I've been loving Jill Lepore's takedown of the new business snakeoil, disruptive innovation and the responses to it. I especially love how Slate's Will Oremus replied. This is a man who has inherited the humorous stylings of Mickey Kaus and the ignorance of subject matter of Will Saletan. Those are big shoes to fill - in fact, I think size 24s - the bozo class. Of course, he trips all over himself trying to find an angle. His angle is, wait for it, that this being the internet, he, Oremus, is able to paraphrase Lepore's article, which is apparently behind a pay wall, and thus you, the reader, get it for free. Sakes alive! Lepore has been disrupted. Why is it like this is 1996 - or maybe 1936, since Readers Digest did the same thing.
But the freebie you get from Oremus is worth what you pay for it. He evidently never met an argument with more than one variable in it that he could understand, and he severely misunderstands, and thus misparaphrases, Lepore's article. In the toady style that Slate has perfected, he didn't seem to high himself to one book or article to write his refutation - why should he? I mean, when you are a genius, anything you draw out of your ass must be high class. This was always Will Saletan's motto - used especially when he embraced white supremecy as science in an infamous series in 2007 - so Oremus is following in the footsteps of the masters. Oremus might be interested in the fact that I can go to the library here in Santa Monica and read the whole issue for free - I mean, isn't that a portent of the singularity!
Frankly, save for their book and movie reviews, Slate has been a must-laugh-at ever since they put a stick in Bush and saw he was done in 2000. For years, their schtick has been to find clever ways to wrap rightwing conventional wisdom in neo-liberal wrapping and claim that the resulting product is some brand new thing nobody had ever thought of before, rather than yesterday's dog poop. It is like the monster child of the New Republic and the Third Way.
So I was happy to see them smarm attack Lepore's article. It shows that she must have tapped a vein.
“I’m so bored. I hate my life.” - Britney Spears
Das Langweilige ist interessant geworden, weil das Interessante angefangen hat langweilig zu werden. – Thomas Mann
"Never for money/always for love" - The Talking Heads
Friday, June 20, 2014
Thursday, June 19, 2014
Absence one
Anyone who reads continental philosophy or the philosophical
essayists will soon be impressed by the almost obsessive mooning over the
concept of absence.
This has no parallel in Anglophone philosophy – absence is
at most treated as a simple description of a physical phenomenon. Jack doesn’t
show up for the exam – he is absent.
There is nothing here for the
analytics (or post-analytics) to get moony about.
Nevertheless, there is something strange about the absence
of absence in Anglophone philosophy. The unexamined master-trope of that
philosophy is substitution. Surely it if
were examined, understanding substitution should encourage us to look at absence
more closely.
Substitution implies that a place is preserved – in logical
or physical or social space – that is filled with one or another variable. In a
sense, the presence of the variable isn’t total, since it isn’t identical to
the place. One can find another variable to put in that place.
The latest metaphor in the analytic tradition to designate this
is “candidate”. A candidate – whether as an explanation or as a particular – is
always being considered as the solution to some problem. Whether it is
materialist accounts of cognitive states, theories of the reduction of the
biological to the physical, etc., etc., the papers I edit in philosophy are
built upon comparing one ‘candidate’ with another.
Although analytic philosophers go about closely peering at
language with the fervor of a myopic seamstress threading a needle, they are
curiously indifferent to their own use of language – so I have not read any
account of how suddenly the candidate metaphor appeared in all the right
journals. It is easy to see, though, that it is a metaphor that tells us
something about how absence is thought of here. The implication is that the
“place” where substitution takes or can take place is like an office. It is a
position created by a political system. The politics may only be bureaucratic –
it may be a position in a firm, in which the candidates compete against each
other without seeing each other, before a hiring person or board. Or it may be
a political system in which they compete against each other consciously, before
a voting constituency. The main thing is that the competition is about filling the position. The binary in
place is between the filled place and the empty place – or potentially empty
place. These are pre-eminently relative states – the dialectic between them is
deflected onto the system which determines them, and which has the power to
simply get rid of the place – or multiply it.
Monday, June 16, 2014
the material life
We call it a
sucette. Our babysitter calls it a binky, and a couple of days ago the clerk at
the grocery store, teasing Adam by asking for it, called it a nuk-nuk – I think.
Nuk nuk sounded vaguely disturbing to me, and the surprisingly popular game of
leaning over Adam and asking for something – can you give me your shoe? Your fruitpack?
Or whatever, which many people seem to think is just the way to tease a baby,
was played by that clerk just a tiny bit too roughly. This went with nuk nuk, I
thought.
Such are the various
titles of what is more neutrally called a pacifier. It is an article that, for
the last year and a half, has been essential in our house. When Adam was very
young – around three months, I believe – we bought our first one and he
rejected it, and I thought that we wouldn’t need a pacifier. However, it turned
out that this rejection was more in the nature of a misunderstanding. Or
rather, it was more in the nature of how a sucette is used – for the calm that
comes with putting it in his mouth and shifting it around and laying back and
playing with its little handle (that handle that has a certain unpleasant
visual association for me – I am always reminded of the ring they put on a bull’s
nose, and I sometimes think it gives Adam too painfully the air of an animal we
have domesticated, even if that is, really, the truth), it also seems to be
comforting to throw it away. There’s some ceremony in it – in the same way that
a baseball player tears his cap from his head and throws it down and stomps on
it to theatricalize some fault in the umpire’s judgment, Adam likes to definitively
toss the pacifier to signify that he’s about to run around yelling or play
chase or hide. He also likes to lay it aside, with a graceful, judgmental
gesture when he has decided to eat. This is always interesting to watch,
because it means that he is going to be serious, now, about his turkey, or his
yoghurt, or his bread. And just as taking the sucette out of his mouth prefaces
his decision to grab the little strips of turkey and stuff as many of them as
possible in his mouth, or take the plastic spoon and see how much Nature’s Own
Turkey and Rice glop he can get on it and then, in a perilous trajectory
towards his face, in his mouth (the glop often leaving a trail of drops on his
pants and shirt on the way to its slide down the digestive tract.), so, too,
the resumption of the pacifier is a final punctuation, a full stop that means
this meal is over. Surely, this is manners on the infant scale.
