Are the clerks on the barricades this time?

One day Tolstoy, who was at that time an officer in the army, confronted a fellow officer who he had seen whipping a peasant and asked him: Have you never read the New Testament? The officer replied with a question of his own: ‘have you never read the army’s rules and regulations? Julien Benda put this story as an emblem at the beginning of La Trahison des Clercs, a pamphlet that became famous in the late twenties, because to Benda, Tolstoy’s question was central to what it used to mean to be a clerk – that is, an educated person who defends humanistic values. And the nameless officer’s reply, Benda thought, was what it meant to be a clerk, as the intellectuals abandoned the side of the eternal for the side of pure doxa. The clerk now serves a political passion, and speaks for the interests of a temporal and limited group, whether economic, national, or party. The clerk now sides with the army’s rules and regulations.

I, too, am interested in the clerk as a figure, although I betray humanity, in Benda’s eyes, by thinking of the clerk as, primordially, in the Great Transformation to an industrial and market economy, an agent of circulation. On the other hand, the clerk is dialectically riven – both the promoter of those routines that, in the countryside, the factory, and the store, generated a capitalist mentality, and the first responders to the elevation of the level of alienation this entailed. The clerks are the poets of the routinized world.

It is in this sense that Benda’s fight for eternal and against the engaged ‘intellectual’ is not, as it would seem to be at first glance, simply a reactionary gesture, a Christian nostalgia.

Benda started writing for the dreyfusard part of the press – he was published in Peguy’s Cahiers – and his career lasted well into the era of the existentialists, against which he took aim with furious quotations in his long second preface to The Betrayal of the Clerks, when it was reissued after WWII.

So: I want to look at Benda, Thomas Mann’s Reflections of an Non-political Man, and Russell Jacoby’s book on the last intellectuals – all in the light of the Occupy Wall Street movement – in some upcoming posts.

Don't let the Fed enact another quiet bailout!

Suggestion for a Occupy Wall Street Sign: Stop Bank of America from Getting FREE US INSURANCE on ITS DERIVATIVES!

And here's today's story:

Ben Bernanke apparently used a rear entrance in Boston, yesterday, to avoid the Occupy Boston protestors.
That's par for the course, as Bernanke and his Fed are masters of the rear entrance.
For example, take the Bank of America announcement of its 6 + billion dollars in profits for this quarter. Doesn't that mean that bailing out the banks worked? Our 16 trillion in loans for the behemoths can be criticized on many levels, but surely we can't criticize the techno genius that resulted in a solvent bank system, eh?
Well, apparently not. This is what is happening before our eyes, from the Economic populist site:

"It appears Bank of America moved Merrill Lynch derivatives to a FDIC insured subsidiary. Bloomberg:

Bank of America Corp. (BAC), hit by a credit downgrade last month, has moved derivatives from its Merrill Lynch unit to a subsidiary flush with insured deposits, according to people with direct knowledge of the situation.

The Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. disagree over the transfers, which are being requested by counterparties, said the people, who asked to remain anonymous because they weren’t authorized to speak publicly. The Fed has signaled that it favors moving the derivatives to give relief to the bank holding company, while the FDIC, which would have to pay off depositors in the event of a bank failure, is objecting, said the people. The bank doesn’t believe regulatory approval is needed, said people with knowledge of its position.

By moving toxic assets, i.e. derivatives, into a FDIC insured subsidiary, gives BoA's Merrill derivative holdings indirect access to the Federal Reserve discount window and also if the bank fails where the derivatives are now located, the FDIC is required to pay depositors through their insurance guarantee. It appears from Bloomberg's report that $53 trillion of BoA's derivatives are being tied into depositors*, which implies the Federal Reserve and the U.S. taxpayer have the potential to be on the hook.

Bank of America’s holding company -- the parent of both the retail bank and the Merrill Lynch securities unit -- held almost $75 trillion of derivatives at the end of June, according to data compiled by the OCC. About $53 trillion, or 71 percent, were within Bank of America NA, according to the data, which represent the notional values of the trades.

