Solitude is feared by all wardens – whether they watch over a prison, a church, a factory, an office, or a school. Solitary, that American torture, is the jailkeeper’s mockery of solitude, stripping the self of its senses and making the self bear, weightily, upon the self – a weight that soon enough becomes a torture. Solitary is not, of course, merely a thing of prison basements, but is out there in the fields of everyday life, a scarecrow to enforce subservience in the general population. Schools socialize children, but you will never be taught solitude there.
It may seem tendentious to contrast solitude to individuality, but these are very distinct social modes, and it is the underplaying of solitude that has allowed individuality to dominate the discursive field of the self. Solitude is existential and original, individuality is derivative and legal. Solitude is the release from self interest, individuality is its tightened grip. Solitude tends towards sovereignty or abjection, individuality tends towards the normal.
In Rousseau’s thought (and Rousseau was the poet of solitude), equality, which is tacitly posited against the old order, collapses without solitude. This is not to say that a republican society must purge individuality; but it must never confuse it with solitude. This is the real work of culture. From this, Rousseau thought, sprang real happiness.
This is why Rousseau’s denial of the capacity for solitude to women, a conclusion based on a shady rhetorical move, is at the heart of Rousseau’s sexism. Without solitude, women must always, in the end, be essentially companions – and companions to men. The denial of solitude is the denial of the basis of community.
2.
The fifth book of Emile begins the “last act of Emile’s
youth.” Which is described as
follows: “Il n’est pas bon que l’homme soit seul, Émile est homme ; nous lui
avons promis une compagne, il faut la lui donner.” This borrowing from
Genesis, with Rousseau as the “we” and Emile as Adam presents us with a problem
that is traditionally solved by simply extracting the concepts, here,
connecting them to this “we”, and making out as if Rousseau were writing a
treatise. The literary is a sort of small bend in the fall of the conceptual
atoms, but nothing to worry about, if we go at this narrative as a thing that
can be reduced to an exempla derived from the principles of practical reason.
Meditating on this not exceptional allusion to the creation
story, we find we are faced with the true oddity of the project outlined in
this book: this is a re-creation story in which Emile is and can’t be Adam.
That he can’t be is clear enough – Rousseau has been clear throughout the book
that there is an existing, intrusive society with which Emile will have to
deal. Any education he receives will have to, in some way, work to insert him
in that society. And yet that society is laced through with corruption in such
a way that it isn’t clear that Emile will succeed in that society. And yet
here, again, we have the Adam motif, for was Adam created to succeed in Eden?
The story has always been unclear, always been related to many other stories in
many other cultures about the peculiar fear that man evokes in the Gods.
Created to worship God, and yet hiding, the Gods suspect, the aspiration to
overthrow the Gods, to become as God.
It is not good that man is alone. In the blank towards which
that statement gazes, there appears a woman – made not from Emile’s rib, but
from our idea of the woman Emile needs, Sophie.
And as Emile is educated to take his place as a man, so
Sophie should be educated to take her place as a woman. And that place is
firstly a negation – of the solitude that is not good for the man. Right away,
then, that place is company – peculiarly defined by a lack in the man. And yet,
the logical step beyond company would seem to be the space of company, the
public space. This is, of course, not going to be the case for Sophie – because
that space is inhabited, it turns out, with many men, for all of whom it is not
good to be alone, and who thus seek out the negation of that solitude in woman.
3.
From Maria D’Agoult, who wrote one of the great inside
accounts of the revolution of 1848, through Susan Oken, there is a long
feminist tradition of complaining about Rousseau. Complaining about a
philosophe who should have been the champion of women, instead of being,
ultimately, a paterfamilial scold.
Susan Okin’s 1979 essay on Rousseau, Rousseau’s Natural
Woman, is one of the great feminist landmarks in the literature on Rousseau.
