Remora
The journalist beat
For months, LI has been beating on a drum that is made out of the cyber-skin of James Glassman. The disintegration of the business press, which in the last week saw two more casualties -- Forbes ASAP and Upside -- has not prompted the kind of investigative fervor that is revved up by, say, the kidnapping of blond California tykes. Still, there's a lot to say about it, and we've been boringly, boringly on target about this issue. Well, in memes we trust -- Washington Monthly has an article about this topic by journalist Philip Longman. Longman begins in the self-critical mode, although it never reaches a properly Maoist depth. Here's a couple of grafs from the meat of the article:
"I was once proud of my profession and resentful of those who criticized it. For more than 20 years, I rode the great boom in business journalism that began in the early 1980s. I like to believe that at least some of my stories helped to enlighten readers and remedy wrongdoing. But today, I'm more likely to admit--at least on a bad day--that I spent my youth hustling Tyco shares to senior citizens.
Just as Americans put far too much faith in the integrity and intellectual prowess of stock analysts and other supposedly disinterested financial watchdogs during the boom, they also put far too much stock in business journalism, and have a right to be disappointed and angry. Like many of the industries we once covered, business journalists built their own bubble during the last decade. And now--as is appropriate for an industry that grew rich by dishing out so much bad advice and flabby reporting--business journalism is currently suffering the same financial fate as Wall Street and Silicon Valley. The Industry Standard --where reporters once took time off from chronicling the achievements of dot-com heroes to enjoy in-house massages and open-bar parties graced by belly dancers--is history, along with many other formerly high-riding business rags. And even the most venerable and established business publications are in trouble. The Wall Street Journal has suffered huge layoffs. Forbes, no longer profitable, is reducing staff and executive salaries, eliminating the 401(k) plan, and raising cash by auctioning off old man Forbes's various art collections. Business Week , which championed the "new economy" and in the late 1990s proclaimed an end to the business cycle, saw its advertising plunge from 6,000 pages in 2000 to 3,786 last year, and may finish 2002 with even fewer."
So far, so good. Alas, Longman, revving up for some fancy shooting, never takes a nice shot at a named target -- besides the obvious Cramer and Glassman. This is one way to cover your behind: criticize the bubble of biz journalism without naming the journalists. Worse, Longman apparently believes strongly in the Efficient markets theory. That this theory conflicts with the use of the term bubble, which he sensibly employs, doesn't seem to phase him:
"Few business journalists spend much time analyzing balance sheets. But even if they did, they wouldn't be of much help to folks trying to figure out how to invest their 401(k)s. This truth was forced on me when I set out to learn high finance (after years of writing about it) at Columbia Business School. Here I was, a 40-something guy on a fellowship for mid-career business journalists, surrounded by 20-something whiz kids who would shortly go off with their newly minted MBAs to dazzle Wall Street. And what was the first lesson our finance professor drove home? That even after spending two years and $60,000 at Columbia Business School, none of them would be able to outperform the markets except by sheer luck or inside information."
If Longman really believes his second sentence, than he can't really blame business journalists for the negligence alluded to in the first sentence. Oddly, he doesn't reflect on the contradiction. LI thinks that Longman is right, if he is floundering towards the proposition that business journalists should not think of their jobs as that of advising investors, as opposed to informing the public.
Still, the idea that an MBA won't be able to outperform the market over the long hall is, firstly, contradicted by some well known instances (among them Warren Buffett); and second, depends on breaking up the market into time segments, and elastic definitions of risk that are convenient to the EMH guys. In fact, Longman's discovery of this principal couldn't have been worse timed. During a down market, the pick and chose method of investment emerges as a competitive speculative tool in comparison with the idea of parking your money with a money fund and forgetting about it.
A good critique of EMH is this paper written by Andrew Smithers and Stephen Wright. The discrepency between bubble talk and EMH talk is revealed by what Smithers and Wright call the "extreme form" of EMH: that financial markets adjust immediately and perfectly to new information. Thus, the three hundred some point rise in the NYSE Friday represented a perfect adjustment of markets to new information. That information has to do with the fundamental prices of stocks. Well, although EMH detours around the problem of short term volatility, I buy Smithers and Wrights story about predictable regularities in the market that count against the premises of EMH. Smithers and Wright talk about one of them that we are getting acquainted with over the past two years: "...stock returns are negatively correlated to over the long term, so that periods of high stock returns are typically followed by periods of low returns." The EMH view, which has an ideological quotient that satisfies your average libertarian economist, is what the Longmans will always hear in their classes at Columbia. Joseph Stiglitz won the Nobel Prize, a couple of years ago, for showing that perfect efficiency would collapse the market. The market will always be incomplete, and the information distributed through it will always be assymetrical. Neither Stiglitz nor the experiments of behaviorial economists have made, or will make, a dent in the equilibrium model.