Nice huh? Bank of America just transferred risk to the taxpayer with no approval by regulators, Congress and of course the public."

I'm reminded of the scene in Chinatown in which Jack Nicholson discovers that the city has been dumping water during a drought - in the service of a land development scheme, as it turns out. He goes to the water department and talks with the head of it, a man beaufitully named Yelburton, yed there, who tells him:

"Wait -- please sit down, Mr. Gittes.
We're... well, we're not anxious
for this to get around, but we have
been diverting a little water
to irrigate avocado and walnut
groves in the northwest
valley. As you know, the farmers
there have no legal right to our
water, and since the drought we've
had to cut them off -- the city
comes first, naturally. But,
well, we've been trying to help
some of them out, keep them from
going under. Naturally when you
divert water -- you get a little
runoff."

A little runoff. That is what the 99 percent is living through! But the Fed has a beautiful system all in place to help the people who really count.



http://www.economicpopulist.org/content/bank-americas-socialize-risk-and-reap-reward-business-model

destruction is the ultimate luxury

I'm dredging this up from a post I wrote in 2002, because I think it is relevant to the psychology of the Occupy Wall Street movement. And to the psychology of the academic and policy elite who criticize the movement.

In 2002, two British professors, Andrew Oswald and Daniel Zizzo, reported on an experiment in which various subjects were gathered together and given cash, distributed – by arbitrary gift and betting – in such a way that some got more and some got less. Then, subjects were allowed to anonymously burn other people’s money – only, however, if they were willing to reduce their own.

62% of those tested chose to destroy part of other test subjects' cash, and half of all the cash was destroyed by other subjects.

A story about this experiment on the site Mindpixel contains this summing up of the burners:

"The researchers found that those who gained the most additional money at the betting stage burned poor and rich alike, while disadvantaged laboratory subjects mainly targeted those subjects they saw getting what they perceived as undeserved financial windfalls."

The libertarian magazine Reason reported on Oswald and Zizzo's experiment, too, under the headline, Burn the Rich. This is, in fact, not so far from the way Oswald and Zizzo presented their results themselves. Curiously, what the experiment clearly shows is that the rich also burned the poor and the rich. The difference is that the poor showed solidarity – they burned only those with higher amounts of cash – while the rich did not.
That the rich burned the poor and the rich seems not to have impressed itself on Reason, even though, as they correctly reported:
"Zizzo and Oswald found that nearly two-thirds of players happily paid for the privilege of impoverishing their fellow participants. Even as the price of burning went up, the percentage of people who chose to burn other players did not fall substantially."

Z. and O. had labels for two classes of burnings, depending on the rank of the burner. One they call rank egalitarianism. Most of the burners who were poorer sacrificed to burn the rich. The other they call reciprocity. Their thesis is that the rich burners were simply responding to being burned.

"In the case of our money burning experiment, advantaged and disadvantaged subjects may,
because of the existence of the advantage, perceive the game differently. This different game
perception implies that subjects prime differently two social categories, one based on deservingness and one on reciprocity. For disadvantaged subjects, what matters is the fact that advantaged subjects got the advantage undeservedly, and they did not. Advantaged subjects may think not only in terms of deservingness, but also in a different light, namely, in the light of the fact that disadvantaged subjects will burn them. They may then want to reciprocate the favour.'"

But how does this explain their earlier result, that the rich burn the rich? Moreover, hidden in the paper is an interesting paragraph about the behavior of the "undeserving" rich -- those who accrued money arbitrarily (in the experiment, money could be made by betting, but money was also randomly allocated at intervals, thus randomly favoring certain individuals).

"In the twin experiment run in Oxford, Zizzo (1999) crossed advantage and deservingness in a factorial design, and found that deservingness mattered. More specifically, he found significantly more negative interdependent preferences in sessions where the advantage was induced unfairly than when it was induced according to a relatively fair procedure. Moreover, in one condition of that experiment, stealing was possible. Zizzo then found that there was substantially more stealing by advantaged subjects if they had got the advantage undeservedly. One possible interpretation of this interaction effect was that undeservedly advantaged subjects expected themselves to be stolen or burnt significantly more, and behaved using a reciprocity logic, in defending their own gains significantly more."

