Over at Economists View, there is a post disputing, to an extent, a new study by Michael Bordo and Christopher Meissner that disputes the idea that inequality caused the crisis. I can't resist reprising my mangle of inequality idea, with a few changes from the way I originally formulated it after my friend S.'s wedding.
“I’m so bored. I hate my life.” - Britney Spears            
 
Das Langweilige ist interessant geworden, weil das Interessante angefangen hat langweilig zu werden. – Thomas Mann  
"Never for money/always for love" - The Talking Heads
Friday, March 09, 2012
Digression: a vitruvian theme
The second book of Vitruvius’ treatise on architecture
begins by considering the origin of human building. That origin is, it turns
out, connected with the origin of human speech, the origin of politics, and the
discovery of fire – which form a sort of originary matrix:
“Mankind originally brought forth like the beasts of the
field, in woods, dens, and groves, passed their lives in a savage manner,
eating the simple food which nature afforded. A tempest, on a certain
occasion, having exceedingly agitated the trees in a particular spot, the
friction between some of the branches caused them to take fire; this so alarmed
those in the neighbourhood of the accident, that they betook themselves to
flight. Returning to the spot after the tempest had subsided, and finding the
warmth which had thus been created extremely comfortable, they added fuel to
the fire excited, in order to preserve the heat, and then went forth to invite
others, by signs and gestures, to come and witness the discovery. In the
concourse that thus took place, they testified their different opinions and
expressions by different inflexions of the voice. From daily association words
succeeded to these indefinite modes of speech; and these becoming by degrees
the signs of certain objects, they began to join them together, and
conversation became general. 
 Thus the discovery of
fire gave rise to the first assembly of mankind, to their first deliberations,
and to their union in a state of society. For association with each other they
were more fitted by nature than other animals, from their erect posture, which
also gave them the advantage of continually viewing the stars and firmament, no
less than from their being able to grasp and lift an object, and turn it about
with their hands and fingers. In the assembly, therefore, which thus brought
them first together, they were led to the consideration of sheltering
themselves from the seasons, some by making arbours with the boughs of trees,
some by excavating caves in the mountains, and others in imitation of the nests
and habitations of swallows, by making dwellings of twigs interwoven and
covered with mud or clay. From observation of and improvement on each others'
expedients for sheltering themselves, they soon began to provide a better
species of huts.” 
As Erwin Panofsky pointed out in a famous and beautiful essay
on a series of paintings by Piero Cosimo that were inspired by Vitruvius’ text,
the story Vitruvius tells is related to other stories about Vulcan, the God of
fire, and Aeolus, the God of the wind, that crop up in many classical texts.
Vitruvius introduces no gods – Panofsky attributes this to his Lucretian
naturalism. It is the wind that is in action here, not the god of the wind, and
the fire that starts in the woods is not started by a god, but by the friction
of the branches. The story of the discovery of fire, along Vitruvian lines, has
had a long intellectual life, serving both as a model and a limit case of the
logic of that vexed pair, discovery and invention. In turn, these terms seem to
overlap the discourses of history and social science, in as much as these have
to do with social collectives – aggregates – and individuals. The first
sentence of Vitruvius’ second paragraph begins like this: “ergo cum propter
ignis inventionem conventus initio apud homines et concilium et convictus esset
natus…” The first impulse of we moderns is to lead these words back into the
great dual categories under which modernity has proceded, nature and culture.
However, it turns out that we cannot shoehorn these concepts into those
categories without covertly applying the logic of the supplement so expertly
defused by Derrida in On Grammatology  –
for what nature is borrows on what culture is to be, and vice versa: it is a
conman’s checking account.  
Which is not to say that it can’t be drawn on – on the
contrary. After showing how the forest fire was seen as the predecessor and
model for the first fires of man in the classical and Hellenistic epochs and
from thence was lifted into the allegorical key to a series of three paintings
about the origin of civilization by Piero di Cosimo, Panofsky writes,
beautifully: “The ruling principle of this
aboriginal state, namely, the unfamiliarity of man-kind with the use of fire,
is conspicuously emphasized by what might be termed the " leitmotiv"
of the whole series: the forest fire, which can be seen ravaging the woods and
frightening away the animals in all three panels ;2 in two of them it even appears
repeatedly. The persistent recurrence of this motif cannot be accounted for by
mere pictorial fancy. It is, most evidently, an iconographical attribute rather
than a whimsical " concetto,"fo r it is identical with the famous
forest fire which had haunted the imaginations of Lucretius, Diodorus Siculus,
Pliny, Vitruvius, and Boccaccio. It appeared regularly in all the illustrations
of Vitruvius, and in the Renais-sance it was as characteristic of
representations of the Stone Age as the tower of images of St. Barbara.”