Okin carefully goes through the Second Discourse to disentangle what Rousseau
meant by natural and how human nature within nature – a human nature
unencumbered by society – is to be imagined. She notes that Rousseau does not
imagine that the nuclear family existed at the beginning. Rather, men and women
existed, so to speak, side by side, and if their sexual congress resulted in a
pregnancy, this did not particularly concern the man, nor did it particularly
concern the woman to make any claim on the father. In this section, in a long
footnote on Locke, Rousseau attacks the British version of the state of nature:
“At this point in the Discourse, there is a long footnote in which Rousseau
attacks Locke for his argument that the nuclear family existed even in the
state of nature.5 Whereas Locke had claimed that the helplessness of human
offspring meant that the race could not survive without the institution of
monogamy, Rousseau argues that this is a prime example of the failure of phi-
losophers to get beyond social and moral developments and back to the true
state of nature. The human female, he asserts, is quite capable of rearing her
child unaided, and since no man knew which child was his, what possible reason
could there be at this stage for any man to participate in the rearing of any
woman's child? Though Locke may want to justify the family as an institution,
he cannot show it to be necessary, or even comprehensible, in the natural order
of things. As Rousseau says (and it is important to note the form of this
argument because of what he himself does subsequently):
Although it may be advantageous to the human species for the union between man
and woman to be permanent, it does not follow that it was thus established by
nature; otherwise it would be necessary to say that nature also in- stituted
civil society, the arts, commerce, and all that is claimed to be useful to men.
[Okin, 1979: 397]
As Okin notices, Rousseau’s conception of human nature accords to women, in
this Ur-scene at the beginning of the world, a full independence in relation to
men. Which is why the next move he makes is so logically puzzling:
“The transition, in the Second Discourse, from the original state of nature, in
which the sexes were equal and independent, to the patriarchal family, is very
sudden, and of critical importance for the subject of this paper. In a single
paragraph, and virtually without explanation, Rousseau postulates a "first
revolution," in which, to- gether with simple tools and the first huts,
which together constitute "a sort of property," appears the very
first cohabitation in the form of the monogamous nuclear family. Suddenly, and
without justification, since up to this time women have been supposed capable
of fending for themselves and their offspring alone, Rousseau intro- duces a
complete division of labor between the sexes. Previously the way of life of the
two sexes has been identical. Now, he says, "Women became more sedentary
and grew accustomed to tend the hut and the children, while the man went to
seek their common subsistence."10 With no explanation, then, we have the
division of labor between men as breadwinners and women as housewives. This
division of labor, moreover, means that the entire female half of the human
race is no longer self-sufficient. Since it was this very self-suffici- ency
which had been the guarantee of the freedom and equality that characterized the
original state of nature, one might expect some commentary on this suddenly
introduced inequality, but one will not find it. Rousseau describes these
original families as united only by the bonds of "reciprocal affection and
freedom," but it is also made very clear that, since the male is assigned
the only work which Rousseau considers to be productive of property, the
family's goods belong to him alone.”
Okin presses here upon a “rhetorical syllogism”, as Aristotle would call it,
that reappears in Emile. The two works were composed in the 1755-1760 period,
which also included the writing of Julie. The pattern is the same: we have, on
the one hand, a primary equality, and on the other hand, a defense of
dependence. Let me get ahead of my texts, here, and say that what is at issue
here is solitude. Can a woman be solitary? In the creation story as Rousseau
has inherited it, women are simply dependent by way of a divine fiat. The
enlightenment gesture one would expect would be clearing away the theological
impression – which Rousseau, following Locke, does. But Rousseau does not want
to import England into the primal scene: rather, the New World. In so doing,
Rousseau creates an insurmountable logical problem for himself – from the New
World, we only get to the patriarchal world by an illegitimate violence –
illegitimate in that it does not reflect or extend our nature. This is a truth
too far for Rousseau, which is why he revisits the creation scene, this time
using the language not of Locke, but of the Bible. And yet still, the dice give
him snake eyes – one and one.
