Gersholm Scholem, in his exchange of letters with
Hannah Arendt, accused her of being one of those Weimar leftwing Jews who
objectively strenghthened anti-semitism.
Specifically, he referred to Kurt Tucholsky: “I cannot refute those who say the
Jews deserved their fate, because they did not take earlier steps to defned
themselves, because they were cowardly, etc. I came across this argument only
recently in a book by that honest Jewish anti-semite, Kurt Tucholsky.”
Surprisingly, Arendt not only replied that she was not
an anti-semite at all, but that Tucholsky was not one, either: Besides, I am
happy that I misunderstood your phrase about my belonging to the Jewish people.
You mention the « antisemite Tucholsky, and if I undestand correctly,
established a link between the two. In as far as Tucholsky is concerned, I do
not at all share your opinion. An antisemite is an antisemite and not a Jew for
whom it may happen, sometimes, that he expresses himself in critical terms on Jewish
matters, and it doen’t make any difference if he is right or wrong.”
There is a lot of bad faith in Scholem’s mention of
Tucholsky. I don’t believe he just recently came across some “argument” by Tucholsky
recently; Tucholsky, after all, was one of the targets of Walter Benjamin’s
Left Melancholy review-essay, in 1931; moreover, Tucholsky’s satire of the
upper class bourgeois Jewish German culture, in the Mr. Wendriner stories, were
not about “Jews” as such, but about how a particular class, invested in German
nationalism, refused to recognize the seriousness of anti-Semitism and was
compliant with a call to order that ran counter to the enlightenment ideal of
tolerance for all creeds. That ideal was, of course, also one that Israel was
countering in its own way in Scholem’s time – and seventy years later, the
ethno-state that has emerged in Israel finds its allies more in Hungary and
Saudi Arabia than in any distant descendent of the enlightenment.
For German intellectuals, Tucholsky is a sort of
touchstone. Unlike Karl Kraus, Tucholsky
has never made any serious inroad into the Anglosphere: there’s no Jonathan
Franzen translation of Tucholsky. But Benjamin’s 1931 Left Melancholy essay,
ostensibly a review of Eric Kästner’s poems that groups Kästner with Tucholsky, has left a mark.
To my mind, the Left melancholy article is Benjamin at
his Zhdanovian worst. Although ostensibly a review of Kästner’s
poems, it does not mention a single poem, or quote a single line. It dismisses
the job of, well, actually reviewing the poems by saying that these poems flit through
newspapers and magazines like fish flit through dirty water: in the claustrophobic
space of a book, the poems are out of place. That is a promising start that
goes nowhere, because Benjamin wants to use Kästner as a type – the literary Leftist.
Unserious, disengaged from working class politics, a product of the decayed
bourgeoisie. That Benjamin is himself a member of the decayed bourgeoisie, the
son of a prosperous assimilated German Jew, is left aside. The mention of
Tucholsky is definitely flitting – like a minnow darting through cloudy
invective: “With the worker’s movement they had little to do. They are much more
the counterpart to the feudal mimicry that was so admired in the Wilhelmine era
among reserve officers, a phenomenon of bourgeois disintegration. The left
radical journalists of the type of Kästner, Mehring or Tucholsky are the
proletarian mimicry of the bourgeois collapse. Their function is, from the
political point of view, to make cliques instead of parties, and from the
literary point of view, to make fashions instead of schools, while
economically, they are not producers but agents.”
The argument that a group known for its anti-military
activity are really analogous to reserve officers thuds along, using a paradoxical rhetoric of
saying that x, which claims to be the opposite of y, is really in cahoots with
y, and takes its job as making analogies,
not arguments. The analogies, in the time honoured tropes of the demagogue, can
then be used to condemn. The honor and
hierarchy, feudal values to which the officers pretended to adhere, are one
thing; what values are being mimicked – and in a proletarian way – by the left
radical authors? As we peer into that analogy, we see that it is made more for
the insult and injury, and less for the concept: it is impossible to make sense
of a proletarian mimicry of bourgeois collapse, unless what is being hinted at
here is that these authors are adopting the values of a lumpen proletariat of
pimps, prostitutes and hoods. This is one way of explaining the left radical
demand for sexual freedom and the abolition of laws against abortion and homosexuality,
and it would go along with the reactionary tendencies in Stalin’s Soviet Union
at the time. But Benjamin himself can’t get that out of his mouth – because he
knows that saying it explicitly would align him with the worst characteristics
of the right.
Benjamin’s whole essay is composed in this din, where argument
gets lost in aggression. At its lowest point, when Benjamin compares the
suicide of an expressionist poet to “dumping” stock on the stock market, the
Zhdanovian polemic truly takes on the mask of the gutter press, in which Tucholsky and other
left radicals are “Jewish swine.” Benjamin should have been more superstitious:
can only write such things if one is
certain of never committing, or having to commit, suicide. A curse is unleashed
here which comes back to haunt both the victim and the perpetrator of this
essay.
Tucholsky, of course, could
take care of himself. I do not know if Tucholsky mentioned this essay in some
letter. I doubt it, as the “review” was refused by the Frankfurter Zeitung, Kracauer’s
paper, and published in Gesellschaft, which I believe was edited by Horkheimer.