I would like to argue that
scorch marks from Vitruvius’ fire haunt that fabulous myth, Western man, and
his sidekick, homo oeconomicus, long after Cosimo.  The semantic architecture of
Vitruvius’ story of the origin of architecture can be traced not only in the
way the history of technology is told, but in the way the social sciences have
explained themselves – not just explained themselves in the internal dialogues
of the disciplines, but explained themselves in collaboration with the ongoing
mission of capitalist civilizations, which automatically divided the primitive
and the civilized according to a Vitruvian measure – that of technology. That
fire is both a natural and an artificial product blurs its definitional import
– but the language that springs up from those huddle about the fire seems to
take from the fire the decisive force that will, in one form or another, become
the dividing line that justifies a global exercise of power. Writing, or, after
the printing press, the book, becomes the civilizing technology par excellence,
thrusting those ‘without writing’ into not only a different category, but even
a different time zone, as though this lack had cut them off from  the zone of simultaneity which traverses and
determines the way those who do write make sense of writing.  
Monday, March 05, 2012
News from the Zona: Ireland, Negri and Chérèque
I was in Ireland last week. Ireland, surely, is a
posterchild and ward of the Zona: rolling in tax evasion wealth in the 2000s,
constructing like mad and paying its chief officials, it turns out, like mad
too, in 2008 it went off the cliff and has contracted and contracted since, all
the while hocking its future to the plutocrats of the financial sphere, and
cutting funding for normal life elsewhere. That’s Ireland then. But in Wicklow
where I went, and then in Dublin where I went after, there was not a strong
sense of disaster in the air. Rather, what was in the air was something more
delicate, like the air whistling out of a punctured tire: there was a slumping
towards lower expectations. And in fact expectations were well and truly
privatized – one probably heard more about politics than is usual – and we did
talk to a journalist who had very articulate ideas about politics – but on the
whole, there was no sense of a collective project at all. 
This is one of the remarkable successes of the neo-liberal
era, and perhaps the secret of its apparent ability to spawn a Zona and yet
keep its bony hands on the world’s throat. What it has exploited is the
dialectic of vulnerability that was forged in the Cold War system, in which the
power to destroy the world was granted to the political elites in return for a
return on that power that traversed ordinary life – that is, the setting up of
the conventions and circumstances of middle class life. I want to avoid
assigning the responsibility for that set up to the state or to the private
sphere, since it is a delusion that the state and private enterprise are
opposed to each other in any essential way. The Cold War system, as I’ve
pointed out before, owes a lot to the Hitlerian totalitarianism of the thirties
– which, contrary to the ideologists, was anything but an epoch of total
mobilization. Rather, it was an epoch of specialized mobilization in which the
state did what it could to insulate the individual “authentic” German from any
collective project that would require sacrifice on his or her part. 
We are the heirs of that thinking. As long as the mass of
people are not, individually, vulnerable, as long as no sacrifice is really
required for a collective vision, the mass of people are content to operate
individually, to think of their fates as having to do with their defects or
virtues, their hard work or laziness, their propensity to save or spend –
without really having any sense of the systems put in place from the point of
view of which they, individually, are simply so many human products, and their
tics and life experiences so much  bland
margin of error that the models can easily deal with. The power of the masses
has been given up without a shot – or, to put it more Adorno-esquely,  every time you turn on the tv set or
computer, you surrender a little bit more. 
But you never surrender all the way – the systems of
governance that have both produced the Zona and have managed it can’t
accommodate complete surrender, although they don’t know it. The human economy,
which puts holes and tunnels in even the most rational economic institutions
and enterprises, is required for capitalism to exist. 
Which brings me to the point of this post, the dialogue
between Tony Negri and François Chérèque, the general secretary of the French
union, The Democratic French Confederation of Labor, or Confédération française
démocratique du travail (CFDT) in the February issue of Philosophie. The pdf
can be found here:
http://www.monsyndicatcfdt.fr/content/m-tro-boulot-bobo-echanges-entre-fran-ois-chereque-sg-de-la-cfdt-et-toni-negri-philosophe-it
The dialogue has not been given any attention, as far as I
could tell, among the English speaking blogs. Too bad. Chérèque presents an
empirical view of the condition of the wage class in France stemming from his
interviews with that class. The project of interviewing the class was motivated
by the self-immolation of an employee of France Telecom, a militant of the
CFDT: why would one’s self-identity be so wrapped up on one’s work? 