The sucette is slowly
losing its necessity as Adam pressses onward to that magic 2 year old mark. It
used to be part of the standard kit for going out. I’d make sure I had water,
crackers, maybe a fruit or a fruit pack, and the sucette before I lifted our
boy up and strapped him into his stroller. The stroller did pose the problem
that, often, Adam would decide that it was time to toss the sucette, and if I
wasn’t paying attention, we’d lose it. Even if I was paying attention, I hesitated
about taking a pacifier that had been tossed onto a sidewalk traversed by man
and beast and tucking it back into Adam’s mouth. In truth, one loses a lot of
squeamishness when raising a baby, but I had some left. Besides of course the
mortification of somebody seeing me giving a pacifier to my baby after I’d
picked it off the sidewalk or grass or floor. We found our solution one day in
Atlanta in a Walmart, where they sold these handy ribbon clips, which allowed
us to clip the band to Adam’s shirt and attach the sucette to the band. This
didn’t entirely solve the problem, however, as Adam developed a way of
unclipping the pacifier and tossing it, with the ribbon attached. Also, in the pandaemonium
that takes the place of housekeeping when you have a baby, those ribbons would
crawl under beds or dressers or insinuate themselve among the socks or somehow
get in the bathtub – which meant that, added to the hunt for the pacifier was
the hunt for the ribbon so that the pacifier wouldn’t get lost. Such is the
treadmill of consumerism, ladies and gents.
Saturday, June 14, 2014
replay: the trouble with thought experiments
In 1877, John
Tyndall gave an address in Belfast that
was emblematic of the high and confident positivism of the time. In one
passage, he violates one of the canons of Victorian gentility – the Oxford
variety – by aligning himself with the gloriously vulgar tradition, going back
to Francis Bacon, of using Aristotle, conceived of as the father of a lot
of a priori nonsense, as an all purpose punching bag:
“…in Aristotle, as in Goethe, it was not, I believe, misdirection, but sheer natural incapacity which lay at the root of his mistakes. As a physicist, Aristotle displayed what we should consider some of the worst attributes of a modern physical investigator: indistinctness of ideas, confusion of mind, and a confident use of language, which led to the delusive notion that he had really mastered his subject, while he had as yet failed to grasp even the elements of it. He put words in the place of things, subject in the place of object. He preached Induction without practising it, inverting the true order of inquiry by passing from the general to the particular, instead of from the particular to the general. He made of the universe a closed sphere, in the centre of which he fixed the earth, proving from general principles, to his own satisfaction and to that of the world for near 2,000 years, that no other universe was possible. His notions of motion were entirely unphysical. It was natural or unnatural, better or worse, calm or violentóno real mechanical conception regarding it lying at the bottom of his mind. He affirmed that a vacuum could not exist, and proved that if it did exist motion in it would be impossible. He determined a priori how many species of animals must exist, and shows on general principles why animals must have such and such parts. When an eminent contemporary philosopher, who is far removed from errors of this kind, remembers these abuses of the a priori method, he will be able to make allowance for the jealousy of physicists as to the acceptance of so-called a priori truths. Aristotle's errors of detail, as shown by Eucken and Lange, were grave and numerous. He affirmed that only in man we had the beating of the heart, that the left side of the body was colder than the right, that men have more teeth than women, and that there is an empty space at the back of every man's head.
There is one essential quality in physical conceptions which was entirely wanting in those of Aristotle and his followers. I wish it could be expressed by a word untainted by its associations; it signifies a capability of being placed as a coherent picture before the mind. The Germans express the act of picturing by the word vorstellen, and the picture they call a Vorstellung. We have no word in English which comes nearer to our requirements than Imagination, and, taken with its proper limitations, the word answers very well; but, as just intimated, it is tainted by its associations, and therefore objectionable to some minds.”
Tyndall’s groping attempt to put his chemical stained fingers around a term to distinguish a distinct, yet under-conceptualized mental act – and can’t one feel him almost painfully balance just on the edge of the unknown word, like Watson trying to follow one of Holmes’ points – eerily points to the need that was met ten years later, when just the thing emerged under the pen of a German physicist, Ernst Mach. The Gedanken-experiment was born.
Ever since, it has been retrospectively accorded to other times and conceptual schemes. I have always found this a rather uncomfortable anachronism. But what I’d like to consider is how, exactly, the thought experiment is an experiment.
We don’t kid ourselves that our objections will squelch the word. We don’t want to. The relation between the thought experiment and the experiment is like the relation between the red breasted American thrush and the English robin: they look enough alike that English settlers in the New World called the thrush a robin. Lexically, only a pedant would object to that – taxonomically, it is a disaster.
A common defense of thought experiments, among philosophers, is that thought experiments are a common element of science. In fact, we have read claims that in certain scientific discourses, they have an essential function. I don’t doubt it. However, the move from saying that that class of things that we call “thought experiments” play a role in science to saying that they are indeed a type of experiment is not dependent on a clear view of experiments, but on the prestige of science, which is considered to be ultimately experimental. In other words, we are eye to eye with a vicious circle. Prestige, here, underwrites this logical leap. What it tells us is two things: we are dealing, first of all, with myth; and secondly, we are dealing with myth in terms of a the archaic system of legitimation that consists in referring to authority, rather than rationality.
Our protest against the prestige of thought experiments in philosophy stems from our sense of what experiment meant in the first place. Tyndall’s cool evaluation of Aristotle might not be textually correct re the man himself, but it is certainly correct about the spirit of Aristotelianism. The introduction of the experimental method in Europe in the seventeenth century was about one thing: the art of discovery. The point was to get outside of your head. That the world outside could be discovered was a tremendously exciting and hazardous thing.