From Emile: “This principle established, it follows that woman is especially
made to please man. If man must please in his turn, it is by a necessity less
direct: his merit is in his power: he pleases by this alone, that he is strong.
This, I agree, is not the law of love: but it is that of nature, anterior to
love itself. “
One should notice that the binaries of pleasing/power and nature/love
create the space in which solitude is not only available to man, but is his
right – and is disallowed to woman, as against her essential nature.
In the turn towards the republican idea in the 18th century,
as Maria D’Agoult notes, women were left out. There is an old tradition of
blaming Rousseau for this or that aspect of the French revolution, and it often
does something that I want to be careful not to do, erasing the mediation
between intellectual and social history. But there is, as I’ve pointed out, a
moment in Rousseau’s work in which both D’Agoult’s criticism and the countering
idea, that Rousseau was actually an enlightened figure with regard to women,
both have some justification. Examining that moment, in which the difference
between men and women speaks in a new way, and the equality between men and
women is foreclosed upon in an old way, brings to light a theme that is separated
from Rousseau’s political and cultural politics – the theme of solitude.
Todorov, for instance, speaks of Rousseau’s notion of solitude as an exception
that applies to Jean-Jacques alone, or at least to the rare extra-societal
figure. That notion of solitude, conveniently enough, conflates the solitary
with the stranger. In the 18th
century, one knew the stranger well: as an adventurer. The adventurer was a
creature from the cracks in the old order, the Cagliostro who suddenly appears at the
city limits, the one who transcends the society of the limited good, the
dependence of the little on the great tradition. The adventurer who sails the
ocean with his fevers, and destroys populations. The adventurer who becomes a
politician in the nineteenth century.
Like the adventurer, the solitary is not a type categorized by any division of
labor. I’m concerned – and here I depart from Rousseau, having taken a hint –
though, with solitude as an existential and original condition that founds
equality. It is at this moment, in this dream of an exceptional solitude, that
an almost unnoticeable division occurs between solitude and individuality.
Intellectual historians have noticed that individualism – a word that was first
coined in France at the end of the eighteenth century – connoted something
disrespectable and a-social up to about the 1830s. Solitude was, of course,
eclipsed by individualism. That eclipse inflects, in particular, the history of
women. In founding equality on access to solitude, one is not promoting a
lifestyle of solitude. Rather, one is promoting the kind of community that
allows, in its very structure, access to solitude as one of the basic
interstices of the moral life. It is not the community of the hermit or the
shut in, but as a possibility available to every member of the community to
walk unseen. To change the title of Virginia Woolf’s essay slightly – an essay
about the lack of solitude for women, by the way - equality for women means,
here, ‘a walk of her own.’ A solitary promenade of her own.
Rousseau was not, of course, the first to discover the conjunction of daydream,
meditation, walking, and solitude. There is a famous letter from Descartes to
Guez de Balzac, written in 1631, about the solitary walk. It has been translated
a number of times into English – some of the translations are a little bizarre.
I’m going to translate the famous bits here, and then – I’m going to move on. I
want to go to Madame de Stael and Jane Austin next.
On to Descartes, then.
Guez de Balzac was a school friend from La Fleche. He has now fallen into
obscurity even in France, and was never very famous in the English speaking
world. His fame in the seventeenth century was as a refiner of the language, a
rhetor. Or a corruptor of the language – as Stephen Gaukroger points out,
Balzac’s style was the court style. In 1631, the court was on a collision
course with the nobility – the proto-Fronde. And the Fronde was friendly to the
Gassendi circle. Frondeurs were prominent patrons of Epicurian thought.
Moliere’s Dom Juan is definitely a Frondeur.