Negri opposes to Chérèque’s ‘old fashioned” promotion of the
word and the concept, worker, his new fashioned notion of ‘immaterial labor’ –
what I would call the triumph of the agent of circulation over the agent of
production. For Negri, this signals the passing of a ‘figure’, the figure of
the proletariat, who emerged in the 1840s and attenuated in social importance
after the 1870s. Chérèque, jumps on him about this potted history:
F.C. I don’t wholly share your observation. It is true that
the heroic figure of the proletariat concentrated in mass in the great
industries has disappeared, but material labor hasn’t disappeared for all that…
Firstly with globalisation: the Apple model of Steve Jobs is  “enterprise without factory”: on one side,
immateriality, computers and information research, and on the other, the
delocalized factory in China with the conditions of production that we know.
But this process of dissemination is equally at work in Europe. There is a new
segmentation of work with a massive recourse to temps, to the intermediares, to
precarious labor to support difficult tasks. The farther you are from the
profit center, the more you suffer. Do you know how much a supermarket employee
lifts onto the shelves every day? A ton!
To which Negri replies, backtracking: One cannot efface the
physical and corporeal dimension of work, you are totally right. Imagine that
work can really become immaterial is stupid!”
However, Negri returns to the charge later: “One tends in
fact to forget these workers, who, however, furnish out everyday meat. If I
persist, however, in naming “immaterial labor”, it is in order to break out of
the relation labor/created object and to show that it becomes principally a
network, that its fundamental elements consist more and more in knowledge, the
capacity to organize a cooperation. It equally becomes more and more affective
and liguistic. One of the most important points, it seems to me, which is valid
for all workers, is the mobilization  and
the active imbrication of the set of knowledges (connaissances – skills) and
the living time of the wage earners.” 
Negri, here, is playing his strongest suit, for the
penetration of labor into the private life is part of the social arrangement
that makes the private life everything, and the public object nothing. It is a
new form of moralization that destroys a certain cultural success of the 19th
century – the creation of a higher, or more dialectically complex, narrative
intelligence, one that links together disparate 19th century figures
like Marx, Simmel, Durkheim, Mill, etc. with the novelists from Balzac through
Mann. 
It is the dissolution of that narrative skill that has led
to the odd dualism between work and entertainment that seems, diabolically, to
sit on our lives, and make it hard to utter a peep against the scandalous
cretins who rule us.   
Friday, March 02, 2012
4.2 Kafka and Felice
Für mich ist der Sonntag wenigstens seit 1 ½ Monaten ein
Wunder, dessen Schein ich schon Montag früh beim Aufwachen sehe. Das Problem
bleibt, die Woche bis zum Sonntag hinzuschleppen, die Arbeit über diese Wochentage
hinzuziehn und wie ich es auch anstelle, Freitag geht es gewöhnlich nicht mehr
weiter. Wenn man so Stunde für Stunde einer Woche verbringt, selbst bei Tag
nicht viel weniger aufmerksam als der Schlaflose in der Nacht und wenn man sich
so in der unerbittlichen Maschinerie einer solchen Woche umschaut, dann muß man
wirklich noch froh sein, dass diese trostlos sich aufbauenden Tage nicht
zurückfallen, um von neuem zu beginnen, sondern dass sie glatt vergehn und
endlich zum Aufatmen der Abend und die Nacht beginnt.  
[“For me, Sunday, at least for the last one
and one half months, has been a miracle, whose light I see shining when I wake
up on Monday morning. The problem remains, how to drag through the week until
Sunday, pulling the work through these week days and however I arrage it, by
Friday, usually, it no longer seems to work. When you go hour by hour through
the week, being as attentive by day as the insomniac is at night, and why you
look around you in the unrelenting machinery of such a week, you really have to
rejoice that these comfortlessly piled up days don’t collapse and begin all
over again, but that they smoothly pass and finally you can begin to breathe
out in the evening and the night.”]
The piled up days, piled up by the
“relentless machinery” of time, are, at one and the same time, the product of
the person who is looking around in this machinery and the trap of the eternal
return, a trap that is just barely avoided by the fact that the days pass
“smoothly”. Kafka, in this passage, has brought together the Bergsonian sense
of the infinitely substitutable time of matter – the time that is,
theoretically, always repeatable – and the time of the assembly line, the
accidents of which form one of the constant sources of his concern for the last
three years, ever since he joined the Arbeiter-
Unfall-Versicherungs-Anstalt fur das Konigreich
Bohmen and began to investigate claims for workman’s compensation. 
The letter is dated the letter of October 27,
1912. It is one of the hundreds sent to Felice Bauer, the woman he met on  August 13, 1912, at his friend Max Brod’s
house.  Franz Kafka is thirty years old
at this point – although he doesn’t look it. He has been promoted to the post
of Concipist at the Anstalt – which means that he, as a lawyer, draws up papers
concerning cases of accidents for his firm, pursues employers, and sometimes
gives talks or writes articles on the prevention of accidents at the workplace.