So, Longman should have thought a little bit before unsealing his astonishing revelations among the hotshot MBAs.
Tuesday, October 15, 2002
Saturday, October 12, 2002
Remora
On the subject of Iraq, the two major Washington newspapers, and the two major Washington journals of opinion (The Weekly Standard and The New Republic) are all loudly belligerent. While the WP and The New Republic are (reluctantly, inconsistently) "liberal" journals, and the Washington Times and the WS are boldly and bluntly conservative, they are all agreed that we have to go to war right now, and no fooling around.
The Ithaca, New York city council has voted not to go to war with Iraq. That is an entirely appropriate step, since the war is less the U.S. versus Iraq than D.C. vs. Iraq. Rarely has one locale been able, by its own feverish will, to pull a whole country behind it. But D.C. has become a place of fevers; fevers from which the rest of the country suffers. Who wanted the years of impeachment? Who wanted Whitewater? D.C. Watergate, another D.C. fever, at least caught on in the rest of the country, so that by the time it was over, the whole country really cared. This time, the whole country supports the war only insofar as they reluctantly have to pay attention to it. There was no groundswell of revulsion against Saddam Hussein going on out there in Mississippi, or Texas, or even New York.
As I remember the days leading up to the Gulf war, the country was passionately engaged. I was passionately opposed to it, marched against it, and remember the number of people who supported the war. Now, I was in the minority, then, and according to the polls, I'm in the minority now. But those polls are screwy. They record more fluctuation than support. And, talking to people, I don't feel, even among Bush's supporters, any strong feeling about Iraq. This war is not being driven by the popular will, in any shape or form.
Conservative boilerplate, in the days of Nixon, was that Washington was out of touch -- in fact, the very name of the city, rolling off the lips of your average Southern demagogue, was synonymous with Gog -- or is it Magog? In any case, one of those places that one knows the Anti-christ right at home in. This was before the Southern demagogues took the capital. It has been some twenty-two years since the forces of Reagan stormed the place. Although the conservative wind-up sometimes weedily harks back to the good old Washington Babylon routine, conservatives know that they have finally become the Washington establishment. Reagan's issues have become the default issues: welfare, they are against it; a strong defense, they are for it; they want the muscular foreign policy and no weepers, and there is polite tittering when Senator Byrd takes the floor to quaintly talk about the powers of congress.
The sheer lunacy of D.C. -- the way it brands people, immediately, as serious on the strength of one set of conformities, and dubs people fringe for representing any view that isn't moderately conservative to conservative, has been shown by two things recently. One was the reaction to Al Gore's Iraq speech -- there was an almost audible shifting in the seats in D.C., and then the condemnations flowed, until they became the acceptable version of the story -- which became a story about the race for the Democratic presidential nominee, since D.C. had long ago decided that Gore's objections to belligerence were, in themselves, fringe-ish. The other is the blase reaction to such utter lunacy as is expressed in this NYT article about Bush's "plan" for an occupied Iraq.
"U.S. Has a Plan to Occupy Iraq, Officials Report
By DAVID E. SANGER and ERIC SCHMITT
WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 � The White House is developing a detailed plan, modeled on the postwar occupation of Japan, to install an American-led military government in Iraq if the United States topples Saddam Hussein, senior administration officials said today.The plan also calls for war-crime trials of Iraqi leaders and a transition to an elected civilian government that could take months or years."
The NYT is expanding on an earlier report in last Sunday's LA Times that goes to the same territory.
LI gets into a sort of stylistic problem with stories like these. We have given a good look around at weblogs, and we've been struck by the pall of insult that hangs over the political ones. Pervasive invective diminishes the shock it aims to convey. Indignation, rather than revenge, is the dish that is best served cold. But LI can't read about the U.S. Army calmly occupying Iraq for a couple of years (like our successful occupation of Vietnam?) distributing the oil wealth, laying down a constitution, and trying Iraqi leaders for war crimes (say what? are the judges then going to try themselves, for aiding and abetting?) without spontaneously switching into insult mode. And this, this is the kind of thing D.C. takes seriously.
I can't think of a worse nightmare than a dream you can't get out of.
This is that nightmare.