It is interesting how neoclassical models and ‘rational’ choice has bent the minds of academics, which is the only reason I can think of for calling the rich burning the poor or each other a reciprocity hypothesis. After all, O. and Z. assumes that the rich are the very epitome of rationality. They are profit maximizers. Thus, they couldn’t be burning because, well, they could get away with it. Oswald and Zizzo accord the egalitarian strategy a sequential primacy that exists psychologically, even if it doesn't exist empirically. That is, the rich could be striking in the expectation that they will be struck.
However, one should notice -- or an old deconstructive veteran like myself notices -- the binary which is operating here. While the rich are operating on "intention" -- that is cognitively -- the poor are operating on "passion" -- the envy aroused by riches. Why, actually, don't we think that the poor are striking pre-emptively, like the rich? Especially as Zizzo's earlier experiment shows that the perception of the "unfair" accrual of wealth, which is prevalant among its benificiaries as well as among its victims, prompts further "unfair" action among its benificiaries. I.e., the undeserving rich steal. The unconscious bias of the experimenter consists in this: poverty denies one a full sense of self-interest. Thus, we interpret the actions of the poor, sacrificing to burn the rich, as envy, while we accord a sense of intellectual strategy to the wealthy who do the same thing. Oswald and Zizzo show themselves to be the worthy heirs of those nineteenth century economists who saw the laboring classes as so much betail, so much dangerous animality. An entity to be organized by the police, always liable to filch from the fortunate.

To put this another way -- we think the reciprocal thesis explains too much, is bounded by a circular definition, and is ultimately inseparable from passion itself. This passion expresses itself in the wealthy burning the wealthy -- surely, here, we aren't seeing a response to rank egalitarianism, but the play of pure power. Let's suggest to Z. and O. a most non-Anglo explanation for their findings, one explored by Mauss in his classic essai sur la don: one of the attributes of being rich is the ability to destroy. Destruction is the ultimate luxury. This is as true among Manhattanites as among the Kwaikutl. Zizzo and Oswald might want to reference such classics, in this vein, as various Beverly Hillbilly episodes, the tv show Dallas, and the dot com parties of 1999.
It is such power that the Occupy Wall Street people are protesting. Nobody gets wealthy just to continue getting wealthy – the miser is an obsolete figure. More and more wealth is needed to reinforce another passion, the cruel and relentless passion for power. At the heart of power is the power to destroy. Far from simply being envious, the poor are wise enough not to be deluded by the veil of rationality. The same can’t be said for many social scientists.

my own humble attempt at tax simplification

Simplifying the tax system on the 9-9-9 system (which, fans of the Book will notice, is 6-6-6 upside down) is all the rage right now.

I have an even simpler plan. It is based on a phrase used over and over by the anti-tax (the rich) crowd. The phrase is simple – taxes take dollars from your pocketbook. Or your wallet.

My plan takes this phrase very seriously, because it gives us a nice way to visualize money. The anthropologist, George Marcus, has theorized, from his ethnographic research among the rich, that one of the salient characteristics of fortune is its invisibility. That invisibility has many semiotic effects: one of them is obviously to reverse the marginal disutility thesis, which would make it seem like the millionaire of the billionaire would discount the added dollar. Invisibility melds together all money as one thing – which means that the 4.9 billion dollars made by hedgefund manager John Paulson (the man who, in conjunction with Goldman Sachs, shorted mortgage backed securities while Goldman sold its suckers, er, clients, mortgage backed security ) is to him one unified thing. Not perhaps in all instances. Paulson could well chip off a bit of that 4.9 billion for a coupla yachts, or a home. For instance, a nice 25 million dollar ranch in Aspen. The 3 million dollar Olympic tower “pad”. But when it comes to taxes, every invisible bit needs defending.