The mania for thought experiments cruelly inverts this moment. Reflection, instead of being forced to confront the obdurant outlines of some irrepressible piece of exteriority, contents itself with the soft and pleasing task of creating bad fictions in the image of its desires. The movement from Bacon, whose death as a ‘martyr to experimentation’ is well described by Macaulay to the spectacle of a Chalmers, doing “consciousness science’ by means of infantile fantasies of zombies, is a painful indicator that civilization ain’t what it used to be.
In a conference on thought experiments that was published in the 1992 PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Ian Hacking, one of my favorite philosophers (who has gained this coveted status by being interested in what is going on outside of his head and studying it – a rare thing), commented on the papers presented that defended the validity of the thought experiment. He conceded the force of many of the arguments for thought experiments, but his emphasis was on the fact that he felt, in the presence of the thought experiment, unmoved. That is, he felt that the experiment was not explicative. Experiments, in Hacking’s account, have a life – thought experiments exist frozen in their pictorial essence. Referring to Thomas Kuhn’s essay on thought experiments, Hacking points to the character of good thought experiments:
“… thought experiments are rather fixed, largely immutable. That is yet another respect that thye are like mathematical proofs, but good proofs have proof ideas that can be used over and over in new contexts – which is not, in general the case with thought experiments. They have just one tension to expose. Of course there are false starts, and the exposition gets neater over time. And here the prescience of Kuhn’s paper comes to the fore. The reason that people wrestle with thought experiments, use them for exposition and put-down argument, is that they can reveal tensions between one vision of the world and another. They can dislodge a person from a certain way of describing the worlds. They can replace one picture by another. That is their job, their once and future job.”
Note: Since I began this number in Victorian prose, let me end it the same way. Here is Macaulay’s great description of Bacon’s death:
„It had occurred to him that snow might be used with advantage for the purpose of preventing animal substances from putrefying. On a very cold day, early in the spring of the year 1626, he alighted from his coach near Highgate, in order to try the experiment. He went into a cottage, bought a fowl, and with his own hands stuffed it with snow. While thus engaged he felt a sudden chill, and was soon so much indisposed that it was impossible for him to return to Gray's Inn. The Earl of Arundel, with whom he was well acquainted, had a house at Highgate. To that house Bacon was carried. The Earl was absent; but the servants who were in charge of the place showed great respect and attention to the illustrious guest. Here, after an illness of about a week, he expired early on the morning of Easter-day, 1626. His mind appears to have retained its strength and liveliness to the end. He did not forget the fowl which had caused his death. In the last letter that he ever wrote, with fingers which, as he said, could not steadily hold a pen, he did not omit to mention that the experiment of the snow had succeeded "excellently well"
“…in Aristotle, as in Goethe, it was not, I believe, misdirection, but sheer natural incapacity which lay at the root of his mistakes. As a physicist, Aristotle displayed what we should consider some of the worst attributes of a modern physical investigator: indistinctness of ideas, confusion of mind, and a confident use of language, which led to the delusive notion that he had really mastered his subject, while he had as yet failed to grasp even the elements of it. He put words in the place of things, subject in the place of object. He preached Induction without practising it, inverting the true order of inquiry by passing from the general to the particular, instead of from the particular to the general. He made of the universe a closed sphere, in the centre of which he fixed the earth, proving from general principles, to his own satisfaction and to that of the world for near 2,000 years, that no other universe was possible. His notions of motion were entirely unphysical. It was natural or unnatural, better or worse, calm or violentóno real mechanical conception regarding it lying at the bottom of his mind. He affirmed that a vacuum could not exist, and proved that if it did exist motion in it would be impossible. He determined a priori how many species of animals must exist, and shows on general principles why animals must have such and such parts. When an eminent contemporary philosopher, who is far removed from errors of this kind, remembers these abuses of the a priori method, he will be able to make allowance for the jealousy of physicists as to the acceptance of so-called a priori truths. Aristotle's errors of detail, as shown by Eucken and Lange, were grave and numerous. He affirmed that only in man we had the beating of the heart, that the left side of the body was colder than the right, that men have more teeth than women, and that there is an empty space at the back of every man's head.
There is one essential quality in physical conceptions which was entirely wanting in those of Aristotle and his followers. I wish it could be expressed by a word untainted by its associations; it signifies a capability of being placed as a coherent picture before the mind. The Germans express the act of picturing by the word vorstellen, and the picture they call a Vorstellung. We have no word in English which comes nearer to our requirements than Imagination, and, taken with its proper limitations, the word answers very well; but, as just intimated, it is tainted by its associations, and therefore objectionable to some minds.”
Tyndall’s groping attempt to put his chemical stained fingers around a term to distinguish a distinct, yet under-conceptualized mental act – and can’t one feel him almost painfully balance just on the edge of the unknown word, like Watson trying to follow one of Holmes’ points – eerily points to the need that was met ten years later, when just the thing emerged under the pen of a German physicist, Ernst Mach. The Gedanken-experiment was born.
Ever since, it has been retrospectively accorded to other times and conceptual schemes. I have always found this a rather uncomfortable anachronism. But what I’d like to consider is how, exactly, the thought experiment is an experiment.
We don’t kid ourselves that our objections will squelch the word. We don’t want to. The relation between the thought experiment and the experiment is like the relation between the red breasted American thrush and the English robin: they look enough alike that English settlers in the New World called the thrush a robin. Lexically, only a pedant would object to that – taxonomically, it is a disaster.
A common defense of thought experiments, among philosophers, is that thought experiments are a common element of science. In fact, we have read claims that in certain scientific discourses, they have an essential function. I don’t doubt it. However, the move from saying that that class of things that we call “thought experiments” play a role in science to saying that they are indeed a type of experiment is not dependent on a clear view of experiments, but on the prestige of science, which is considered to be ultimately experimental. In other words, we are eye to eye with a vicious circle. Prestige, here, underwrites this logical leap. What it tells us is two things: we are dealing, first of all, with myth; and secondly, we are dealing with myth in terms of a the archaic system of legitimation that consists in referring to authority, rather than rationality.