On the subject of Iraq, the two major Washington newspapers, and the two major Washington journals of opinion (The Weekly Standard and The New Republic) are all loudly belligerent. While the WP and The New Republic are (reluctantly, inconsistently) "liberal" journals, and the Washington Times and the WS are boldly and bluntly conservative, they are all agreed that we have to go to war right now, and no fooling around.
The Ithaca, New York city council has voted not to go to war with Iraq. That is an entirely appropriate step, since the war is less the U.S. versus Iraq than D.C. vs. Iraq. Rarely has one locale been able, by its own feverish will, to pull a whole country behind it. But D.C. has become a place of fevers; fevers from which the rest of the country suffers. Who wanted the years of impeachment? Who wanted Whitewater? D.C. Watergate, another D.C. fever, at least caught on in the rest of the country, so that by the time it was over, the whole country really cared. This time, the whole country supports the war only insofar as they reluctantly have to pay attention to it. There was no groundswell of revulsion against Saddam Hussein going on out there in Mississippi, or Texas, or even New York.
As I remember the days leading up to the Gulf war, the country was passionately engaged. I was passionately opposed to it, marched against it, and remember the number of people who supported the war. Now, I was in the minority, then, and according to the polls, I'm in the minority now. But those polls are screwy. They record more fluctuation than support. And, talking to people, I don't feel, even among Bush's supporters, any strong feeling about Iraq. This war is not being driven by the popular will, in any shape or form.
Conservative boilerplate, in the days of Nixon, was that Washington was out of touch -- in fact, the very name of the city, rolling off the lips of your average Southern demagogue, was synonymous with Gog -- or is it Magog? In any case, one of those places that one knows the Anti-christ right at home in. This was before the Southern demagogues took the capital. It has been some twenty-two years since the forces of Reagan stormed the place. Although the conservative wind-up sometimes weedily harks back to the good old Washington Babylon routine, conservatives know that they have finally become the Washington establishment. Reagan's issues have become the default issues: welfare, they are against it; a strong defense, they are for it; they want the muscular foreign policy and no weepers, and there is polite tittering when Senator Byrd takes the floor to quaintly talk about the powers of congress.
The sheer lunacy of D.C. -- the way it brands people, immediately, as serious on the strength of one set of conformities, and dubs people fringe for representing any view that isn't moderately conservative to conservative, has been shown by two things recently. One was the reaction to Al Gore's Iraq speech -- there was an almost audible shifting in the seats in D.C., and then the condemnations flowed, until they became the acceptable version of the story -- which became a story about the race for the Democratic presidential nominee, since D.C. had long ago decided that Gore's objections to belligerence were, in themselves, fringe-ish. The other is the blase reaction to such utter lunacy as is expressed in this NYT article about Bush's "plan" for an occupied Iraq.
"U.S. Has a Plan to Occupy Iraq, Officials Report
By DAVID E. SANGER and ERIC SCHMITT
WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 � The White House is developing a detailed plan, modeled on the postwar occupation of Japan, to install an American-led military government in Iraq if the United States topples Saddam Hussein, senior administration officials said today.The plan also calls for war-crime trials of Iraqi leaders and a transition to an elected civilian government that could take months or years."
The NYT is expanding on an earlier report in last Sunday's LA Times that goes to the same territory.
LI gets into a sort of stylistic problem with stories like these. We have given a good look around at weblogs, and we've been struck by the pall of insult that hangs over the political ones. Pervasive invective diminishes the shock it aims to convey. Indignation, rather than revenge, is the dish that is best served cold. But LI can't read about the U.S. Army calmly occupying Iraq for a couple of years (like our successful occupation of Vietnam?) distributing the oil wealth, laying down a constitution, and trying Iraqi leaders for war crimes (say what? are the judges then going to try themselves, for aiding and abetting?) without spontaneously switching into insult mode. And this, this is the kind of thing D.C. takes seriously.
I can't think of a worse nightmare than a dream you can't get out of.
This is that nightmare.
Thursday, October 10, 2002
Remora
Trailing distantly in the wake of the comet...
Well, people are starting to wake up to LI's complaint about the lack of competition in the executive labor market. The Economist deigns, even, to notice that something is rotten in Coutersport -- although they assume the attitude of ingenues in a brothel:
"The market is also characterised by extreme secrecy. Companies may run advertisements for technicians and accountants, but they rarely advertise the top job�and if word of a candidacy leaks out, the person concerned usually has no option but to rule himself out of the race. Mr Khurana argues that the search process, with its emphasis on confidentiality, restricts the hunt for potential candidates and puts enormous power in the hands of the recruiting firm. And, precisely because it is such a restricted and secretive market, it is bad at price-setting. Hence the immense sums that companies offer outsiders to persuade them to take the job, sums that then influence the pay of other chief executives. Because a search firm's fee is typically one-third of a new recruit's negotiated annual cash compensation, they have every reason to push up pay.