Tucholsky in 1931 was a much bigger personality than Benjamin; but the terms of
Benjamin’s criticism converge, in an odd way, with Scholem’s latter accusation that
Tucholsky was “objectively anti-semitic”. It is an odd thing, and perhaps due
to the perverse power of the satirist’s negativity, that these criticisms seem
by some fate to tread in the rhythms of Tucholsky’s
own satires. Around the time Scholem and
Arendt were discussing Tucholsky, Golo Mann,
that pompous cold warrior, summed up the problem with Tucholsky in rhetoric
that uncannily sounds like the plea for a gentleman’s agreement – that is, for a quota
system for Jews. Mann does use the J word. What he says is there is a place for
these nay-sayers like Tucholsky and, before him, Heine, writers who “in the
positive sense of the word believe in nothing… men of high gifts, we are
thinking for instance of Kurt Tucholsky. We confess that he lacks the tact,
modesty, and restraint of a firmly
affirmative tradition, even a creative one; yet in the in spiritual household
of the nation it is good there are some such critics, some such verse makers,
some such sociologists, but not too many of them, and that in the twenties
there were rather too much than too few.”
Yes, it wasn’t the
authoritarian judges letting those paramilitaries go free who murdered
leftists, but it was those without a sense of, well, restraint who satirized
these judges who made it all go to hell. Perhaps called their fate up on
themselves!
Twelve years before Benjamin’s
Left Melancholy article, Tucholsky published what some of his critics consider
to be a manifesto – in the key of Nein. It appeared in the journal he
co-edited, the Weltbuehne: Wir Negative.
Tucholsky starts out by an
implicit question: is it just his character, or has there emerged, in post-war
Germany, a collective spiritual negation? From his experience as an editor, he
finds that the negations to which he is attached seem to pop up in the work of
his contributors. Of course, this is an elementary survey bias, but nevertheless
there is something this bias touches.
His starting point is
revolution. In 1919, Revolution did not seem so far away – one could take a
train to Russia and see it in action. Tucholsky did not: instead, he looked
around Germany.
“If Revolution means collapse,
we we had one: but one must not expect that the ruins will look different than
the old buildings. We had failure and hunger, and those responsible have gotten
away with it. And there stand the people: they have ripped down the old
banners, but there haven’t been any new ones. “
In 1931, from Tucholsky’s
viewpoint, the people who got away have now come back, twice as bad, and the
positive response on the left, the opposition in particular of the Communists, has been grossly inadequate. For all Benjamin’s
talk of the writer as producer versus the writer as agent, the social fact of a
changed media system made the productivist notion archaic. The nineteenth
century, where Victor Hugo could plausibly dream of employing his pen to
overturn a government, had been buried by a new, symbol-pushing form of
capitalist enterprise.
It is not that Tucholsky was
not an activist. In fact, his book against the German culture and military was
so disturbing to the system that even after World War II and the fall of the Berlin
wall, Kohl’s government was trying to censor Tucholsky’s phrase: Soldiers are
murderers with laws making it against the law to “discredit the military.” This
was in the 90s, when Benjamin had long been absorbed into academia.
Tucholsky proposes, in this
essay, a thought experiment: suppose the war had gone another way, and Germany
had won? Would the people have been happy? And his answer is that, given the
situation today, in 1919, given the spiritual conditions, many of them,
including the workers, probably would have.
It is a rabble rousing
document, this manifesto for the negatives, but it is very conscious that it
has no rabble to rouse – that the point is to make that rabble. To raise its
consciousness.
“We cannot yet say yes. We
cannot reinforce a consciousness that forgets from on high the humanity in
human beings. We cannot encourage a people to do its duty only because for
every toiler a mirage of honor has been created that only hinders essential
work. We cannot say yes to a people who remain today in the frame of mind that,
had the war somehow come to a happier end, would have justified our worst
fears. We cannot say yes to a country obsessed with collectives and for whom
corporate bodies are elevated far above the individual. Collectives merely
provide assistance to the individual. We cannot say yes to those whose fruits
are now displayed by the younger generation:
a lukewarm and vapid species infected with an infantile hunger for power at
home and an indifference toward things abroad, more devoted to bars than to
bravery, with unspeakable antipathy for all Sturm und Drang—no longer bearable
today— without fire and without dash, without hate and without love. We are
supposed to walk, but our legs are bound with cords. We
cannot yet say yes.“
This is much more predictive
of the world Benjamin was entering in the 30s than his dismissal of left
melancholics as a slumming annex to the bourgeoisie. Like many manifestos, it
dates itself; and yet the heart of the thing – the refusal to accept the idea
that the world that exists at present is our only alternative and the goal towards
which we have been striving – is still hopelessly valid. If Tucholsky was “mourning”,
it was not because he had some love for a dead and gone thing, but for a thing
that never came to be, even as it obviously should have been. What obviously
should have been is, I would say, the crisis we face on all fronts today.
Tucholsky is still relevant, not as an academic good but as an agent provocateur.