Our protest against the prestige of thought experiments in philosophy stems from our sense of what experiment meant in the first place. Tyndall’s cool evaluation of Aristotle might not be textually correct re the man himself, but it is certainly correct about the spirit of Aristotelianism. The introduction of the experimental method in Europe in the seventeenth century was about one thing: the art of discovery. The point was to get outside of your head. That the world outside could be discovered was a tremendously exciting and hazardous thing.
The mania for thought experiments cruelly inverts this moment. Reflection, instead of being forced to confront the obdurant outlines of some irrepressible piece of exteriority, contents itself with the soft and pleasing task of creating bad fictions in the image of its desires. The movement from Bacon, whose death as a ‘martyr to experimentation’ is well described by Macaulay to the spectacle of a Chalmers, doing “consciousness science’ by means of infantile fantasies of zombies, is a painful indicator that civilization ain’t what it used to be.
In a conference on thought experiments that was published in the 1992 PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Ian Hacking, one of my favorite philosophers (who has gained this coveted status by being interested in what is going on outside of his head and studying it – a rare thing), commented on the papers presented that defended the validity of the thought experiment. He conceded the force of many of the arguments for thought experiments, but his emphasis was on the fact that he felt, in the presence of the thought experiment, unmoved. That is, he felt that the experiment was not explicative. Experiments, in Hacking’s account, have a life – thought experiments exist frozen in their pictorial essence. Referring to Thomas Kuhn’s essay on thought experiments, Hacking points to the character of good thought experiments:
“… thought experiments are rather fixed, largely immutable. That is yet another respect that thye are like mathematical proofs, but good proofs have proof ideas that can be used over and over in new contexts – which is not, in general the case with thought experiments. They have just one tension to expose. Of course there are false starts, and the exposition gets neater over time. And here the prescience of Kuhn’s paper comes to the fore. The reason that people wrestle with thought experiments, use them for exposition and put-down argument, is that they can reveal tensions between one vision of the world and another. They can dislodge a person from a certain way of describing the worlds. They can replace one picture by another. That is their job, their once and future job.”
Note: Since I began this number in Victorian prose, let me end it the same way. Here is Macaulay’s great description of Bacon’s death:
„It had occurred to him that snow might be used with advantage for the purpose of preventing animal substances from putrefying. On a very cold day, early in the spring of the year 1626, he alighted from his coach near Highgate, in order to try the experiment. He went into a cottage, bought a fowl, and with his own hands stuffed it with snow. While thus engaged he felt a sudden chill, and was soon so much indisposed that it was impossible for him to return to Gray's Inn. The Earl of Arundel, with whom he was well acquainted, had a house at Highgate. To that house Bacon was carried. The Earl was absent; but the servants who were in charge of the place showed great respect and attention to the illustrious guest. Here, after an illness of about a week, he expired early on the morning of Easter-day, 1626. His mind appears to have retained its strength and liveliness to the end. He did not forget the fowl which had caused his death. In the last letter that he ever wrote, with fingers which, as he said, could not steadily hold a pen, he did not omit to mention that the experiment of the snow had succeeded "excellently well"
Friday, June 13, 2014
Iraq: more fruits from the criminal American occupation
By any real standard of international conduct, the American
invasion of Iraq was a crime, which the occupation compounded a thousand fold –
or should I say 450,000 thousand fold, as that is the latest concensus figure
as to how many people died in the post-invasion violence? It is one of the
signs of the cretinous influence of the same journalistic clique that got us
into the war that the newspapers, when writing about the war, still use “around
100,000 dead” as their standard cliché. Casualties are tedious, but I am sure
that an article about 9.11 that understated the number of the dead by about 5
times (dozens of people were killed at the WTC) would receive condemnation from
the chorus of the defenders of our grievances.
It would be the height of fifth column lefty anti-Americanism, and
probably anti-semitic too! No such problems cross the mind when underplaying
the Iraqi massacre.
It looks like Maliki’s government is crumbling, and we are
going into another stage of the disaster. In this one, too, the US’s heavy hand
has played a role. Instead of condemning the totalitarianism in Saudi Arabia
for arming and encouraging the rebels in Syria – and in the process exuding its
own Islamicists – the US has colluded at it. The Americans did this before in
the 1980s, when the CIA and the Reagan administration generously designed a
global jihadist network. Great times! This time, the Obama administration –
which seeminly can’t shake off Bush’s shadow – is getting its blowback early.
Where, however, will we – we Americans, looking around in
our boredom for some rip and rotten piece of instant history to amuse us – get our information about ISIS, the Kurdish
forces, the no doubt looming Shi’ite militia response? Unfortunately, the
villains in the press the last time – the Dexter FIlkinses, the Jeff Goldbergs,
all the previous unindicted co-conspirators with the White House – are still
their, still seiving the flow of data, still conveying whispers from the
Pentagon, the Weekly Standard keyboard warriors, and all the rest of it. Having
learned nothing, they have nothing in their heads to impede the grave nonsense
that they will perpetrate in the weeklies and the op ed pages.
My one consolation is that they write for a dying industry.
The liberal media was no myth – media was born out of partisanship, not science
or the law, not truthseeking that takes place in the lab or the courtroom, and it flourished through its fidelity to its
audience. But establishment media has long forgotten its strappy beginnings and
rubs elbows with all other establishments – and in so doing has lost its
readership and viewership. Nobody grieves that the Washington Post is a charity
operation at present, and will no doubt be dumped by Bezos when the time comes.
Partisanship means developing to an acute degree one’s
capacity to criticize, to investigate one’s enemies, to expose, to muckrake.