True, the market finds only a small (but rising) minority of all the bosses appointed each year. Most big firms still choose an insider for the top job�though many boards assume their inside recruit would be available for hire in the marketplace, and so still pay the �market� price for him. Once a firm opts to look outside, any internal candidate inevitably comes to look less impressive than the names on recruiters' lists: 75% of outsiders appointed in 1985-2000 had previously been chief executives or company presidents. "
Well, gee whiz. I bet everyone reporting for the Economist is just amazed by this pattern of interlocking interests that prevent a competitive labor market place from taking place. But the article ends on one of those conflations of natural and class constraints so dear to the Marxist analyst of ideology. See, it just doesn't seem that in the executive sphere, the same laws could apply as do in the sphere of, say, middle management. The authors are commenting on a recent, highly commented book by Khurana about the rise and fall of the charismatic CEO. Now for the drums and the dying fall:
"Even Mr Khurana is stumped for ways to make the market for bosses work much better. Letting shareholders elect their chief executive, perhaps from a slate of competing candidates, is likely to remain the stuff of corporate-governance fantasy. Changing the way headhunters are paid might discourage them from ignoring internal stars in favour of external candidates, particularly expensive ones. But they are likely to remain at the heart of the market, for the only practical alternative is for the board to do the search itself�a hunt that might not extend far beyond the 19th hole of the nearest golf club.The best hope is that boards, closely watched by today's more vigilant large shareholders, will be clearer about the problems a new boss must solve. They should forget about hiring another firm's boss on the strength of his eloquence on CNBC, and care more about operational skills and an ability to read a balance sheet. In the market for bosses, as in any other, the best way to improve efficiency is for consumers to remember the ancient rule of caveat emptor, or buyer beware."
Well, if Mr. Khurana is really so stumped, he ought to read LI's post for September 25 and 26. And hey, being a big hearted lefty type of guy, I'm givin' away my ideas for free!
Trailing distantly in the wake of the comet...
Well, people are starting to wake up to LI's complaint about the lack of competition in the executive labor market. The Economist deigns, even, to notice that something is rotten in Coutersport -- although they assume the attitude of ingenues in a brothel:
"The market is also characterised by extreme secrecy. Companies may run advertisements for technicians and accountants, but they rarely advertise the top job�and if word of a candidacy leaks out, the person concerned usually has no option but to rule himself out of the race. Mr Khurana argues that the search process, with its emphasis on confidentiality, restricts the hunt for potential candidates and puts enormous power in the hands of the recruiting firm. And, precisely because it is such a restricted and secretive market, it is bad at price-setting. Hence the immense sums that companies offer outsiders to persuade them to take the job, sums that then influence the pay of other chief executives. Because a search firm's fee is typically one-third of a new recruit's negotiated annual cash compensation, they have every reason to push up pay.
True, the market finds only a small (but rising) minority of all the bosses appointed each year. Most big firms still choose an insider for the top job�though many boards assume their inside recruit would be available for hire in the marketplace, and so still pay the �market� price for him. Once a firm opts to look outside, any internal candidate inevitably comes to look less impressive than the names on recruiters' lists: 75% of outsiders appointed in 1985-2000 had previously been chief executives or company presidents. "
Well, gee whiz. I bet everyone reporting for the Economist is just amazed by this pattern of interlocking interests that prevent a competitive labor market place from taking place. But the article ends on one of those conflations of natural and class constraints so dear to the Marxist analyst of ideology. See, it just doesn't seem that in the executive sphere, the same laws could apply as do in the sphere of, say, middle management. The authors are commenting on a recent, highly commented book by Khurana about the rise and fall of the charismatic CEO. Now for the drums and the dying fall:
"Even Mr Khurana is stumped for ways to make the market for bosses work much better. Letting shareholders elect their chief executive, perhaps from a slate of competing candidates, is likely to remain the stuff of corporate-governance fantasy. Changing the way headhunters are paid might discourage them from ignoring internal stars in favour of external candidates, particularly expensive ones. But they are likely to remain at the heart of the market, for the only practical alternative is for the board to do the search itself�a hunt that might not extend far beyond the 19th hole of the nearest golf club.The best hope is that boards, closely watched by today's more vigilant large shareholders, will be clearer about the problems a new boss must solve. They should forget about hiring another firm's boss on the strength of his eloquence on CNBC, and care more about operational skills and an ability to read a balance sheet. In the market for bosses, as in any other, the best way to improve efficiency is for consumers to remember the ancient rule of caveat emptor, or buyer beware."