This is where my tax plan comes in. It is called the envision the wealth tax plan, and it is pretty simple. It uses a standard – the Tommy Hilfinger Men’s Tilton Front Pocket Wallet. According to the specs, it is made of Soft Polished Lamb, and features 4 credit card pockets, an ID window, and a metal hinged moneyclip – just the kind of wallet that the rightwing pundit wants to conjure up with the government taking dollars out of it!

So, here’s the scheme. It is pretty easy to assess how many Tommy Hilfinger Tilton Front Pocket Wallets would be needed to contain 4.9 billion dollars. A bill has a width of around .005 inches. You need to stuff 49 million of them in the wallets. The capacity of those wallets is, at best, able to accommodate, say, 50 one hundred dollar bills, or 5,000 dollars. That gives us nine hundred eighty thousand Tommy Hilfinger Tilton Front Pocket Wallets. Now, lets compare this to, say, the janitor who works in thePaulson and company building. The average salary for a janitor in NYC comes to a whopping 21,000 per year, which is the equivalent of four THFP wallets, and a little change. So we have four of these wallets, and we line them up against nine hundred eighty thousand THTFP wallets, and we ask – is it fair that the four wallet guy didn’t pay the same percentage tax as the guy with nine hundred eighty thousand THTFP wallets?

And then we hit ourselves on the head and go, dude, are you on acid?
And then we do our tax reform! Which is simple – no tax for the janitor. No tax for even people who have 20 THTFP wallets. No, make it 40. After that, the government starts seriously collecting your THTFP wallets. After you reach 100 hundred, it really gets down to business, going with the 90 percent marginal rate that was common in good king Dwight D. Eisenhower’s day.
See how simple this is? It is called the visualize their fuckin’ fortunes tax. It is beautiful, and will save the country a load of grief from self pitying people who have done nothing world historical, or even necessary, to earn nine hundred eighty thousand THTFP wallets stuffed to the gills with 100 dollar bills.

pascalian peasant economics

Paul Warde makes useful distinction (in Subsistence and Sales: the peasant economy of Württemberg in the early seventeenth century, Economic History Review, 2006) between a school of the economic historiography of peasant economies that emphasized Ricardian decreasing returns and Malthusian limits to resources, and a school that emphasized a Smithian growth approach, in which the peasant’s natural inclination to barter and trade and maximize profit is merely hindered by rent seeking and anachronistic guild like institutions. One of the star representatives of the latter approach, Sheilagh Ogilvie, attacks any theory that holds that the peasant economy is somehow special, because, according to her, such a theory is founded on the idea that peasants are irrational. Her reading, then, of Polanyi style analysis is that it is deeply patronizing to peasants and blind to the way peasants were struggling to become capitalists against the dead weight of feudal institutions:

“But whether 'irrational' or 'differently rational', peasants lack the conventional economic concepts of wages, capital, interest, rent, and profit. [Ogilvie here is criticizing non-Smithian approaches] Consequently they can neither minimize costs nor maximize profits; instead, they minimize risks and seek to 'satisfice' culturally defined consumption targets.9 These theories regard peasant minimization of risk as excluding 'capitalist' maximization of profit, a distinction puz-zling to mainstream economics, which regards all economic agents as seeking to obtain the lowest possible risk for the highest possible return.”

If this were an accurate criticism of what is the dominant anthropological paradigm of peasant economies, Ogilvie has chosen the right method to smash it – finding records of peasants minimizing costs, making profits, trading, using money, etc.

But as Ward points out, this pushes the non-Smithian approach into absurdities it never articulates. Far from thinking that peasants have no conception of opportunity costs, as Ogilvie puts it, the school she attacks most harshly bases its whole analysis on the peasant’s awareness of opportunity costs.

Ward is, I think, correct here:

“Historians have not recently argued, at least for central and western Europe, that peasants did not understand profit generally. They have argued that they were not profit maximizers , or primarily motivated by profitability, a rather different position, although it is in truth rather difficult to establish if, or indeed how, peasants might have conceptualized profit or loss across a range of activities over any given period of time.”