Descartes’ letter to Balzac begins with a movement that startles us, so much
does it evoke the Descartes of the Meditations:
“I lifted up my hand against my eyes to see if I was not dreaming when I read
in your letter that you had a plan to come here, and still I dare not rejoice
at the news otherwise than as if I had only dreamt it: however, I don’t find it
strange that an intellect (esprit) as great and generous as your own cannot
accommodate itself to these servile constraints to which one is obligated in
the court; and since you sincerely assure me that God has inspired you to quit
the world, I would consider myself to sin against the Holy Spirit if I tried to
turn you from your holy resolution; but you must pardon my zeal if I press you
to chose Amsterdam for your retreat, and to prefer it, I wouldn’t say not only
to all the convents of the capuchins and chartists, where necessarily good men
do retire, but also to the most beautiful spots in France and Italy, and even
to that celebrated hermitage in which you stayed last year. However well
stocked a country house, it always lacks an infinity of commodities which are
only found in the cities; and the solitude that one hopes to find there is
never quite perfectly encountered after all. I’d like to see you find a canal
that would make the greatest talkers daydream, a valley so solitary that it can
inspire them to transports and joy; but unfortunately, it can also be the case
that you will have a quantity of little neighbors that will importune you on
occasion, and whose visits are more discommoding than those you receive in
Paris: instead in the great city where I live, there being no man except me who
is not engaged in the market, each is so attentive to his profit that I can
remain there all my life without being seen by anyone. I go walking every day
among the confusion of a mass of people with as much liberty and repose that
attends you in your country lanes; and I never consider the people that I encounter
otherwise than I would the trees I would meet in a forest, or the animals I
would pass there; even the noise of their tumults no longer interrupts my
reveries any more than they would be interrupted by some stream: and if I makes
some reflection on their actions, it is with the same pleasure that you have to
see the peasants who cultivate your countrysides; for I see that all their work
serves to embellish the place of my residence, and to make it the case that I
lack nothing. If you find pleasure to see the fruits in your vineyards growing
and to exist there in such abundance under your eyes, don’t you think that
there is as much to see coming here ships which carry us abundantly all the
products of the Indies, and everything that is rare in Europe? What other place
could one chose in any other part of the world where all the commodities of
life and all the curiosities that could be wished for are as easy to discover
as here? In what other country can one enjoy such entire liberty, where one can
sleep with less inquietude, where there are always armed men on foot expressly
to guard you, where poisonings, betrayals and calumnies are least known, and
where there still exists remants of the innocence of our ancestors?”
Solitude and gender
It is said that St. Petersburg was built on the bones of the builders, the army
of serfs that drained the swamps and laid the foundations.
And then, too, as Emerson once said, there was a deal of guano in every
immigrant ship that came to America. Buffalo skinners and railroad track men,
how many laid down their only homestead and died.
So while we are on the subject, give a thought to the hundreds of thousands of
permanently bent spines, the hernias, the paralyzing shoots of rheumatism that
rattle around in your clean clothes. Blanchisseuses, Wascherfrau, laundresses,
washing woman – from the early modern period to the washing machine of the 50s,
this overwhelmingly female job was ill paid, unhealthy, and exhausting. It is,
of course, far from over yet. In Mexico City, with its terrible water system,
you will not find the American style washer/drier set up as the convenience we
all have, and on the rooftops of even rich mansions you might well find the
maid soaking clothes in the tub.
Now there is some justice in asking if intellectual history would come
unscathed through the judgment of the bones it ignores. And such might be one
judgment on solitude as I’ve been construing it. Solitude is a bourgeois
affectation – I can hear the voice of the commissar say exactly that, imagine
some cloth capped Marxist enforcer from the 30s or 50s pronouncing the very
word ‘solditude’ with the utmost contempt.
But contempt has its day, too, its warrant, its reasons. There were armies of
washerwomen, and it is a fair question: what would solitude mean to them? To
the 167,607 who worked in England and Wales in 1861 (Malcolmson, 7) To the half
of free black women who worked as laundresses in Philadelphia in 1840. In
France, in the 1870s, there were 90,000 in Paris alone.
