If things are in the saddle and ride mankind, as Emerson
said, then let us imagine that things take a break every now and then and let
words ride. It is a 30 – 70 split,
perhaps, is what I am getting at. This being so, it is foolish to argue with a
word once it has established a claim on mankind.
In fact, this is just the kind of foolishness that
philosophers – who at one time acknowledged themselves to be half-fool,
although now they more often consider themselves to be half-scientist, a half
and half creature that to me is still fool – like to engage in. Thus, I, in my
half a fool robes, have always had a steady dislike for the word “real” and its
court favorite, “realism”.
Here’s my reasoning. If real is meant to refer to the
constitution of reality, then, in my opinion, it cant go picking out some bits
of reality and discarding others. It must be wholly promiscuous, rather than
half chaste. It must include magic, dreams, mirages and perceptions as well as
carpenters crowns, heaps and pi. In other words, I take real to make the widest
of ontological claims. However, in actual use, real has been turned into an
ontological grift, setting itself up as something ontologicallly direct as
opposed to all those soft ontologically indirect objects. These, the realist wants to say, are
dependent on a subjective privilege that
takes us out of the real and into the ideal, or the fanatastic.
Here we spot everyday dualism, doing its silent work. And
everyday dualism has its advantages, or it wouldn’t hang around. But those
advantages, which prime it for everyday distinctions, don’t prime it for metaphysical
argument. There, it forgets its place. It rubs up against its own original
quantitative claim – that reality is all, whereas non-reality is nothing – and can only help itself out of its dilemma by
silently inserting assumption into the discussion that , indeed, must be
discussed before we can have the discussion.
In my opinion, realism is only plausibility writ large: it
is a view on what is possible and important that gains its justification from a
certain class background. Aristotle, in the Topics, speaks of endoxa – credible
opinions – that are “accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the wise”.
This is the filter through which reality becomes realism. The privileged point
of view is given us by the class system in the regime in which that point of
view is expressed. The reputable class bears various names, depending on the
regime we are talking about, whether it is the middle class in America, or
public opinion, or most scientists, or – more commonly – an implied everybody
who counts that lurks behind a passive construction (“as is well known,” “as is
generally agreed”, etc.). Realism’s affiliation with plausibility, rather than
reality, is the secret of why the term seems so indeterminate, when you come to
close quarters with it.
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