But the establishment media of the Bush era was an overpaid, overstuffed lot of
“insiders” and they jumped onto the Iraq
bandwagon gratefully, wagging their tails, basking in the proximity to the “rebel
in chief”, as he was named by one of the sycophants. It is this group that
still wails when the US misses a chance for a war, or at least a good stiff
bombing campaign. Unfortunately, the mindset is bipartisan – as bipartisan as
the mindset that takes “partisan” to be a dirty word.
Iraq could never be won, so it could never be lost. The
question really is: who is responsible for a policy spreading death and destruction
on a 450,000 casualty scale in the Middle East. The answer is the Americans. I
am sure the discussion in the next couple of weeks will be about how Americans
can add more bodies to their tally.
This is sad beyond bearing.
Wednesday, June 11, 2014
the negative labyrinth
We know the labyrinth, with its enclosing folds, at the
claustrophobic center of which resides the secret for which the structure was
built. But the negative labyrinth is, perhaps, De Quincey’s invention. You find
suggestions of that image all over his work, but most concentratedly in Suspira
de Profundis, when he explains his idea of the brain as a palimpsest. The idea
is introduced in a very odd and distaff way – De Quincey tells us that his
explanation of the palimpsest is aimed at his women readers, who have not taken
Greek – or if they have taken it, will politely hold mum, in order not to
embarrass their men. This entirely unnecessary gesture is followed by a long
discussion of the palimpsest as a metaphor for memory, where traces are erased
to receive other traces, and then erased again. Yeet each level can be
recovered given the right chemical solution (which, in De Quincey’s case, will
definely involve opoids). Although on first glance a palimpsest is not a
labyrinthian product, De Quincey’s use of it as a memory model makes it one – a
negative labyrinth. Unfoldings here lead to other unfoldings, erasures to other
erasures, down and down. It is a vertiginous descent without any inherent
limit. The prose generates a host of images, among which the most striking is
the phoenix
“Even the fable of the Phoenix, that secular bird who
propagated his solitary existence, and his solitary births, along the line of
the centuries, through eternal realys of
funeral mists, is but a type of what we have done with Palimpsests. We
have backed upon each pheonex in the
long regressus, and forced him to expose his ancestral phoenix, sleeping in the
ashes below his own ashes.”
The negative labyrinth, perhaps, marks a turn in the
romantic figure of the labyrinth that leads to modernism. It must have
fascinated Baudelaire, De Quincey’s translator (although the Suspira was never
published as a whole in De Quincey’s lifetime, so it is possible Baudelaire was
unaware of it). We use our escape into the world to go back, link by link,
through the chain from which we’ve been freed, to find another chain at its
end, that chain also broken – and so on.
We are reminded, here, that addictus was the Roman word for creditor. I
would draw out this thought at length, but I feel like instead, I’ll simply
juxtapose it to a citation from William
Smith’s Dictionary of Greek and Roman antiquities and let the devil take
the words from my tongue:
“A curious passage of
Gellius (xx.1) gives us the ancient mode of legal procedure in the case of
debt, as fixed by the Twelve tables. If the debtor admitted the debt, or had
been condemned in the amount of the debt by a judex, he had thirty days allowed
him for payment. At the expiration of this time, he was liable to the Manus
Injectio and ultimately to be assigned over to the creditor (addictus) by the
sentence of the praetor. The creditor was required to keep him for sixty days
in chains, during which time he publicly exposed the debtor on three nundinea,
and proclaimed the amount of his debt. In no person release the prisoner by
paying the debt, the creditor might sell him as a slave or put him to death."
Saturday, June 07, 2014
Tucholsky today
Hey, a little miracle today> a nyt story about, of all people, Kurt Tucholsky. This makes me think that I should recycle the translation I made in 2007 of one of his great essays. Here it is.
"Continuing our futile anti-war shrieking and babbling, LI is going to translate a famous article of Tucholsky’s entitled the “Der Leerlauf eines Heroismus” – “A Heroism’s hollow trajectory” – but before we do it, a little background is necessary. Luckily, Time Magazine has recently put online an article, “Handsome Adolf”, it published in 1930 about the treason trial in Leipzig, in which was ‘uncovered the mental situation of the military for those who didn’t know it,” as Tucholsky puts it.
Here’s the salient first grafs, displaying Time’s truly annoying journalistic style – this is the kind of writing that Robert Coover parodied in The Public Burning:
“Not in Berlin, not even in Prussia, but in Saxony, in Leipzig sits the German Supreme Court: das Reichsgericht. Justice is done beneath a mighty dome topped by a big bronze statue of Truth. Through tall casement windows Saxon sunbeams glint upon carved oak. In such a setting presiding Judge Baumgarten (except when fiddling with one of his ears) is a sight awesome as Olympian Jove. Boldly to face the justice down, to use the Supreme Court dome as a demagog's thumping tub, to hurl from dem Reichsgericht a defy which reverberated throughout Europe, such was the feat last week of Adolf Hitler, No. I Brown Shirt Fascist (TIME, Aug. 25).
Ostensibly the proceedings were a trial for High Treason. Three young German army officers (Lieutenants Richard Scheringer, Hans Ludin, Friedrich Wendt) were charged with inciting their men to join a Fascist putsch should it be proclaimed. Without quite admitting their guilt the young officers waxed hotly truculent. "I would obey an order to shoot down Communists," shouted Lieutenant Scheringer, "but I would disobey a command to fire on men of my own persuasion!"
Exactly what was this "persuasion"? Evading damaging admissions, the Lieutenants said in effect that their views are those of Brown Shirt Hitler, leader of the National Socialist [Fascist] party whose sensational gains in the last election make it second strongest in Germany (TIME, Sept. 22). If such views be treason, argued the defense, then make the most of it!
Smart, the defense determined to do exactly this, subpenaed Herr Hitler as a witness, got ready to offer him the opportunity to use the witness stand as a soapbox.