Here is what M. Moisy, author of Les Lavoirs de Paris, wrote about the
washerwoman:
She has a good heart. A strong yeller, I concur – like the daughter of Mme
Angot – she is not less strong in her good sentiments. When an accident, or
unemployment strikes one of her neighbors: let a drive be organized in the
lavoir: she always gives, even if the charity is to an enemy of yesterday.
She also has the love or her profession, more than other workers of any other
profession, and it is tough, this job: the laundry worker begins at six in the
morning, only takes an hour off to eat, and works until eight or eight thirty
in the evening, around thirteen to fourteen hours a day.
Returned home, wet down to her bones, she has to prepare the soup for her
husband and kids, and doesn’t get to sleep until she has done her housework.
The next day should puts on her humid rags to begin the day’s rude existence
all over again.” (Barbaret I: 271 – my translation)
Such numbers of women force an image upon the collective mind. It is a little
unsettling that the image of the washing woman in the 18th and 19th century
corresponds so well to national stereotypes. In Germany and Austria, there was
the hetera washerwoman, the Alte Wascherfrau, who had her place in Volkslied
and Grimm’s tales, and even casts a shadow in Kafka’s The Trial. In France,
from Jean Vadé’s 1740 comic Parisian dialect novel, Lettres de la Grenouillère
to Balzac’s La Rabouilleuse, the blanchisseuse was renowned for her freedom,
for her constant presence on Parisian streets, and, of course, for her erotic
charm – a charm that wished away the wet rags of Moisy’s description. Balzac’s
men, his mature men, ass men, cannot resist her. And in England? England, that
frightening, puzzling place. Unlike the cook and the chambermaid, who at least
get some bawdy attention from 18th century writers and printmakers, and of
course get orders in respectable 19th century households, there is something
like a negative space, as though the laundress really was a pariah. Which is
not true, of course, about Ireland – the old washerwomen in Yeats, and the
voices of them in Finnegan’s Wake, are taken from life – that is where the
authentic circus animals come from. In America, as we have mentioned, race has
everything to do with cleaning clothes.
So my faithful gadfly North wants to know, why washerwomen?
Wash women. Laudresses.
Why not seamstresses? Why not the workers in pin factories? Why not paysannes
or prostitutes?
Well, partly it is for that most male of reasons: la donna è mobile.
Blanchisseuses in 18th century Paris were not only numerous, but also moved in
a number of social spaces. The obscure washed their own clothes, often jostling
professional wash women on the banks of the Seine. As one climbs the ladder of
notability, however, self-presentation, and thus clean linen, becomes ever more
important.
And then, too, what would our artificial paradise be without chemicals? In the
seventeenth and eighteenth century, while some remnant alchemists looked for
universal solvents or the philosopher’s stone, others – whose very spirit is
breathed out by the wonderful planches in the encyclopedia, those busy, small
worlds – turned to more practical questions. And what was more practical than a
better soap. Various substances – from dried pig’s shit to oak ash – were used
to get cloth clean. Soap was the big expense for a wash woman – in 1789, when
the cahiers de doleances, or notebooks of complaint (or, to be all Jeremiah
about it, books of Lamentation) were collected throughout France, the blanchisseuses
of Marseilles presented their complaint that the regulations concerning the
composition and price of soap were not being respected.
And the relation between soap and clothes is as dramatic, in its way, as that
between thesis and antithesis in Hegel’s dialectic. Clothes, after all, took on
the complete impress of the ordinary – and especially the extraordinary. Every
wine stain, every drop of grease, sperm, juice, all the perfumes and powders,
all the sweat – and it is just these fantasmal half-beings, social doxa, that
had to disappear. They had to be trampled, beaten, spindled, driven out – all
these real ghosts, ghosts in material time. At the same time, the cloth itself
had to be preserved. Soillure, dirt, - ground terms, terms that are rooted in
the fundamentals of purity and impurity – and the wash woman stands at these
archaic portals of purity. “There is not a city where one uses up more linen,”
wrote Sebastian Mercier about Paris. And there was not a city where the archaic
so joins the modern.