Well, if Mr. Khurana is really so stumped, he ought to read LI's post for September 25 and 26. And hey, being a big hearted lefty type of guy, I'm givin' away my ideas for free!
Wednesday, October 09, 2002
Dope
LI doesn't usually read the NY Press for pretty articles -- we skim the controversialists, and move on. But this week, there is a very nice little article about Writing in New York: and no, it isn't some damn take on Jonathan Franzen's earmuffs. It is about the very civilized sounding NY Society Library. Lincoln MacVeagh, the writer, is happy to indulge in the causerie that Joseph Mitchell perfected -- a NYC stroll among odd fellows. Well, we think that form is un-improvable. Here's the first three grafs:
"Anthony Trollope didn�t need a writing desk; he was perfectly happy composing his novels in crowded train compartments. Not every writer possesses such power of concentration. Virginia Woolf insisted on several thousand pounds and a room of her own before she could get on with the job, and it�s my guess that most of us are more like Mrs. Woolf than Mr. Trollope.
The trouble is, it�s not easy to find a room of one�s own. Manhattan apartments don�t come with spare bedrooms, and renting an office at $1200 a month is out of the question. So where is a writer to write? One answer is the New York Society Library at 53 E. 79th St.
Founded in 1754, the Society Library is open to the public and membership costs $150 a year per household. It houses a good collection, a magnificent reading room and an elevator that is as elegant and temperamental as a Park Ave. hostess. The library opens at 9 and on any given morning you�ll find a handful of authors waiting outside to start work."
It sounds so much more civilized than our quarters. LI writes on a heavy office desk, one with black, pressed metal drawers crammed with drafts, envelopes, cds, pennies, letters and forms that we were urgently requested to fill out years ago, and that we didn't, and, far back in the top left hand drawer, a condom in plastic wrap, which, we believe, was given out at some long ago SXSW event. Our efficiency apartment is one of those rooms that never seem to get enough light, or get the light right -- somehow it always falls in some slightly irritating, oblique way on the page, which is a real bother for a person whose living consists of reading books and writing about them. If this sounds like the genteel life, it is certainly not: it's assembly line work without dental. I recently estimated that, in the past three and a half years, I have reviewed over four hundred books. At an average of 300 pages each, that comes to what, 120 thousand pages? Plus the books read to supplement those reviews -- research and such. Plus books read for enjoyment. So you can see that the question of light, far from being an aesthete's pre-occupation, is more in the nature of an occupational hazard.
On the topic of writers we are reviewing: we've been enjoying the marvelous autobiography of Anthony Burgess, Little Wilson and Big God, which we are reading, natch, in preparation for a review of Burgess's upcoming bio. What we like about Burgess -- what we love about Burgess -- is his luxuriant, sprawling, variegated, I don't give a damn English. It is nice to read a man who is not afraid that the dictionary's going to bite. Here he is, going on about having a childhood case of scarlet fever:
"My stepmother, knowing my disease was damnably contagious, was more anxious to shoo me off the premises than solicitous about my headache and nausea. Dr. Sneddon wound the handle of our extension telephone and told 21 Princess Road (Moss Side 1274) to call an ambulance. Anges shrieked "Me baby!" at the other end (I had played with the child the day before) but was calmed. I was taken to where I started -- northeast Manchester, Monsall Isolation Hospital, between Monsall Road and Northhampton Road. There, while I desquamated, I completed my primary education."
A lesser writer would have crossed out 'desquamated'. I had to look it up. It means to shed skin. It is a word I am now proud to know -- that "squa-" sound, as in sqalid, with the denunciatory de-, reproduces the sickly squirm of the skin shedder. It made me think of a recent piece by Jonathan Franzen on William Gaddis that was in last week's New Yorker.
Franzen's essays, lately, remind me of the title of one of Norman Mailer's books: Advertisements for Myself. Except with Franzen's coy grad school mannerisms the title should be: Valentines to myself. The man is incorrigbly smitten, and writes as if he was taking himself out on a date. He's cute, he impresses himself, and at the end of the evening he presumably gets to third base with himself. But that's something I just don't want to know. Neal Pollack's parody catches that perfectly. In any case, Franzen begins the essay (the burden of which is a general, essentially not very smart condemnation of Gaddis' work) with a letter he received about The Corrections from a woman who noted down four difficult words used in it, and asks: who are you writing for, the sophisticates who read the New Yorker? Then she calls him an asshole.