Felice is also in a fairly modern profession – she works in the gramaphone division
of the Carl Lindstrom Company in Berlin as a supervisor, under
whom there is a pool of secretaries. 
Like coins, people have more than one side.
Unlike coins, they often have even more than two sides, although eventually
most people can be grasped by the head or the tail. Felice B. seemed to grasp
Kafka, in the end, as a man with a white collar job and a part owner of an
asbestos factory. However, as the abundant flow of letters show, he was a
writer – a writer to his very fingernails. Felice B. is harder to grasp, since
we don’t have her letters. And there is something irresistibly symbolic about
this, because she was working for a company that was pioneering records and Dictaphones
– capturing the oral without the pen or the typewriter. Ideally, that is. Kafka
is in fact very inquisitive about the “parlograph” at the same time that he
admits that he sees it as an obscure enemy. On 
the 13th, when he meets Felice, he is engaged in his extra-office
life, bringing his friend Max Brod, a manuscript for the first of Kafka’s works
to be published in his lifefime. 
Wednesday, February 29, 2012
simultaneity 4.1: EWG in Nietzsche and Kafka
When Nietzsche came down from the mountains of Sils Maria in
1882 and wrote the first four books of the Gay Science, he was filled with a
rare, unifying vision that had sprung itself upon him and completely turned
around his mood. As any moraliste knows, the mood is a cognitive tool  – it is by the mood that one judges certain
intangible but real changes in the world. No barometer is complex enough to
allow us to judge our historical moment, with its different forms of existence
that are set  loose in the quotidian and
bump against each other as though in a fair; with its obsessions and routines,
its shifting matrixes of exchange, its speeds. Thus, Nietzsche wrote his book
with this mood like a muse on his shoulder, and revealed, shyly, like a great
secret, in the fourth book, his inspiration and great idea. It was of course
the doctrine of the eternal return, announced – as though balancing the
lightness of the title of the book – as the heaviest weight, das grösste
Schwergewicht.  The dramaturgy here is
along the lines of the great philosophical coups de theatres, from Socrates’
death to Descartes’ dream: thus, it includes a demon. 
“What if, one day or night, a
demon slinks up to you in your loneliest loneliness and says: your life, as you
live it now and have lived it, you will have to live again, and countless times
again; and there will be nothing new in it, and instead, every pain and
pleasure and ever thought and sigh and all the unspeakably smallnesses and
greatnesses of your life must return to you and everything in the same series
and succession – and likewise this spider and this moonlight between the trees,
and likewise this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is
turned over again and again – and you with it, dust speck of specks!”  [My translation]
The eternal return of the same enters the literature of the
late nineteenth century through many doors. Nietzsche’s is the most famous. In
the early twentieth century, it enters with a bit less gravity – in fact, as a
slapstick routine, performed by a po faced clown. The clown, here, is not
Chaplin but Kafka, the place is in an early letter to Felice Bauer, his future
fiancé, but the setting is surely Modern Times, the office version: 
Wednesday, February 22, 2012
Simultaneity 3: the accident
It is a very bad career, but only a bad career gives the
world the light that a not perfect, but still good writer wishes to produce,
although unfortunately at any cost. Naturally, too, such people, observed from
the outside, seem to wander everywhere, I could tell you about some of them, me
of course included, but they are not in the least remarkable than through the
work of illumination in rather good novels. One could say, that these are
people that emerged a bit slowly from out of the previous generation, one can’t
demand that everybody should follow the regular leaps of the times with the
same regular leaps. But if one once gets behind in one’s march,  one will never catch up with the march of
the crowd, obviously, yet even if the step left behind soon begins to look like
one could bet that it was not a human step, one would lose. Imagine the view
from a running horse in a track, if one could keep your eyes on it, the look of
a horse springing over the hurdles, which surely shows one the most external,
actual, wholly true nature of the race. The unity of the stands, the unity of
the living public, the unity of the surrounding region in a specific time,
etc., but even the last waltz of the orchestra and how one loves to play it
nowadays. But if my horse turns around and doesn’t want to jump and goes around
the hurdles or even breaks out and becomes spirited inside the arena or throws
me off, naturally in appearance the collective view has won. There are gaps in
the public that some fly over, and some fall in, hands wave here and there as
by every possible wind, a rain of fleeting relations falls on me and it is
easily possible, that some onlooker feels 
it and is sympathetic to me, while I lie on the grass like a worm.