Housewives & Blue Eyes. "Hitler Kommt!" cried 2,000 excited Saxons massed inside and outside the supreme courthouse. Many were women—for thrifty German housewives particularly dislike paying reparations, have swallowed eagerly the brash Fascist promises to repudiate the Young Plan. As Herr Hitler's motorcar swirled up the women pelted him with flowers. As this medium sized man with a small blond mustache but hard, blue, twinkling eyes stepped out, soprano voices cried "Ach, der schöne Adolf!" (Ah, handsome Adolf!). But so vast, dim, labyrinthine is the supreme courthouse that Witness Hitler, studiously quiet at first, stepped into the chamber and was actually on the stand before the courtroom galleries saw him.
Ostensibly the proceedings were a trial for High Treason. Three young German army officers (Lieutenants Richard Scheringer, Hans Ludin, Friedrich Wendt) were charged with inciting their men to join a Fascist putsch should it be proclaimed. Without quite admitting their guilt the young officers waxed hotly truculent. "I would obey an order to shoot down Communists," shouted Lieutenant Scheringer, "but I would disobey a command to fire on men of my own persuasion!"
Exactly what was this "persuasion"? Evading damaging admissions, the Lieutenants said in effect that their views are those of Brown Shirt Hitler, leader of the National Socialist [Fascist] party whose sensational gains in the last election make it second strongest in Germany (TIME, Sept. 22). If such views be treason, argued the defense, then make the most of it!
Smart, the defense determined to do exactly this, subpenaed Herr Hitler as a witness, got ready to offer him the opportunity to use the witness stand as a soapbox.
Housewives & Blue Eyes. "Hitler Kommt!" cried 2,000 excited Saxons massed inside and outside the supreme courthouse. Many were women—for thrifty German housewives particularly dislike paying reparations, have swallowed eagerly the brash Fascist promises to repudiate the Young Plan. As Herr Hitler's motorcar swirled up the women pelted him with flowers. As this medium sized man with a small blond mustache but hard, blue, twinkling eyes stepped out, soprano voices cried "Ach, der schöne Adolf!" (Ah, handsome Adolf!). But so vast, dim, labyrinthine is the supreme courthouse that Witness Hitler, studiously quiet at first, stepped into the chamber and was actually on the stand before the courtroom galleries saw him.
"Heads Shall Roll!" Asked if he were planning revolution, Herr Hitler answered composedly:
"Nein, we are merely preparing an intellectual eruption of the German people by peaceful means."
When this drew from the gallery a roar of "Germany Awake!" (Fascist slogan), Judge Baumgarten glared at the assemblage, rumbled, "Silence, this is not a theatre!" but soon Herr Hitler in smashing demagog style was carrying all before him.”
It is always a jolting thing to see how the devil was painted before he became the devil. Those twinkling blue eyes - here's a man who might just have the answer to the red menace!
Here's the great Kurt:
Heroism running on empty - Kurt Tucholsky
The Leipzig trial for high treason has unveiled the mental situation of the German military for those who did not know it.
We don’t take the trial very seriously. The official court has long disappointed the trust of all observers with its political judgments – what is inscribed in its judgments is resentment and politics, which are served up as a form of justicery.
That communists would never be treated like these three officers doesn’t surprise us. “I have”, said one of the government attornies, “not wanted to offend the accused, and I would regret it if they had been offended (gekraenkt habe). Well, that’s all righty then….
The important and implication heavy thing is not the attitudes of the court, but instead, the the pattern of military thought, which is less known.
It is grim.
That voluntary soldiers are voluntary opponents of pacifism ought not to astonish us, and is understandable. That has always been the case. Although it is rarely thought about - as it would be if the fire department, for example, struggled against those who wanted to put out flames… but these soldiers have never felt like firemen, who are called in the moment of danger, but have always seen themselves as their own end.
Although I won’t speak to those majors and lieutenants, who can’t be persuaded because they can’t read, and if they could read, could not understand, and if they could understand what they read, would apply it falsely – I will speak to people who wish to battle un-intelligence with intelligence.
Although I won’t speak to those majors and lieutenants, who can’t be persuaded because they can’t read, and if they could read, could not understand, and if they could understand what they read, would apply it falsely – I will speak to people who wish to battle un-intelligence with intelligence.
Every man creates in his mind a world, in which he stands in the center, according to his abilities. Few confess this. Let’s begin with ourselves.
Pacifists who are good horsemen are exceptions. In every pacifistic tendency is – next to the best ethical intentions – the rejection of a world in which the preaching pacifist does not play a leading role. It is already much, if he could stand with respect in this warrior’s world. This dainty aunt-y feature is unmistakable in pacifism; where it works itself out sentimentally, is where it is hardest to defend. For that is not the sense and content of pacifism. The military opponent fights with us: with slanders, as for example in this trial; with insults, that are uninteresting, and … without a trace of justice. They struggle mostly, however, against the worst and lowest level of pacifism, against its caricature, against the cry baby in it.
Otherwise such a fight is a question of intellectual force, and really not only of the brachial type, as it is thoroughly impressed upon us today. The peaceloving person, who doesn’t want to squander his best forces on the battle field, builds himself a world, in which he has some value. He is easily inclined to place this world ethically higher than all the others.
It is weakness and lies to close one’s eyes to the fact that these elements have to be cleanly expelled. I hold it for wholly just and natural.
The pacifist is correct, even so, in his fight against war, because he is denying it the power to manage the lives of other people. I have no vegetarian feelings in any way: there may be situations, in which spilling blood is no injustice. But one must hold upright, as a fundamental demand, that nobody has the right, to rule over the life of his fellow men in order to elevate himself. But that’s exactly what soldier’s do."
Cut in here some recent 2007 news - this translation will be collaged, an art at which Tucholsky excelled:
Otherwise such a fight is a question of intellectual force, and really not only of the brachial type, as it is thoroughly impressed upon us today. The peaceloving person, who doesn’t want to squander his best forces on the battle field, builds himself a world, in which he has some value. He is easily inclined to place this world ethically higher than all the others.
