. Nart is of the walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, must be a duck school of thought. His conclusion is that the philosopher was a spy.

To the calmer mind, though, that a duck and a platypus both have a bill doesn’t make them cousin creatures. Or, less allegorically, Nart’s proof is far from convincing. As Kojève was helping build the framework for the Common Market, he would have every reason to establish a backchannel to the Soviets. Stepping back from the narrow image of Kojève Nart presents, we might consider the mores of French ministries that enacted long term policies that were often indifferent to the political figures heading the governments, a sort of background hum of the machinery keeping it all going. Constantine Melnik, a counter-intelligence expert who has worked at Rand, has already pointed out before in the matter of previous of Nart’s “revelations” – for instance, that Charles Hernu, the Minister of Defense under Mitterand, was a Soviet agent – that this reading of files from Secret Police agencies in Communist countries should not be accorded a blind trust. There is all the difference in the world between between having a backchannel relationship with the Soviets – or with the Americans - and spying. Using Nart’s method, one could as well say that Henry Kissinger, the emblematic back-channel man, was a Soviet spy.

Yet Nart’s story is not the first time Kojève’s loyalties have been suspected. This is the White Russian who proclaimed that Stalin was the philosopher-king, the end of history, in the Popular Front Paris of the 30s. He was a man who had a talent for both entrancing and mystifying, and an audience that went out and changed French intellectual culture in the 50s and 60s. He was, as it were, a back-channel philosopher.

It would be nice to have an English language biography of Kojève. I thought I’d found one when I picked up Jeff Love’s The Black Circle: a Life of Alexandre Kojève (Columbia University Press, 2018), but it turned out that the sub-title belonged to a book in some other parallel universe, for this book is as little like a life of Kojève as a donut is like a spare tire. Love, a professor of German and Russian literature at Clemson, is after the life of the mind, not the intrigue of the exile. Love has given us a reading of Kojève that is now fascinating, now plodding, now insightful – especially about the last sections of Kojève’s lectures on Hegel, which have mostly not been translated into English – and too often lengthy paraphrase.

An American might not be tempted to read the book at all. In France, at least, Kojève is a second level intellectual celebrity: but in the United States, it has been his fate to owe his fame, what there is of it, to the Straussians, who are ideologically his opposites. One of them, Francis Fukuyama, referenced him directly in his bestselling The End of History and the Last Man (1992). This prompted the NYT reviewer of Fukuyama’s book, the historian William H. McNeill, to confess that the name was utterly unknown to him. But Americans who are concerned with the broader intellectual culture of the 20th century should really know their Kojève.

Alexandre Kojève was born in Russia, to a wealthy family of bankers and merchants. His cousin was the painter Kandinsky. When the Revolution came, much of that wealth disappeared. Kojève, who was merely a teen in 1918, got into the trouble with the Bolsheviks for operating on the black market in 1920. He was released from prison due to pull – that handy cousin of his, Kandinsky, was working with the Soviets at the time - and fled to Germany in 1921. There he studied philosophy and wrote a dissertation on the Russian philosopher and mystic, Soloviev. He met fellow exile Alexandre Koyre through a circumstance that usually would produce lifelong enmity: Kojève seduced Koyre’s sister-in-law, and Koyre went to talk him out of continuing the affair. In a story that adds lustre to the Kojève legend, Koyre was bowled over by the brilliance of the scoundrel he had made an appointment to meet. It was Koyre who helped Kojève get the gig giving lectures about Hegel at the École pratique des hautes études, then located in apparently cavernous quarters at the Sorbonne. Among Kojève’s colleagues were Marcel Mauss, the great anthropologist, and Emile Beneviste, the great linguist. Kojève was only 31 years old. But of the lectures that were given in 1933, it was Kojève’s that made him a star – although an underground star.

Hegel was not a well known figure in France at this time. Rather, he was considered to be most important for influencing the French positivist philosopher Victor Cousins. His chief works – the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Logic – had not even been completely translated into French. It was Kojève who brought Hegel to France. His lectures were attended by Georges Bataille, Raymond Queneau, Jacques Lacan, Pierre Klossowski, and Raymond Aron, among others. Mimeographs of them were read by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. None of these people, it seems, had read Hegel in German (save perhaps Aron). Kojève claimed, later, that he did not prepare his lectures in advance, but that he would typically come in, translate a passage of Hegel, and see where the passage led him. We will come back later to the soundness or lack thereof of this method.