- Kafka, letter to Director Eisner, 1909
On
June 6, 1885, F.R., a railroad conductor, was involved in a train accident in
which the train derailed. The walls of the baggage car that he was in at the
time caved in, and he was barely able to escape, after which he lost
consciousness. However, when he regained consciousness he discovered that not
much time had elapsed, and he was able to help drive the train to the next
station. After that incident, however, he suffered “pains in the left thorax
and back, flickering and colors in his vision. Also intervals of weakness of
memory, fear and a racing heart.” These effects occurred when he was working,
and he even once lost consciousness. He went to an eye clinic, but there was
found no pathological damage to the eye. 
J.R.,
a clothcutter in a factory, was involved in an accident in March, 1885, when he
accidentally grasped a driver belt (which turned 80 times per minute and was
carried by it up to the area between the belt and the ceiling, where he pressed
his hands and head firmly against the ceiling to resist being sucked in by the
belt and crushed. A worker held onto his legs while another worker rushed to
turn off the machine. J.R.’s clothing was torn off, he suffered burns all over
his body, and he experienced immediate shock. After a week he began to feel a
hammering in his temples, his eyes would film up, and he had dizzy spells. He
also began to forget things and to say “nonsensical things’.
R.V.
was working in a wood finishing factory. On 
June 18, 1886, his sleeve was caught by a bladed rotating machine used
for planing wood. The rotating maching went at a speed of 2000 to 3000
rotations a minute. His right arm was twisted around it, but he was balk to use
his free left arm to grasp an iron cart. The rotating machine ripped the shirt
from his chest and shoulders, but this allowed him to free his arm. He saw that
he was uninjured, but he felt fear to the extent that his entire body shook.
Two days later his arm showed marks of being severely scraped up and swollen,
with blood red, painful bruises. He worked six more months, essentially using
only his left arm, while he took to medicating himself for the pain he felt in
the right through alcohol.
All
of these cases – and some thirty nine more – appeared in Hermann Oppenheim’s
book, Traumatic Neuroses, which was a salvo in the long battle concerning
medicine and politics that was the result of the accident insurance legislation
that had been passed by the German parliament. Bismark publicly expressed his
fear of the gains being made by the socialists, and to counter them, he began a
process of reforming industrial relations, a key piece of which was workman’s
compensation insurance. 
Germany
was soon followed by Austria. In the meantime, these matters were being debated
in the United States and Britain. Wherever they were debated, the question of
what to do about injurious effects that seem disproportionate to their causes.
And thus, nosology was pulled by the nose into the class war. 
In
the United States, this war was fought, firstly, around the railroads. Eric
Michael Caplan’s article about ‘Railroad sprain” – the symptoms that arose from
the trauma of railroad accidents – follows the trajectory of the report of
these injuries from their first description in John Eric Erichsen’s On Railway
and other injuries, in 1866. The politics of the industrial accident in the U.S. followed a
typically bifurcated path: while the courts generally found against claims made
by workmen for injuries, they were much more sympathetic to passengers – for of
course passengers were more likely to belong to the respectable class. They
could even be judges. Thus, a diagnostic war was waged over whether ‘railroad
spine” – whiplash – and other seemingly psychogenic illnesses were real or not.
Real diseases are those with physiological causes, while those traumas that
were psychogenic – well, courts and doctors tended to put them to the margins,
close to overt fakes and malingerings. 
Herbert
Page,  a surgeon who worked for the
London and Northwest Railroad, produced the most interesting theory. Page took
up the idea of neuromimesis, first articulated by the French psychologist,
Paget, to suggest that “fright itself… was capable of eliciting neuromimetic
symptoms by way of some willful hypnotic state.” [396]  And, slyly, Page suggested that there was
evidence for the neuromimetic hypothesis: 
“The existence of a certain amount of control is shown moreover by the
disappearance of the mimicries, when all cause for their representation is
removed. The matter of compensation as we have seen, exerts in many cases a
very favorable influence on the symptoms of nervous shock.”
This
is an argument that continues to break out on various fronts to this day.
Certainly the railroad companies, at the time, were losing in courts – juries
tended to believe accounts of injuries from people like themselves, so that
surveys showed plaintiffs winning 70 percent of the time. This became a chronic
source of irritation to the stockholders of railroad companies.  
Railroad
spine and other “traumatic neuroses” were caught in a set of rather confusing
forces. For one thing, while  it might
be very well to say that the injured were actually under hynpnotic suggestion,
what this meant, in effect, was extending hysteria from women to men.  At the same time, there was a general
suspicion of any explanation that relied on psychological factors – it went
against the materialism of the times. The pressure from the population through
the courts was one of the pressures that made industries reluctantly adopt
state regulations for injury, in fact, as the costs could be controlled and
predicted, then.