The modern came in the form of Claude Louis Berthollet’s invention of “l’eau de
Javel”, in which chlorine was dissolved in a solution of potash lye. You may
think that here we have got away from the gods, but actually, here we begin the
divine and diabolic course that has touched every creature on earth – for it is
among the elements of social life, raising crops, cleaning clothes, that
chemistry turned practical, and then took over the human sphere to a point we
cannot even comprehend.
Meanwhile, the body breaking method of beating clothes was also slowly being
modified. In London, in 1782, Henry Sidgier was issued a patent for a drum
rotating machine to wash clothes. Obscure Sidgier! And yet, as Lee Maxwell
points out in his history of the washing machine, the principle of the drum
rotating machine remains the same today.
What is funny is that out of this vast, centuries old enterprise, relatively
little comes down to us. Compare the songs we all know celebrating the cowboy,
to those we know celebrating the wash woman. In fact, do we know any
celebrating the wash woman? The ‘we’ here is Anglophone. In fact, in France and
Germany, and no doubt in Italy, those songs and the literature certainly
remain.
We are not utterly cut off.
There was, for instance, Mary Collier. An agricultural laborer, a washerwoman,
and a poet. She was taught the crude elements of reading and writing and, in
the midst of her toils, took some precious time out of the day to read. She
read, for instance, Stephan Duck, another peasant poet, and noted his
disparaging words about women “sitting in the fields” rather than swinging
their scythes. She cried out against the lie here in her own poem, The Woman’s
Labour an epistle to Stephan Duck, which was published in 1739. Collier gives
us first hand an account of standing outside in the cold winter dark of early
mourning, waiting for the maid to get up and let her and other washerwomen into
the house, so they could begin the laundry.
But
when from Wind and Weather we get in,
Briskly with Courage we our Work begin ;
Heaps of fine Linen we before us view,
Whereon to lay our Strength and Patience too ;
Cambricks and Muſlins, which our Ladies wear,
Laces and Edgings, coſtly, fine, and rare,
Which muſt be waſh'd with utmoſt Skill and Care ;
With Holland Shirts, Ruffles and Fringes too,
Faſhions which our Fore-fathers never knew.
For ſeveral Hours here we work and ſlave,
Before we can one Glimpſe of Day-light have ;
We labour hard before the Morning's paſt,
Becauſe we fear the Time runs on too faſt.
AT length bright Sol illuminates the Skies,
And ſummons drowſy Mortals to ariſe ;
Then comes our Miſtreſs to us without fail,
And in her Hand, perhaps, a Mug of Ale
To cheer our Hearts, and alſo to inform
Herſelf, what Work is done that very Morn ;
Lays her Commands upon us, that we mind
Her Linen well, nor leave the Dirt behind :
In Collier’s account, the labour is overwhelming. Duck had compared the
endlessness of it to Sisyphus – and Collier replies:
“While you to Syſiphus yourſelves compare,
With Danaus' Daughters we may claim a Share ;
For while he labours hard againſt the Hill,
Bottomleſs Tubs of Water they muſt fill.”
What Collier complains of most, in the end, is
Our Toil and Labour's daily ſo extreme,
That we have hardly ever Time to dream.
It is being cut off from something vital that is felt to the very root of one’s
wet being. And these nattering ghosts can’t be put down, then, by the
utilitarian faith that the market will eventually make all parties happy. I’m
making a wager that the vital portion is not the philosopher’s individuality,
but Rousseau’s solitude – a flashing, unstructured portion of life upon which
the community worth having – the community dreamt of by the aliens from
happiness culture, the community in which there is time to dream – must be
built.
And so she passes by – one
of the obscure. Although not by Virginia Woolf’s standards.