Franzen doesn't have the wit to say: no, I'm writing for people who read the Reader's Digest; which, after all, features, or used to when I was a kid, a monthly vocabulary builder. I loved that vocabulary builder. A large vocabulary, like a free public library, used to be one of the signifiers of the autodidactic blue collar class. I come from that class, or a region just a bit above it. So did Anthony Burgess. The old socialist dream of the commons -- riches for everyone -- still guides my politics, and I believe the Readers Digest vocabulary builder is a spar from that shipwrecked Utopia. Autodidacts of the world unite, you have nothing to lose but your standing in the minds of Jonathan Franzen's sillier readers -- among whom, sad to say, I count Jonathan Franzen himself. The common readers first book, and last book, will always be the dictionary. Only a intelligence that has permanently stooped to pander to power equates the common reader's taste to the kneejerk anti-intellectualism of the bogus populist.
LI doesn't usually read the NY Press for pretty articles -- we skim the controversialists, and move on. But this week, there is a very nice little article about Writing in New York: and no, it isn't some damn take on Jonathan Franzen's earmuffs. It is about the very civilized sounding NY Society Library. Lincoln MacVeagh, the writer, is happy to indulge in the causerie that Joseph Mitchell perfected -- a NYC stroll among odd fellows. Well, we think that form is un-improvable. Here's the first three grafs:
"Anthony Trollope didn�t need a writing desk; he was perfectly happy composing his novels in crowded train compartments. Not every writer possesses such power of concentration. Virginia Woolf insisted on several thousand pounds and a room of her own before she could get on with the job, and it�s my guess that most of us are more like Mrs. Woolf than Mr. Trollope.
The trouble is, it�s not easy to find a room of one�s own. Manhattan apartments don�t come with spare bedrooms, and renting an office at $1200 a month is out of the question. So where is a writer to write? One answer is the New York Society Library at 53 E. 79th St.
Founded in 1754, the Society Library is open to the public and membership costs $150 a year per household. It houses a good collection, a magnificent reading room and an elevator that is as elegant and temperamental as a Park Ave. hostess. The library opens at 9 and on any given morning you�ll find a handful of authors waiting outside to start work."
It sounds so much more civilized than our quarters. LI writes on a heavy office desk, one with black, pressed metal drawers crammed with drafts, envelopes, cds, pennies, letters and forms that we were urgently requested to fill out years ago, and that we didn't, and, far back in the top left hand drawer, a condom in plastic wrap, which, we believe, was given out at some long ago SXSW event. Our efficiency apartment is one of those rooms that never seem to get enough light, or get the light right -- somehow it always falls in some slightly irritating, oblique way on the page, which is a real bother for a person whose living consists of reading books and writing about them. If this sounds like the genteel life, it is certainly not: it's assembly line work without dental. I recently estimated that, in the past three and a half years, I have reviewed over four hundred books. At an average of 300 pages each, that comes to what, 120 thousand pages? Plus the books read to supplement those reviews -- research and such. Plus books read for enjoyment. So you can see that the question of light, far from being an aesthete's pre-occupation, is more in the nature of an occupational hazard.
On the topic of writers we are reviewing: we've been enjoying the marvelous autobiography of Anthony Burgess, Little Wilson and Big God, which we are reading, natch, in preparation for a review of Burgess's upcoming bio. What we like about Burgess -- what we love about Burgess -- is his luxuriant, sprawling, variegated, I don't give a damn English. It is nice to read a man who is not afraid that the dictionary's going to bite. Here he is, going on about having a childhood case of scarlet fever:
"My stepmother, knowing my disease was damnably contagious, was more anxious to shoo me off the premises than solicitous about my headache and nausea. Dr. Sneddon wound the handle of our extension telephone and told 21 Princess Road (Moss Side 1274) to call an ambulance. Anges shrieked "Me baby!" at the other end (I had played with the child the day before) but was calmed. I was taken to where I started -- northeast Manchester, Monsall Isolation Hospital, between Monsall Road and Northhampton Road. There, while I desquamated, I completed my primary education."
A lesser writer would have crossed out 'desquamated'. I had to look it up. It means to shed skin. It is a word I am now proud to know -- that "squa-" sound, as in sqalid, with the denunciatory de-, reproduces the sickly squirm of the skin shedder. It made me think of a recent piece by Jonathan Franzen on William Gaddis that was in last week's New Yorker.