In 1979, Vincent Descombes, in his survey of contemporary French philosophy, wrote that Hegel became a touchstone both for the existentialist generation (who were for) and for the structuralist and post-structuralist generation (who were against). In both cases, Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel and his philosophical anthropology had a long lasting and major effect. Not that Descombes is praising the man: writing during the time when France was taking a neo-liberal and anti-Marxist term, Descombes claimed that Kojève had a “terrorist conception of history”. There is some truth to this: after all, in the Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, it is clear that Kojève finds a bond of blood between the Hegel who heard the cannons roaring at the battle of Jena and the Napoleon who won that battle. Making serious history, in Kojève’s opinion, was a matter of bloodshed, and the philosopher king would not be afraid of spilling buckets of the stuff.

This is where the Straussians come in, for they, too, have ideas about history and its closure. Kojève translated a book of Leo Strauss’s on tyranny, and wrote an essay about it, to which Strauss replied. Strauss’s disciple, Allan Bloom, wrote the introduction to the partial English translation of Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, in which he claimed that Kojève’s book was one of the few great philosophy texts of the twentieth century. The Straussians substitute a knowledgeable elite for the tyrant. It is all about soft power and esoteric writing, and small seminars about the Great Books. Love’s book probably requires some knowledge of this background, if only to appreciate the novelty of his approach.

Love is concerned with three things: first, to bring out more clearly the Russian background of Kojève’s philosophy.Second, to give a closer reading of the notorious theme of the “end of history”, bringing into play the rather enigmatic sections of the Introduction devoted to the Sage and the Book; and finally, to ask about the status of finality today – or, more generally, why does our current cultural moment lack a “sense of an ending”?

Love’s knowledge of the Russian intellectual climate that impinged on Kojève in his formative years is helpful. Following in the footsteps of Boris Groys, he brings to the fore Vladimir Soloviev, the Russian mystic, who hypothesized an end of history that would be a compact of universal love among divinized humans, Godmen. But he also brings into focus another Russian thinker Nicolai Fedorov, who proposed that humanity’s purpose was, literally, resurrection, or the overcoming of death; and finally Dostoevsky, who through the Underground Man makes a strong and emblematic claim for the partial against the whole, the toothache against the Eureka moment, the man against the godman; and who displays, in the ideas and fate of Kirillov in The Possessed, the logical outcome of making the apocalypse one’s personal destiny – Kirillov has proven by argument that he,as the superior man, must commit suicide. These varieties of self-annihilation put Kojève’s own case, via Hegel, for the death of man in context.

Love wrestles with how much we should consider Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel a real commentary on Hegel and how much we should take it as Kojève projecting on Hegel his own philosophical conclusions. In the latter case, all of the Russian writers Love deals with are of paramount important. Still, it is curious that the strong 19th century tradition of Hegel commentary is left to the side. In particular, I wondered whether Kojève should not be juxtaposed with Herzen, who of all the Russian thinkers seems to be the one who learned the most from Hegel, while ultimately rejecting any schema that inserted logical necessity into history.

Reading the Introduction, one sometimes feels that Hegel is being victimized as much as he is being explained. Like John Slade, the American poet in Nabokov’s Pale Fire, whose autobiographical poem is absorbed in his commentor’s own autobiographic obsessions, Hegel is read in a way that wrenches out of certain of his 1806 concepts – for instance, the concept of Science, or Wissenschaft – products of Kojève’s own 1936 theories – most importantly, in the emblematic figure of the Sage, the self-annihilating last man, and the Book, the zombie-like totality that comes after man. Love’s comparison of Kojève and Heidegger is a good one: both were creators of a new genre of reading, founded on the notion of a sort of readerly violence. The text, here, is much like a musical score, which a musician of genius makes her own by a subtle and systematic recasting of its cues, its tone, its emphases, its essential rhythm. Kojève set the example for the reading practices of Deleuze and Derrida – in fact, Derrida’s famous defense of this kind of reading in his essay on Nietzsche, where Derrida asks about the force and origin of a certain decorum in interpretation that distributes certain texts for interpretation under certain genres, is very pertinent to, even inspired by, the way Kojève, before an audience that was generally ignorant of the Phenomenology, would shore up his interpretations by, as it were, scanning Hegel’s corpus for favoring pointers.