Because
the way the sides are marked does not correspond to a clear battle between the
‘progressive” and the “regressive”, it is easy to misunderstand the context
here. Hermann Oppenheim’s career is a good example of the casualties to which a
‘regressive’ materialism is heir.
Oppenheim
is now a semi-forgotten figure. Although he was one of the founders of
neurology as an independent discipline in Germany, he ran into a solid wall of
hostility in World War I from neurologists, many of whom had been his students,
when he maintained that that soldiers traumatized at the front were suffering a
real material injury that was signaled in post-traumatic symptoms. The
neurologists, seeking ways of sending traumatized soldiers back to the front as
quickly as possible, were invested in the psychogenic explanation. Like the
Railroad surgeons, these neurologists represented, from one point of view, the
progressive side of according reality to psychological factors – but they came
to that point of view for the most regressive of reasons: money in the one
case, nationalism in the other. 
Andreas
Killen has pointed out that Oppenheim’s career as a neurologist, which began in
the 1880s, coincided with the new importance of interpreting seemingly
unaccountable pains and symptoms: ‘Arguably the most important factor in this
disease picture was the accident insurance law itself. The law compensated work
related neuroses within strictly defined limits. Entitlement to benefits was
made contingent upon proof of direct causal connection to an accident.”
Oppenheim
re-asserted the importance of material cause – that is, the material
displacement of neurons – against the French school of suggestion, led by
Charcot.  The shaking experienced by
truck drivers, firemen, steelworkers, textile mill roller operators and the
like had unexpected effects not because there was variances in the degree of
suggestibility of different people, but because there were different degrees of
material stress that were put upon the neural system.  That system was hooked into the emotions felt.
On the basis of the
comparative analysis of his “observations”, Oppenheim presented as their common
symptom the fact that the initiatory accident or injury always “had to produce
a strong psychic emotiom or lead to them.” Oppenheim expressly refered to the
fact that the symptoms of the traumatic neurosis occurred independently after
the event, even though the patient laid claim to compensation,  grounding this forensically important
affirmation with his unilorm clinical experience.  Oppenheim described a central problem of all the victims as
‘disquiet, excitement, fear and terror”, and more, a
“hypochrondrial-melancholic mood, anxiety and finally an “abnormal
sensitiveness” (Oppenheim, 1889) The anxieties mostly manifested themselves as
panic attacks with agoraphobia, through which obsessive petty fears and
compulsions can manifest. On the basis of their ‘intensified sensibitivity” the
patience are extremely inclined to “pull back from society into solitude.”
Oppenheim
was never clear about how, if the basis of these neuroses was changes in the
microscopic configuration of the cerebellum – his guess – they could, as
symptoms, feed back into the disease. This is an ontological paradox that
didn’t worry Oppenheim, but in the end, it left him behind – having no place in
his etiology for the psyche, he, in a sense, failed to explain the evolution of
these disorders. 
The
industrialized experience of accident is one of the great social symptoms of
the felt divide between organic time and vehicular time. Heidegger, in the 20s,
speaks of how a background comes into view when there is a break in the routine
– he uses the example of a missing or misplaced tool. The example that comes
into view in the late nineteenth century when the tools were the toolusers –
and what is embodied is something missing, filled in by pain. If in fact
neuromimesis was happening, what was being imitated? For Page, fear was
imitating real organic diseases, diseases that occurred in organic time. The
accidents, however, shook the unconscious frame of the users of the industrial
system – their assimilation of the eternal return of the same. That eternal
return of the same is the metaphysical heart of the simultaneous, considered as
a form of social time. Its poet is Kafka, an industrial accident insurance man.  
Friday, February 17, 2012
Simultaneity 2: Bergson and the industrialized experience
In the first chapter of Creative
Evolution (1907), Henri Bergson takes up one of his most celebrated themes,
durée, and refines it in response to his further thought on the matter since he
had first exposed his idea in données immédiates de la
conscience, in 1888.  In reading
Bergson now, one can’t help but be struck by the metaphors of unwinding,
unreeling, and tracking that go through his discourse on time. That metaphoric
is usually associated with film, and it is with good reason that Deleuze turned
to Bergson in writing his two books about cinema. However,  I’d like to make the case  that it goes back to what Schivelbusch has
named the industrialized experience – the experience of speed on the railroad – and
that underneath the surface of Bergson’s philosophy of time we have an image of
the dualism between the vehicle and the driver or passenger, which is part of a
larger dualism between industrial automatism and the worker. 