It is weakness and lies to close one’s eyes to the fact that these elements have to be cleanly expelled. I hold it for wholly just and natural.
The pacifist is correct, even so, in his fight against war, because he is denying it the power to manage the lives of other people. I have no vegetarian feelings in any way: there may be situations, in which spilling blood is no injustice. But one must hold upright, as a fundamental demand, that nobody has the right, to rule over the life of his fellow men in order to elevate himself. But that’s exactly what soldier’s do."
Cut in here some recent 2007 news - this translation will be collaged, an art at which Tucholsky excelled:
“Yesterday morning, police recruits sank their shovels into a shallow grave alongside a highway and turned up the bodies of 29 unidentified men, bound, blindfolded and recently shot.
Hours later, the bodies of 15 more men, their faces splattered with mud, their necks cut with wire, were found piled in the back of a pickup truck.
On Monday, it was the same. More than 40 bodies were picked up from the streets of Baghdad, many having a single bullet wound in the head.
No one seems to know how, for example, a pickup truck full of dead men could turn up at a busy intersection in Baghdad, where there is a strict curfew at night and ceaseless checkpoints during the day. – NYT, March 15, 2006
Hours later, the bodies of 15 more men, their faces splattered with mud, their necks cut with wire, were found piled in the back of a pickup truck.
On Monday, it was the same. More than 40 bodies were picked up from the streets of Baghdad, many having a single bullet wound in the head.
No one seems to know how, for example, a pickup truck full of dead men could turn up at a busy intersection in Baghdad, where there is a strict curfew at night and ceaseless checkpoints during the day. – NYT, March 15, 2006
"The establishment of expressed opinions in the Leipzig trial was more than miserable. One doesn’t have to cite any documents. Ours indeed smells of where the opinions come from. Their views stem completely out of this feeling. It isn’t that they need to be bad because of this. But they are empty and disgusting. For:
If one taps hard enough on the young lieutenant and the suspiciously older officers, one will always find that they think of Germany, their fellow citizens and the collected world as a place for military exercises, for maneuvers, and look at it all as a future battlefield, on which they can unfold what they call their best talents. There we can say ecce homo – there and only there. It is for significant for this heroism, that by many is doubtless believed to be authentic and masculine, that it never asks after the goal of the soldier’s work. The fight is fought; if it is once begun, it must be gone through – but to what end the whole goes, for what reason, for who, to whose use: this is something they don’t question. In Heinz Pols novel Either-or, there is a marvelous passage: “ He wanted to see just once what he was struggling against.” That’s it. The struggle is primary – only afterward is it rationalized.
This leads easily to wanting to fight in general, and thus: to evoke hostilities and to make enemies, with whom man can be a soldier. The soldier needs an enemy. Otherwise he would be nothing.
Thus, if these officers win influence on the politics of the country – and they have achieved more than is commonly assumed – than we are near the point that they, for the sake of activating their handwork, will provoke fighting even where one could avoid it.
What the young men have said before the tribunal does not deserve any contradiction: where there is sheer nothingness, the polemicist loses his rights. It was the typical resentment of the soldier’s attitude, a casino speech, that anybody who has been through a war could repeat in his sleep. It was and is the rejection of the intellectual world, the world of peace in general, because it is too boring for men of this mold to live in. One can’t ask an actor to approve of a social order in which the theater is banned and expelled. The actor wants to act. The soldier wants to make war.
This leads easily to wanting to fight in general, and thus: to evoke hostilities and to make enemies, with whom man can be a soldier. The soldier needs an enemy. Otherwise he would be nothing.
Thus, if these officers win influence on the politics of the country – and they have achieved more than is commonly assumed – than we are near the point that they, for the sake of activating their handwork, will provoke fighting even where one could avoid it.
What the young men have said before the tribunal does not deserve any contradiction: where there is sheer nothingness, the polemicist loses his rights. It was the typical resentment of the soldier’s attitude, a casino speech, that anybody who has been through a war could repeat in his sleep. It was and is the rejection of the intellectual world, the world of peace in general, because it is too boring for men of this mold to live in. One can’t ask an actor to approve of a social order in which the theater is banned and expelled. The actor wants to act. The soldier wants to make war.
Now, the military man didn’t fall from heaven. He is nothing more than a kind of person found throughout the human race, who is, because of history and tradition, simply overbred in Germany, because a certain type of German is wired to go beserk.
In the soldier is – observing this with complete value neutrality – force; youth, a spirit that wants to be applied; a surplus energy, that wants to spill out; a desire for riot; joy in obedience and joy in being obeyed; joy in working in the fresh air; joy in colors and in equipment – all of this and more. All of which is scrambled up, in modern soldiers, with the type of office-capable organisor, men who want to command and let others work. And with technicians, who just enjoy modern machinery, which he commands with his type of orders… for these people, it is unimportant if, in striking England, Germany is right, that doesn’t move them at all. What moves them is commanding a division and using a tank. Sports.
In this activity there is a lot of what is good and legitimate. But instead of exploiting such forces, they are regressing the modern social order. In the capitalistic office-industry, young men who are so constituted cannot begin to make anything of themselves and their particular strengths, and now they are making themselves what they need.
For the military with all its trimmings is not only a need of society in general, but a need, most fundamentally, of a particular part of society.
Thus, like the half-intellectual, who “not knowing, what he should do”, enters in the administrative world or in industry and builds a “niche for himself’ that didn’t exist before, one, which needs the man who holds it in order to exist at all: similarly , the soldier creates in every country: a, the necessary spiritual preconditions for his existence in the form of enemies, dangers, and a nationalism intensified to an insane level, and b., a mechanism, in which he reigns supreme, and works, and unfolds his special powers – in which he can, in other words, simply be. These institutions congealed out of powerful men inclined towards violence are the armies; these instruments are used, misused and needed by whatever reigning order is current: for the suppression of the class enemy, thus the worker, for the diversion of the society to external threats and so on. The soldier doesn’t see this for the most part. He just is.