“Ann married Mr. G., of course—of course. The words toll persistently through
these obscure volumes. For in the vast world to which the memoir writers admit
us there is a solemn sense of something unescapable, of a wave gathering
beneath the frail flotilla and carrying it on.”
Virginia Woolf’s stunning essay on the literature of the Obscure is not about
the literature of the working woman or man, not about the Mary Colliers, but
that of the midlevel, that of families in the very cage of respectability, like
Jane Austin’s Bennets, who sense how precariously they are perched. If we
search for what has been left behind – what dirt, what voice, what soul – in
order to reconstruct the wave gathering underneath these routines, we have to
have an ear for lateral communication – those moments when the obscure speak to
obscure in their own ever twisting language.
We are not utterly cut off.
“The atmosphere of London is so charged with particles of carbon and black
smoke that if you hang up a white cloth in a current of fresh air, you will
find it, at the end of two hours, entirely covered with little plack spots, and
the white vest that you put on in the morning is dirty before the hour of
dinner.” –A year in London, Auguste Jean B. Defauconpret, 1819 – my translation.
In Domination and the arts of resistance, Scott wisely sees that the very form
of Hegel’s presentation of the master-slave relationship is politically coded.
It is a dyadic form, master on one side and slave or servant on the other. This
face to face form has been inherited by philosophy since, and even considered
the nucleus of revolutionary thought, but… as Scott points out … the dyad is
the master’s preference. ‘The politcal symbolism of most forms of personal
dominance carries with it the implicit assumption that the subordinates gather
only when authorized to do so from above.” And though we have been told that
his personalized struggle for recognition is the very essence and myth of
liberation, what is avoided here is the lateral, the association, the crowd.
When the slave, in the great myth, faces the master, what is pre-emptively
excluded is what Scott calls the hidden transcript, and what I would call
lateral communication.
‘One has only to imagine a feudal lord noticing a large
number of his serfs advancing unsummoned to his manor, a large number of
beggarts (masterless men by definition) moving through the countryside, or even
a large crowd of factory workers gathered near the plant manager’s office to
recognize the possibilities.” (63)
These two modes of conversational direction – vertical and lateral – are, of
course, our old friends from school, our first sense of disciplinary space.
Lateral speech, at the wrong time, is punishable.
It may seem a long stretch from masterless men to the Bennet daughters,
attending a ball in Pride and Prejudice, but I think that the novel, and
especially the novel as the symptom of female insubordination or corruption,
participates in this grid. Of course, lateral speech happens at the top as well
as at the bottom – and the English novel, supremely, wants to make a place in
the middle for it. However, even at the top it is felt to be somewhat lowering
when it is exposed, as if the masters speaking among themselves go down the
hierarchical scale and gossip. They reveal secrets, they lose the mask – and
these secrets are precisely what they are accused of by the slave. It is not
all recognition, you see.
The pathos of the obscure, the heavy “of course” that Virginia Woolf correctly
sees as forming all the motion that sweeps the obscure across history, is
lodged in the fact that the secrets aren’t interesting. That so and so slept
with x, that uncle y was a drunkard – all of this, in the memoirs that Woolf
picks up, has faded away. It has lost our interest. Such is the difference
between synchronic interest, in which busy-ness itself engages us, and
diachronic interest, in which only the heroic engages us. One definition of
revolution is that it is the time when the arms, so to speak, of the synchronic
and diachronic are squeezed together, imposed one on top of the other, so that
the obscure becomes heroic, the complaints (doleances) of the blanchisseuses of
Marseilles exert an oversocial force that is as riveting as the beheading of a
king. Obviously, here, too, the forms of vertical and lateral communication
correspond, in some way, link up with the synchronic and diachronic sense of
interest.
Time, as Hamlet points out, is out of joint. Time, as Derrida points out,
quoting Hamlet in Specters of Marx, is out of joint.
No, we are not utterly cut off. We are wired in.
No comments:
Post a Comment