That sense of the vehicularity of
matter in which the organism is placed begins with a description of the
continual changes we as consciousnesses are subject to. “This is to say tht
there is not an essential difference between passing from one state to another
and persisting in the same state… precisely because we close our eyes to the incessant
variation at ech psychological state, we are obliged, when the variation
becomes so considerable that it imposes itself on our attention, to speak as if
a new state were juxtaposed to a prceding one. The latter is supposed to remain
invariable in its turn, and thus so on, indefinitely. The apparent
discontinuity of psychological life thus depends on the fact that our attention
is fixed upon it by a series of discontinuous acts; where there is only a
gentle slope, we believe that we perceive, in following the broken line of our
attention, the steps of a stairs.” [2-3 – my translation]
Compare this to the analysis in
chapter 3 of Schivelbusch’s The Railroad Journey. For Schivelbusch, the
exemplary industrialized experience was riding on a train, since even the first,
primitive trains could achieve speeds that were more than three times that of
stagecoaches. In other words, railroads introduced a completely inorganic mode
of travel on a mass scale, and in doing so accustomed people to an inorganic
form of speed. Schivelbusch quotes authors from the 1830-1850 period who were
quite aware of what was happening, putting it in terms of ‘shrinking space” or,
paradoxically, of expanding the individual’s capacity to reach distant spaces.
This was put in contrast with the fact that the shrinking and expanding did not
affect the actuality of things. “Yet by a sort of miracle,” says the Quarterly
Review article [from 1839, which Schivelbusch is citing], after describing the
shrinking process, “every man’s field is found not only where it was, but as
large as ever it was.”[35] Indeed, after reading Schivelbusch’s abundant citing
of articles of this type, one understands why Einstein’s popular essay on
relativity used the example of the railroad train, as the trope was already
long in the popular consciousness. 
If we consider that Bergson’s
theme of durée was also colored by the industrialized experience, then we can see
further into the metaphor and metaphysics that grounds it. Evidently, from the
first, Bergson draws a line between organic time – which is irreversible – and
artificial time – the time of matter – which is reversible. These are not
accidental results of the duality between the two, but go to the heart of their
different temporal regimes:
“From the survival of the past
[for the self] results the impossibility for a consciousness to traverse the
same state two times. However much the circumstances may be the same, it is not
on the same person that they operate… … This is why durée is irreversible. We
cannot re-live a single bit, for it would be necessary to efface the memory of
all that followed.” [6]
Bergson’s framing of organic time
results in his re-discovery of the new: “But an intelligence, even a superhuman
one, could not foresee the simple, indivisible form which gives these abstract
elements their concrete organisation. For to foresee is to project into the
future what one has perceived in the past, or to have represented for a new
assembly later, in a new order, already perceived elements. But what has never
been perceived, and is at the same time simple, is necessarily unforeseeable.” 
Contrast this regime of the
irreversible and the truly new with the regime of the material, which is how
sameness enters the world:
“Now, we say that the composite
object changes by the displacement of its parts. But when a part has quit its
position nothing stops it from retaking it. A group of elements which has
passed a state can thus always return, if not by itself, at least by the effect
of an exterior cause which puts everything back into place. This is the same as
saying that a state of the group can repeat itself as often as one wants and
that, in consequence, the group never grows old. It has no history.”
An aging without growing old is
the fate to which the mechanical, the artificial, composite matter, is
consigned – whereas growing old and having the property of novelty is the
seemingly contradictory state imposed upon the organism. True novelty and true
age are properties of the ‘passenger’ within the vehicle of matter. The vehicle
can reverse, but the passenger, inherently, cannot.  And so the two move together, but move in different worlds. As
Schivelbusch puts it about the train passenger: 
‘What was experienced as
annihilated was the traditional time-space continuum, which characterized the
old transport technology. Organically embedded in nature as it was, that
technology, in its mimetic relationship to the space traversed, permitted the
travellor to perceive that space as a living entity. What Bergson called the
durée (duration of time spent getting from one place to another on the
road)  is not an objective mathematical
unit, but a subjective perception of time-space.” [36]
Schivelbusch, I think, wrongfoots
himself by putting the matter in terms of the broad subject/object theme –
rather, the irreversibility, or entropy, of durée points to a certain deep
reversal of our expectations: for the illusion is all on the side of the
vehicle, in that it seems from the vehicle’s standpoint that the eternal return
of the same is the law and the prophets. On the other hand, the illusion of
reversibility becomes, in the industrial experience, the tempo of human life.
The ideal of non-aging, the ideal of the assembly line, the ideal of the
vehicle, the ideal of interchangeable parts, all are imposed on the human:
human novelty is supplanted by artificial news.  This is one of the great characteristics of the simultaneity
principle behind Tarde’s publics. 