And yet, it is fair to note that Hegel, like Kojève, was notoriously quick with the ‘off’ button – as for instance Hegel’s idea, expressed in his lectures on Aesthetics, that art was now “over”. That whole areas of intellectual practice can be pronounced “over” creates a certain competition among mandarins that we have witnessed in our own day, where the ‘off’ button is insistently clicked on everything from history to sit-coms. That the off button doesn’t, in the end, turn these things off, leads of course to another channel changer, where everything is “post”. It is an oddly provincial way of doing history, perhaps more forgivable in a figure who actually witnessed the collapse of a whole social order than in thinkers who are witnessing the radical expansion of our intellectual horizons as Eurocentrism loses its grip. Love’s most interesting chapters, to me, were about Kojève’s less studied latter lectures, in which the figure of the Sage and the Book figure the end of “man”. I’d recommend Love’s chapter 6, “the book of the dead”, and chapter 9, which takes up the decline in the prestige of teleological explanations, in particular.

Kojève’s notion that the Book would replace man seems, perhaps, less curious now, when we discuss the same event in terms of the book’s successor, Artificial Intelligence. However, Kojève’s claim that meaning requires finality is a more puzzling feature of his work than, I think, Love makes out. Kojève was well acquainted with the physics and mathematics of his time. He surely knew of, at least, Gödel’s work. The incompleteness theorem was published in 1931, two years before the start of the lectures. Surely in Love’s discussion of the decline of a “sense of ending” in contemporary thought, the incompleteness theory deserves a place, since it seems to aim at the heart of making a Book into a set in which it is itself a member. It would seem, via Gödel, that Kojève’s entire project was doomed to failure. We know how Wittgenstein resisted Gödel, even as, posthumously, Wittgenstein’s writings have been drawn into the circle of pragmatism that accepts incompleteness as the (non)final word. It is perhaps one of the costs of Love’s concentration on the eschatological project and its Russian roots casts some light on the self-annihilation of man, but it casts into the shade a very important part of Kojève’s thought as it explored the intersection of philosophy and science, a field that was dominated by his colleague Koyre.

Love starts his book with an observation that seems at least arguable:

“Kojève’s insistence on finality and repetition is untimely. It reveals the way in which Kojève’s thought is deeply hostile to the governing dogma of our time, a dogma anticipated trenchantly by Dostoevsky’s underground man: that freedom is continuous striving without limits; that, in a pregnant phrase, error is freedom. The praise of error or errancy is everywhere in evidence; it is virtually the rallying cry of modern emancipatory French philosophy, with several notable exceptions, largely from the Marxist camp. The truth as truth has become tyrannical, terrifying. One seeks “infinite play,” polysemy, différance, the free creation of concepts, or various kinds of transgression that satisfy our demand for freedom from hegemonic narratives. Finality is to be rejected in favor of lasting openness, nonfinality, a horizon of possibility that beckons, seduces us to what might be rather than what must be.”

I see a different ideological dominant than Love does: a period in which the neo-liberal dictum, “there is no alternative”, continues to restrain our politics and our imagination. It has been a long time since the graffiti that lit up the walls of the 1968 Paris revolt had a hold on the public imagination – or the philosophical one. The end of hegemonic narratives, proclaimed in Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition, responded to the end of one hegemonic narrative: the orthodox Marxist version of history. One could argue that what Kojève called “history” was identical with the long Cold War that pitted the left against the right in Europe, beginning in the French Revolution, and that reached a certain point of exhaustion in the 80s. However, the ordinary economic realities on the ground, the structures of exploitation and profit, are still basically of the same form. Until capitalism goes, the fortune of the sides in the battle of Jena is still uncertain.