Franzen's essays, lately, remind me of the title of one of Norman Mailer's books: Advertisements for Myself. Except with Franzen's coy grad school mannerisms the title should be: Valentines to myself. The man is incorrigbly smitten, and writes as if he was taking himself out on a date. He's cute, he impresses himself, and at the end of the evening he presumably gets to third base with himself. But that's something I just don't want to know. Neal Pollack's parody catches that perfectly. In any case, Franzen begins the essay (the burden of which is a general, essentially not very smart condemnation of Gaddis' work) with a letter he received about The Corrections from a woman who noted down four difficult words used in it, and asks: who are you writing for, the sophisticates who read the New Yorker? Then she calls him an asshole.
Franzen doesn't have the wit to say: no, I'm writing for people who read the Reader's Digest; which, after all, features, or used to when I was a kid, a monthly vocabulary builder. I loved that vocabulary builder. A large vocabulary, like a free public library, used to be one of the signifiers of the autodidactic blue collar class. I come from that class, or a region just a bit above it. So did Anthony Burgess. The old socialist dream of the commons -- riches for everyone -- still guides my politics, and I believe the Readers Digest vocabulary builder is a spar from that shipwrecked Utopia. Autodidacts of the world unite, you have nothing to lose but your standing in the minds of Jonathan Franzen's sillier readers -- among whom, sad to say, I count Jonathan Franzen himself. The common readers first book, and last book, will always be the dictionary. Only a intelligence that has permanently stooped to pander to power equates the common reader's taste to the kneejerk anti-intellectualism of the bogus populist.
Tuesday, October 08, 2002
Remora
Isn't this sweet? Outgoing senator Phil Gramm -- that's what all the news releases say -- is set to join UBS Warburg:
ABC News announces it in the easy tones that embody the flow of senatorial personage to business personage and back:
"Senator Phil Gramm will soon become vice chairman of UBS Warburg, the investment banking arm of Switzerland's biggest bank, UBS Warburg said on Monday.Gramm, who will take up the private sector post when his Senate term ends later this year, follows a well trodden path of key legislators who join top Wall Street firms. Gramm has been in Congress for 24 years, and co-authored far reaching legislation in 1999 that repealed a prohibition on companies offering banking, brokerage and insurance operations under one roof."
Curiously, nobody connects a few dots. So Limited Inc will take up the pencil. How about this?
1. Wendy Gramm serves on the board of Enron. Preceding this nice little sinecure, she sits on the Commodities and Futures Commission and gives Enron a nice little waiver to embark upon its energy trading business without any pesky federal regulation. After eight years and about 600 thousand dollars, Wendy, on the Accounting committee of the Enron board no less, is shocked, shocked to learn that the company has been looted as thoroughly as the Russian looted Berlin, circa 1945.
2. But as that looting is drawing near its close, certain high up personages in Enron have not wholly given up the idea that, in the last moment, they can lick the spoons. Greg Whalley, among this seedy crew, is operating, supposedly, as Enron's President. It is his decision to reach in the piggy bank and award compensatory amounts up to a million dollars a piece for the people who are sitting at Enron's energy trading desk -- which, you'll remember, was made possible by Wendy Gramm's fortuitous waiver. He justifies these awards by going on about necessary personel, and the need to keep them from jumping ship. Of course, he doesn't allude to the vulgar fact that the energy trading desk has been losing money hand over fist. Or that the compensation comes directly out of the hide of the older workers in the gas pipes division -- yokels all.
"A top Enron executive wrongfully allowed employees who stayed with the company to cash deferred-compensation claims worth at least $32 million, while denying similar payments to former employees, legal experts say. And the experts said one-time Enron Chief Operating Officer Greg Whalley may well be personally liable for the payments distributed in October and November. A lawyer for Whalley recently told the Chronicle that his client had allowed dozens of company executives to cash out their deferred-compensation plans because they were still "providing value" to Enron. But retirees and other ex-employees who sought to cash out at the same time, or earlier, did not get approval."
3. Well, what is a hardworking president to do? Got to keep the energy section going until you can sell it, and yourself with it, to some lucky company. And guess who that company is, sweethearts? Why it is UBS Warburg: here's the announcement, dated February of this year, in Computerworld.
"A wholly owned subsidiary of London-based UBS Warburg, which is itself the investment banking subsidiary of Swiss bank UBS AG, the re-formed energy exchange has acquired Enron's gas and power trading IT infrastructure, its intellectual property and 625 of its former employees (see story).
