Bollettino

MSNBC�s Michael Morin makes the LI case that the War, if it isn�t being seen as a Liberation, will be seen as an invasion. Of course, a piece like this should have been run in February � it was all entirely predictable then. That is, we knew that the D.C. ultra-hawks didn�t know a thing about Iraq. They showed no knowledge of the place, beyond their conviction that Saddam the H. was a bloody tyrant. So they made up an alternative Iraq. In this Iraq, America and American ways were much loved. They were so loved that the people would beam with joy as Smilin� Jay Garner assumed the proconsul�s role. They were so loved that the two years of occupation the Rumsfeldian plan calls for would be, itself, a love fest � imagine the scene! Starving and semi-starving Iraqis would look upon the act of divvying up oilfields to private American companies as the least they could do to say, well, thanks old buddy! And as for using the territory as a staging ground for future American liberations of various other Moslem countries � why, there�d be no Turkish tergiversations about that!

Morin has a nice graf about the future � which is within twenty miles of Baghdad, apparently, if we can trust today�s news.

� The quick victory many had hoped for � one that swept Saddam and his cronies from power, accompanied by mass surrenders and an outburst of relief on the part of ordinary Iraqis � would have been viewed as almost a mandate for the war. Its critics at home and among U.N. Security Council members would have been muted.
So far, quite the opposite has occurred.
Iraq�s own plan to resist the invasion has entranced the Arab world and other countries who felt the U.S.-led war bordered on bullying.
Within Iraq itself, the bitterness of the resistance being put up to U.S. and British troops, even in regions where Saddam�s rule is heavily resented, does not bode well for postwar forces.�

Compare Morin to Kanan Malikya�s latest

Those who imply that a rising surge of ''nationalism'' is preventing Iraqis from greeting American and British troops with open arms are wrong. What is preventing Iraqis from rising and taking over the streets of their cities is confusion about American intentions. That is confusion created by the way this war has been conducted and by fear of the murderous brown-shirt thugs, otherwise known as Saddam's Fedayeen, a militia loyal to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, who control the streets of Iraqi cities and who are conducting the harassing attacks on American and British soldiers.

The coalition forces have not yet sent clear and unmistakable signals to the people of Iraq that, unlike 1991, there will be no turning back before Saddam Hussein's regime has been overturn. But in order to do this effectively they must count on the Iraqi opposition, which has so far been marginalized.

Iraqis do not get CNN. They have not heard, as we have, constant iterations of how Hussein's demise is imminent. More important, they have not seen evidence of his difficulties, as they did in 1991, when they revolted after two months of not seeing his image on TV or hearing him and his henchmen on the radio. Coalition forces so far have been content to position themselves outside cities in southern Iraq; only after incessant urging from members of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) have they finally begun to disrupt Iraqi TV, Hussein's principal means for not losing face in Iraq. And above all, coalition forces have not allowed Iraqis to go in and organize the population, something they are eager and willing to do.�

LI is, oddly enough, in agreement with the ultrahawks on this issue -- at least insofar as the employment of Iraqi troops is concerned. We have a feeling that the reason the Free Iraqi troops have not been �embedded� � Frank Gaffney�s term in the Washington Times � is that the Coalition forces fear that they will fall on their faces. This has happened before, as we know. Here�s a link to a history of the INC � the Iraqi opposition group that Kanan Malikya and Ahmad Chalabi belong to. Now, it looks pretty bad � these are by no means the Garibaldis of Iraq. Rather, the INC looks more like the anticommunist Chinese groups set up by the CIA in the fifties � groups which were invariably defeated, due to an absolute disconnect between the people and their supposed champions. Luce, the owner of Time, etc., was the godfather of those earlier groups. The INC started out with a less elevated patronage:

�The agency turned to Washington insider John Rendon, whose "strategic communications" consulting firm The Rendon Group had provided support in 1988 to "spin" both the Panamanian and American media during Panama's doomed presidential election campaign. One of Rendon's most recent clients, in fact, had been the Kuwaiti royal family to help them in creating a sympathetic image in the U.S. during the Gulf War. This was a man not only with a proven track record but who also had experience in the Middle East. If anyone could get the job done, it was John Rendon.
Rendon and his team worked with the CIA to build the Al-Mu'tamar al-Watani al-Iraqi (Iraqi National Congress - INC) in 1991, and according to ABC News, "provided it with its name and more than US$12 million in covert funding between 1992 and 1996." Intelligence officers correctly saw Iraqi Kurd factions as the most potent force against Hussein's autocracy, but needed a platform for which to unite them under. So they recruited Ahmad Chalabi, an American-educated Arab Shi'ite banker who has extensive ties with Iraqi Kurds, to head the INC so that it could bring together Kurds, Iraqi Shiites, and dissident Sunni Muslims against Hussein.�

According to the Clandestine Radio article, Chalabi nearly defeated the Republican Guard in 1995. His defeat was caused by lack of American air support. This is the spin put on it ever since, by Chalabi's Perle-ish friends. According to the BBC, however, the Chalabi offense did have limited support, but was defeated anyway. Chalabi seems to have put together his troops and made his deals with the Kurds on the promise of US air support, even though there was no such promise. Thinking that a fait accompli would draw in the Americans, he attacked with 15,000 troops and was defeated.

Zero hour has been striking -- in fact, it has been striking for the last two weeks -- and the Kurds seem to be able to coordinate with the Americans to move towards Kirkuk. We wonder if Chalabi's absence from that advance is wholly fortuitous. The man might not be very liked in Northern Iraq, after the 1995 debacle.