Remora

Trailing distantly in the wake of the comet...

Well, people are starting to wake up to LI's complaint about the lack of competition in the executive labor market. The Economist deigns, even, to notice that something is rotten in Coutersport -- although they assume the attitude of ingenues in a brothel:


"The market is also characterised by extreme secrecy. Companies may run advertisements for technicians and accountants, but they rarely advertise the top job�and if word of a candidacy leaks out, the person concerned usually has no option but to rule himself out of the race. Mr Khurana argues that the search process, with its emphasis on confidentiality, restricts the hunt for potential candidates and puts enormous power in the hands of the recruiting firm. And, precisely because it is such a restricted and secretive market, it is bad at price-setting. Hence the immense sums that companies offer outsiders to persuade them to take the job, sums that then influence the pay of other chief executives. Because a search firm's fee is typically one-third of a new recruit's negotiated annual cash compensation, they have every reason to push up pay.

True, the market finds only a small (but rising) minority of all the bosses appointed each year. Most big firms still choose an insider for the top job�though many boards assume their inside recruit would be available for hire in the marketplace, and so still pay the �market� price for him. Once a firm opts to look outside, any internal candidate inevitably comes to look less impressive than the names on recruiters' lists: 75% of outsiders appointed in 1985-2000 had previously been chief executives or company presidents. "

Well, gee whiz. I bet everyone reporting for the Economist is just amazed by this pattern of interlocking interests that prevent a competitive labor market place from taking place. But the article ends on one of those conflations of natural and class constraints so dear to the Marxist analyst of ideology. See, it just doesn't seem that in the executive sphere, the same laws could apply as do in the sphere of, say, middle management. The authors are commenting on a recent, highly commented book by Khurana about the rise and fall of the charismatic CEO. Now for the drums and the dying fall:

"Even Mr Khurana is stumped for ways to make the market for bosses work much better. Letting shareholders elect their chief executive, perhaps from a slate of competing candidates, is likely to remain the stuff of corporate-governance fantasy. Changing the way headhunters are paid might discourage them from ignoring internal stars in favour of external candidates, particularly expensive ones. But they are likely to remain at the heart of the market, for the only practical alternative is for the board to do the search itself�a hunt that might not extend far beyond the 19th hole of the nearest golf club.The best hope is that boards, closely watched by today's more vigilant large shareholders, will be clearer about the problems a new boss must solve. They should forget about hiring another firm's boss on the strength of his eloquence on CNBC, and care more about operational skills and an ability to read a balance sheet. In the market for bosses, as in any other, the best way to improve efficiency is for consumers to remember the ancient rule of caveat emptor, or buyer beware."

Well, if Mr. Khurana is really so stumped, he ought to read LI's post for September 25 and 26. And hey, being a big hearted lefty type of guy, I'm givin' away my ideas for free!