Thus, like the half-intellectual, who “not knowing, what he should do”, enters in the administrative world or in industry and builds a “niche for himself’ that didn’t exist before, one, which needs the man who holds it in order to exist at all: similarly , the soldier creates in every country: a, the necessary spiritual preconditions for his existence in the form of enemies, dangers, and a nationalism intensified to an insane level, and b., a mechanism, in which he reigns supreme, and works, and unfolds his special powers – in which he can, in other words, simply be. These institutions congealed out of powerful men inclined towards violence are the armies; these instruments are used, misused and needed by whatever reigning order is current: for the suppression of the class enemy, thus the worker, for the diversion of the society to external threats and so on. The soldier doesn’t see this for the most part. He just is.
This heroism runs on empty. It is heroism in and for itself – and so it isn’t heroism at all. The vague concept of the ‘homeland'’ is a mythical formula; there is nothing that these men defend against as much as a conceptual analysis of their pseudo-religious formulas, and they know well why. It would be the end. The blank nullity of it would be revealed to the light of day.
It is not that the fundamental forces in play here are reducible to: joy in destruction; the joy of little men parading before little women; that is not the fact to be negated. Negation is aimed fully at the way these powers, running forever on their own emptiness, are put in place and misused.
We must fundamentally distinguish this military pattern of thought from that that the young nationalists preach. They are busily lending to a previous basic feeling a new and spiritual form – but not out of respect for the spirit, of which they mostly have not a breath, but in order to erect their main man on this ground. How much uncertainty is therein! What Ernst Junger did, while becoming in the meantime a clever war reporter, assiduously, obsessively and hop hop, is spiritually thin, undernourished and much more from yesterday than it is from tomorrow, as it pretends to be. Always it is significantly more lyrical than the cold fundamental perspective of the eternal officer class, who are nothing but that. Jünger aims for a mysticism whose clouds can be dispelled by a wave of the hand; behind them grins the blank nothingness, the stubborn view that fighting is something affirmable in itself. Young people in today’s so called “Bunde” associations are not much different. One must be suspicious – against the right and the left – every time someone greets an attack on a given view with the cry, ‘blasphemy’! Because it means something is rotten within.
On both levels, in the military as in the nationalist associations, rules the same running on empty heroism. They are distinct from one another and even divided; possibly, one day they will join together – but by this junction they will mutually keep an eye on each other and never let a moment pass in which one can betray the other … the young nationalists being, for the military, much too literary, for as is known to all the world, he who reads a book is a bookworm…
It is not that the fundamental forces in play here are reducible to: joy in destruction; the joy of little men parading before little women; that is not the fact to be negated. Negation is aimed fully at the way these powers, running forever on their own emptiness, are put in place and misused.
We must fundamentally distinguish this military pattern of thought from that that the young nationalists preach. They are busily lending to a previous basic feeling a new and spiritual form – but not out of respect for the spirit, of which they mostly have not a breath, but in order to erect their main man on this ground. How much uncertainty is therein! What Ernst Junger did, while becoming in the meantime a clever war reporter, assiduously, obsessively and hop hop, is spiritually thin, undernourished and much more from yesterday than it is from tomorrow, as it pretends to be. Always it is significantly more lyrical than the cold fundamental perspective of the eternal officer class, who are nothing but that. Jünger aims for a mysticism whose clouds can be dispelled by a wave of the hand; behind them grins the blank nothingness, the stubborn view that fighting is something affirmable in itself. Young people in today’s so called “Bunde” associations are not much different. One must be suspicious – against the right and the left – every time someone greets an attack on a given view with the cry, ‘blasphemy’! Because it means something is rotten within.
On both levels, in the military as in the nationalist associations, rules the same running on empty heroism. They are distinct from one another and even divided; possibly, one day they will join together – but by this junction they will mutually keep an eye on each other and never let a moment pass in which one can betray the other … the young nationalists being, for the military, much too literary, for as is known to all the world, he who reads a book is a bookworm…
But in these circumstances the eternal military man will create what he needs. An ‘air defense’, a ‘water defense’, a ‘train defense’, and whatever a man needs when he doesn’t know how to do anything intelligent. These and their like are aids to the unfolding of his nature.
But it is a little much to ask all society to pay for the excitation of the internal secretions of a small group of men. Certainly, on all sides the payer is being bombarded with demands for: maneuvers, war reports of all types, uniforms, music, photo ops with cannons … somewhat overbilled, it seems to me.
But it is all empty, completely empty. And it steps up with the complete aplomb of the muscleman, who is, on first impression, always at an advantage over the brainy man. His opponent doesn’t have much time. And as for your average householder… great god. They are touched by the like of General von Seeckt because he has the cleverness not to open his mouth – there are not only inscrutable geniuses, there are other kinds, too. And a book of some reputation seeking general is a curiosity: if the man were not a staff officer, nobody would care about his views and his empty essays.
Mars is blind and has no head. He just has a helmet.
And you are reflected in this helmet. How, after all, did it happen that 1914 went so far? How was that possible? It was made possible by refined and pointed preliminary labor: through a day by day drum fussilade of war preparation, through the market cries of running on empty heroism."
My post was interspersed with war photos of mangled bodies that Tucholsky and his friends, like Heartsfield, tried to rub in the face of Germany. But that ploy didn't work. In the U.S. - where the same idiocy, raised to the American exponential, dominates the airwaves - the ploy would probably not work either. But it doesn't matter - the media will dutifully censor it, and continue to roll out clangorous odes to our military "heros".
My post was interspersed with war photos of mangled bodies that Tucholsky and his friends, like Heartsfield, tried to rub in the face of Germany. But that ploy didn't work. In the U.S. - where the same idiocy, raised to the American exponential, dominates the airwaves - the ploy would probably not work either. But it doesn't matter - the media will dutifully censor it, and continue to roll out clangorous odes to our military "heros".
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