‘… the railroad did not appear
embedded in the space of the landscape, the way coach and highway are, but
seemed to strike across it.” [37] 
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Anti-modernity
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Rather, I want us to go back and understand what contemporary inequality in the developed countries, and particularly in the U.S., is about. The place to start, of course, is the seventies. After thirty years, we are starting to recognize the form of the shift that began to occur then. And let me be the harpooner that points out the shape of that beast, the main points of which are 1., the crushing of the bargaining power of labor; 2., the de-manufacturing of America – which was partly connected to the fact that manufacturing workers were the most militant, and partly the inevitable effect of the ability of capital to find other, cheaper regions in which to place factories; and 3, the dissolving of traditional constraints on credit.
These events occurred in response to the most serious crisis in capitalism since 1945. Galbraith’s New Industrial state, the liberal Keynesian economy, had created structures that were supposed to resolve such crises. These included the management of aggregate demand by the state, the moderation of labors’ older, utopian demands for a slice of the power in return for a steadily rising paycheck, and management’s movement away from optimizing profits in exchange for lessened volatility. The Keynesian moment unwound for a number of reasons – labour, with increasingly less interest in the political dimension that originally animated unions, became much more vulnerable; the government management of aggregate demand, combined with the government dependence on War, had finally unleashed inflation; and the ROI of the Fortune 500 corporations was finally causing an investor revolt. However, of the three factors I am listing in the shift to the new, Reagonomic paradigm, one and three seem oddly disjoint. How is it possible to diminish the bargaining power of labor – which results in the stagnation of wages – and at the same time dissolve traditional constraints on consumer and other credit?
Of course, from the neo-classical point of view, that makes a lot of sense. Instead of the government actively managing aggregate demand, the private sector, with a freer credit market, can take over. And in fact, even if wages stagnate, household incomes rise. The house itself as an asset appreciates, for one thing; more investment vehicles are made available to the public, for another thing; and finally, there is the great entry of women into the labor market.
Credit, then, is the keystone. It is from this moment on that the financial services sector, which had been relatively unimportant in the Keynesian regime, returns in force. It is what I would call the mangle of inequality – playing on Andrew Pickering’s term, mangle of practice. Contemporary capitalism in America has to effect a straddle – the economy depends on consumption, and yet, the majority of the consumers engross less and less of the productivity gains accrued by the system. Freeing the financial markets had two effects – one was to re-vamp the consumer’s financial horizon. Instead of worrying about making a wage sufficient to live the good life, the consumer worries about making a wage sufficient to have a good credit history – which is the magical key to the world of cars, plasma screen tvs, houses, and all the rest. The other was to make the consumer a shareholder in the system. For simplicity’s sake, call this the 401k world – that stands at the symbolic center of a system by which the ordinary person was hooked into the market. And the market could, consequently, use vast flows of capital to keep easing credit. A virtuous feedback, so to speak.
It had another, symbolically resonant significance. The triumph of the state in the 20th century was in providing for retirement. The state successfully created, within a capitalist economy, a mass ability to finish one’s life without poverty or utter family dependence. It was the template for the structural goods that the state, in a mixed economy, could provide – when the demands of distributive justice could not be aligned with the price creating market in a good or service. Consequently, social security has earned a special hatred from the right. The American system of encouraging private investment was meant, on the surface, to complement social security, but the ultimate aim was always to replace it.
The mangle of inequality, then, was not – as in Marx’s time – a head to head confrontation between classes. It is a more complex machine, in which class interests are blent so that head to head confrontation is systematically differed. The political triumph of the system is that the blending disenfranchised populism, since it became unclear who would really benefit from populist practice.
Given this context, we should be posing different questions about the housing bubble - not the question, what caused it, but the question, why was it necessary? It is not as if the policymakers consciously intended a housing bubble. But they did consciously intend returning the Clintonian surpluses to the investor class. And when the 2000-2001 recession happened, they consciously intended to find a way to respond to it that did not involve the government "interfering" in the economy. Luckily for the policy makers, by this time the neo-liberal program of guiding money from the wage class into financial assets was nearly complete - whether on the individual level of the 401k or on the aggregate level of pensions - and thus the neo-liberal machine could be played like a slot machine - there was plenty of money, the market in secondary mortgages as well as the housing market (two things which intersect, but which are not the same) could now provide a collective speedball, and everybody was happy. Otherwise, policymakers would have to face unpleasant alternatives to the neo-liberal version of capitalism. As we have seen in the O. era, they simply can't do that. The conceptual set seals off all solutions that might put in question the neo-liberal mindset. Hence, the mangle of inequality is both a cause and an effect of the neo-liberal economic paradigm.