Ogilvie, in other words, is using the evidence from the record, which amply demonstrates trading, quantifying, and wage labor, as something that demonstrates a collective social tendency on the part of the peasants to conform their economic activity to these kinds of proto-capitalist features. But she actually shows nothing of the kind, since she thinks it is sufficient to show trading in order to show all the institutionally driven activities that result from the circulation of commodities. In fact, the peasants in her example often show exactly the kind of limited good mentality that would make investment and profit maximization not only institutionally difficult, but culturally suspect.

…
How capitalism arrives is a question that is wrapped up with how the capitalist character is formed. It seems, in a sense, that capitalism, with its double aspect – of a certain form of production and a certain form of circulation – is boobytrapped. One must understand the mentality of the agents of circulation in order to understand the condition of the agents of production, and one must understand the limits imposed on the agents of production in order to understand the possibility of circulation. One must, then, understand not only technology, but ideology.

Mainstream economics is proud of its methodological individualism, but it doesn’t believe it. The individual, as the economists understand, does not spontaneously produce his acts. The man in an office, or behind a plow, or behind a gun, did not find his places by inventing his scene. The idea that the individual invents society is, evidently, an act that has never attributed to any individual. So the mainstream economist has come up with a wonderful concept saver: the individual, in their terms, is essentially a chooser. Goethe’s Faust cried out that in the beginning was the act – but the economist’s homo economicus counters that in the beginning was the choice. The cosmology of the preference wraps the societal world in a mystery – for one never seems to come to acts, only to choices. Every blade of wheat, every board of wood, every drop of ink, is not what it seems to be, but is instead an agglomeration of atomic choices. By some inexplicable accident, these choices also seem to be matter, and have weight and chemistry. The only thing that isn’t chosen is choice itself.

This is a rich cosmology, but not necessarily a believable one. So it is reinforced by the time honored method of scolding. If we don’t hold to individualism, all responsibility is lost, and anarchy and concentration camps are loosed upon the world.

The origin of this cosmology is surely to be found in the period between around 1650 and 1789. And it did not arise among the peasant masses, yearning to profit maximize, but among a varied assortment of clerks and policymakers. Intellectuals in Edinburgh universities and ministers at Louis XVI’s court, as well as slave traders and sugar merchants were all starting to put it together.

By the late twentieth century, the capitalist operation had become so dominant – at least among intellectuals – that historians could not believe the cosmos had ever been different. Thus, in the spirit of conquest, the historians went back to pre-capitalist societies and attempted to rescue them for capitalism. Thus, theorems of market equilibrium, or of public choice, are imposed as the real language of rationality that the peasants were, as it were, articulating in mime.

My own sense is that the peasant economies were not irrational, nor are the rational capitalist economies non-peasant – the rational economic institutions are colonized by non-equilibrium, non-growth, non-maximizing kinds of behavior, and peasant economies surely involved calculations to some end. However, instead of the models that Ward and Ogilvie use to understand rationality of peasant economics, I think one should turn to contemporaries, like Blaise Pascal, for the vocabulary of what was afoot. Pascal’s three forms of the spirit – l’esprit geometrique, l’esprit de finesse, and l’esprit juste give us a much deeper sense of what was in question, in the maintenance of the household, the community, and the person in peasant economies, than we are going to get from Ogilivie’s grid. yet historians in the 21st century, who don't yet face a powerful alternative to capitalism, are unlikely to give up the project of conquering the past with the models of the present, even if the rules they are using predict a much different past than the one that we have. Actually, they also predict a much different present, which must be adjusted, nudged, and jammed to fit into the mainstream economist's rational formats. But the present is malleable, while the past, ah, the past - the problem is that the past can't be fired.
More's the pity.

I'm gonna tell you how its gonna be...

At the moment, I presume that on inauguration day, January 19th, 2012, President Obama will hand the reins to President Romney. Romney will have a brilliant political prospect: he’ll be dealing with a Senate and House of Representatives that will be solidly Republican.


