“And Jesus said unto him,
Foxes have holes, and birds of the air have nests; but the Son of man hath not
where to lay his head.”.
“ “While the division of labor increases the productive power of labor, and the
wealth and refinement of society, it leads to the impoverishment of the laborer
until he sinks to the level of the machine. While labor incites the
accumulation of capitals and thus the increasing well being of society, it
makes the laborer ever more dependent on the capitalist, thrusts him into a
greater competition, drives him into a rush of overproduction, from which
follows an equivalent slump.” - Marx
Leszek Kolakowski has written that Marx, unlike the socialists of the 40s, had
a firmer grasp of the fact that capitalism was rooted in de-humanization. His
economic analysis does not marginalize this insight, but builds upon it – which
is why Marx never puts the market at the center of economic analysis, even as
he is able to represent the reasons that mainstream economists do so.
In the Economic-Philosophical manuscripts, the figure for that de-humanization
is the machine.
Not, I notice, an animal. Traditionally, the poor were compared to animals. Animals
themselves occupy an ambiguous status in the popular mindset. Sergio della
Bernardina, who did an ethnographic study of various rituals of cruelty to
animals, from bear baiting to hunting, found that the concept of the person, outside
of philosophy, is a matter of degrees and situations, not an absolute. How personhood intervenes in social practice
can’t necessarily be predicted from our definition of personhood – in the cases
Bernardina examines, the tormenting of a bear or a bull before it is killed
does not happen because its tormenters lack a sense of the animals personhood,
but precisely because they want to provoke aggression on the part of the animal
to which they can respond, shifting the blame for the animal’s death to the
animal itself as a person responsible for lashing out, for acting badly.
Since the sixties, environmental historians have liked to bait Christianity for
the massively bad habit of entrusting nature to man, and thus making the environment
secondary to one species of dweller within it. I think this is a
misinterpretation of the Church’s larger history, which put it in the broad
ancient tradition which, while it certainly did not ascribe property to animals,
did understand them as dwelling things - they did have holes and nests. They
had families. Christian iconography is actually replete with peaceful animals,
with the redeemed sheep, with the dove, etc.
The animal might not have a property relationship with the world – they could
be hunted, they could be sacrificed, they could be eaten – but they were, of
course, God’s creation.
Not the machine. The machine not only has not property claim on the world – it
has no home. It has no family. The son of man would not say, the chariots have
sheds, the hammers have a box – although he’d know it, being a carpenter’s son.
In the double logic of the dissolution of the human limit, when Descartes and
the early modern natural philosophers compare the animal to the machine – and
man, too – they both advance a new claim about the human relationship to the
world (dissolving any limit to its use) while advancing a new and
unrecognizable form of human – the man machine, the Other – as the human
subject.
The poverty of the worker, who sinks to the state of a machine, is the flip
side of the glory of the proletariat, the Other who is the subject of universal
history. What does the poverty consist in? Marx sees it, of course, in terms of
wealth – but also refinement – the “Verfeinerung der Gesellschaft.” I would
call this poverty an imprisonment in routines. It is hard to resist jumping
ahead to Freudian terms, having to do with obsessive behavior and neurosis,
which, after all, is the mechanical coming to the surface – the arm or leg that
doesn’t work, that has returned to dead matter.
A note more here on the machine – I am floating a string of notes
here. It is easy to forget that the Descartes or Le Mettrie’s machine was an
automaton, an entertainment. Court societies love F/X, whether it is
Versailles, Hollywood or D.C. – but in real material terms, the automata did
nothing more than demonstrate the uses of a winding mechanism. What Marx is
talking about is not that kind of machine.
As Schivelbusch nicely puts it at the beginning of The Railway Journey, the
Europe of the eighteenth century, which was still the Europe of wood and woods,
of energy supplied by streams and forests, was losing its woods. He quotes
Sombart – and I am going to give some elbow room here to exaggeration and the
blind eye turned to the forests in America. Still, wood was becoming more
expensive, and in this way an opportunity opens up for other means of energy
and structure – notably, coal and iron. To which one must add that water, too,
but in a new form – as steam – is part of the complex. In one of the historical
ironies that the economic historian scrupulously skirts, even the Corn laws,
decried for two centuries, actually contributed to the industrial revolution,
for, by raising the price of grain and thus of keeping horses, they “helped replace
horsepower by mechanical power in much the same way shortage of wood in 18th
century Europe had accelerated the development of coal production.”
So, the older elements of life – that obsession of the romantics in perhaps the
last final bloom of eotechnical Europe – were being reconfigured before Marx’s
eyes. When Marx was expelled from Paris in 1845, he took the messagerie – the
stagecoach – to the Belgian border. In 1848, when he was kicked out of Belgium,
he took the train back to Paris.
For Marx, the machine like worker is not, here, the automaton, but rather one
of the new machines which incorporated an unheard of precision and
standardization.
Schivelbusch, interested in how the consciousness caught the phenomenological
changes being wrought by the machine, quotes a wonderful passage from an
advocate of steam engine powered transport in 1825, who describes the imperfect
movement of the horse: ‘the animal advances not with a continual progressive
motion, but with a sort of irregular hobbling, which raises and sinks its body
at every alternate motion of its limbs.”[12] Similarly, Schivelbusch notes that
the steam boat was admired at first because it did not tack – it could move
against the current and the wind.
A culture picks up in its proprio-phenomenological net such major changes to
its habits, but often doesn’t express their novelty, because the vocabulary to
express it is lacking. Marx is a monument of the modern moment because, among
other things, he understood that the vastness of the changes taking place
around him called for the deployment of an entirely different understanding of
the world.