But what of the quality of life of the American public? That will have declined precipitously during Obama’s four years. The African-American community will have declined, economically, to where it was in 1990. The American middle class will have continued to lose asset wealth and income, returning to the 1995 point. The housing market will be in deep freeze. Unemployment will be around 9 percent, but in terms of labor participation, the number of Americans working will be in the 1980s levels. The environment, in the meantime, will be starting to show the first signs of its crash. We know its coming, but we don’t know how it will manifest itself – although we know that the government will respond to it in the truly clueless way that it responded to the Gulf Oil disaster, which, I have read, will result in ‘millions’ of fines for BP – instead of the billion plus that BP would owe if the Obama administration had chosen to, well, enforce the law. Perhaps the environmental collapse will be represented by a small thing – for instance, Obama’s FDA has approved sea food from the Gulf in spite of the fact that they have made a much smaller and narrower investigation of the toxins released in the Gulf than George Bush I’s FDA made after the Valdez disaster. That may mean cancers, but cancers a long way down the road. Maybe a series of birth defects, though, or something equally mediagenic. My outside bet, though, is on a negative flood: that we will have the first drought incident soon – some town, say Reno, in the West will simply run out of water. The kind of thing that the townspeople will actually have to flee.


Quality of life for the 20-29 set will, of course, continue to be grim, except for those who are the children of the wealthy. Unemployment in that demo is now at 33 percent, and it isn’t going to go down. As for the mortgage cramdown, that has been an utter failure. Luckily, Obama’s Justice department has failed so far in creating a ‘compromise’ that will let banks off the robo-signer fraud hook. Here, the weakness of the administration has actually created a vacuum that is being exploited for good – a rare instance.


Under President Romney, I think it is safe to say, some big banks will fail again. The Fed, perhaps under the same leadership, and the Treasury – under a Geithner like figure – will save the banks through massive welfare, disguised as a loan. What was broached under Bush and Obama was obviously a template for the next phase of neo-liberalism, which – in its first phase - was never about ‘shrinking the government’, and always about cementing an alliance between newly assertive plutocrats and policymaking elites. The second phase is not going to find money in some interest bearing scheme, as the debt slaves have been tapped, so the new scheme will be to use the powers of the government to create and issue money at an amazingly low price for the use of the speculators.


No man can see into the next minute, much less the next five years. But if the spirit of Christmas future is any guide, Romney, too, is destined to failure and a single term.

Radical idea: let's stop kissing the ass of the rich

In its story about a trader going to jail for inside trading, the NYT injected an explanation of the trader's status that is, well, a sort of thermostat reading of the temperature of this here plutocracy.


"Though Mr. Kimelman lived comfortably, he was hardly a Wall Street titan. In his best year, Mr. Kimelman said he earned about $400,000 and never had more than $1 million in the bank."

I love it when the plutocratic libido scratches a hole in the placid news discourse that tries to normalize it.

Compare this to Heritage Foundation's recent study of the poor, showing the American poor really have nothing whatsoever to bitch about. Here's the rundown from a Bill O'Reilly show:

"O'REILLY: The Census Bureau reports that 43 million Americans are currently living in poverty. The bureau defines poverty as a family of four earning less than $22,000 a year. But the conservative Heritage Foundation says that many poor American families have lots of stuff. Here now to analyze, Fox Business anchor Lou Dobbs.

[...]

O'REILLY: Eight-two percent have a microwave. This is 82 percent of American poor families. Seventy-eight percent have air conditioning. More than one television, 65 percent. Cable or satellite TV, 64 percent -- thank God.

DOBBS: Amen, brother.

O'REILLY: Cell phones, 55 percent. Personal computer, 39 percent."

Wow, heady stuff for the poor, there. In fact, the conservative case for the poor being rich poses the question: why aren't the rich lucky enough to be poor? One would think that the logical next step would be Eisenhower era taxation, since the rich, too, I have heard, have air conditioning, tv, personal computers, and - a sad note - often only a million in a bank account at any one time.

But all mocking aside - one demand I think the 99 percent can and should agree on is: the rich should no longer expect us to continually kiss their ass.