"When the sale was finalized [Feb. 8], those people became UBSWenergy employees," said company spokeswoman Jennifer Walker. Most notable in the group is former Enron President and Chief Operating Officer Greg Whalley, who rose to that position in August after former Enron President Jeff Skillings left unexpectedly."
4. And so now Senator Gramm, the honorable Senator Gramm, who seems to have slipped through this awful mess that must have, just must have been caused by government regulation (ask the guys who write the editorials for the Wall Street Journal) with his wonderful wife Wendy by his side, unbowed by her experience and comforted, perhaps, by that half a mil she earned for two weeks work a year, is headed, by coincidence, for the refuge of the high end final Enron looters. Quelle coincidence! Not that we are accusing anybody of striking a deal, especially not good old dirty fingered, corrupt, cheating, lying, stealing, black hearted, selfish, conniving, worthless Phil Gramm -- as we like to call him, jokingly, in Texas. We simply think that it is, indeed, a small world after all, and one in which Phil simply keeps running into people he's helped out, and who want to help him out in turn.
Isn't this sweet? Outgoing senator Phil Gramm -- that's what all the news releases say -- is set to join UBS Warburg:
ABC News announces it in the easy tones that embody the flow of senatorial personage to business personage and back:
"Senator Phil Gramm will soon become vice chairman of UBS Warburg, the investment banking arm of Switzerland's biggest bank, UBS Warburg said on Monday.Gramm, who will take up the private sector post when his Senate term ends later this year, follows a well trodden path of key legislators who join top Wall Street firms. Gramm has been in Congress for 24 years, and co-authored far reaching legislation in 1999 that repealed a prohibition on companies offering banking, brokerage and insurance operations under one roof."
Curiously, nobody connects a few dots. So Limited Inc will take up the pencil. How about this?
1. Wendy Gramm serves on the board of Enron. Preceding this nice little sinecure, she sits on the Commodities and Futures Commission and gives Enron a nice little waiver to embark upon its energy trading business without any pesky federal regulation. After eight years and about 600 thousand dollars, Wendy, on the Accounting committee of the Enron board no less, is shocked, shocked to learn that the company has been looted as thoroughly as the Russian looted Berlin, circa 1945.
2. But as that looting is drawing near its close, certain high up personages in Enron have not wholly given up the idea that, in the last moment, they can lick the spoons. Greg Whalley, among this seedy crew, is operating, supposedly, as Enron's President. It is his decision to reach in the piggy bank and award compensatory amounts up to a million dollars a piece for the people who are sitting at Enron's energy trading desk -- which, you'll remember, was made possible by Wendy Gramm's fortuitous waiver. He justifies these awards by going on about necessary personel, and the need to keep them from jumping ship. Of course, he doesn't allude to the vulgar fact that the energy trading desk has been losing money hand over fist. Or that the compensation comes directly out of the hide of the older workers in the gas pipes division -- yokels all.
"A top Enron executive wrongfully allowed employees who stayed with the company to cash deferred-compensation claims worth at least $32 million, while denying similar payments to former employees, legal experts say. And the experts said one-time Enron Chief Operating Officer Greg Whalley may well be personally liable for the payments distributed in October and November. A lawyer for Whalley recently told the Chronicle that his client had allowed dozens of company executives to cash out their deferred-compensation plans because they were still "providing value" to Enron. But retirees and other ex-employees who sought to cash out at the same time, or earlier, did not get approval."
3. Well, what is a hardworking president to do? Got to keep the energy section going until you can sell it, and yourself with it, to some lucky company. And guess who that company is, sweethearts? Why it is UBS Warburg: here's the announcement, dated February of this year, in Computerworld.
"A wholly owned subsidiary of London-based UBS Warburg, which is itself the investment banking subsidiary of Swiss bank UBS AG, the re-formed energy exchange has acquired Enron's gas and power trading IT infrastructure, its intellectual property and 625 of its former employees (see story).
"When the sale was finalized [Feb. 8], those people became UBSWenergy employees," said company spokeswoman Jennifer Walker. Most notable in the group is former Enron President and Chief Operating Officer Greg Whalley, who rose to that position in August after former Enron President Jeff Skillings left unexpectedly."
4. And so now Senator Gramm, the honorable Senator Gramm, who seems to have slipped through this awful mess that must have, just must have been caused by government regulation (ask the guys who write the editorials for the Wall Street Journal) with his wonderful wife Wendy by his side, unbowed by her experience and comforted, perhaps, by that half a mil she earned for two weeks work a year, is headed, by coincidence, for the refuge of the high end final Enron looters. Quelle coincidence! Not that we are accusing anybody of striking a deal, especially not good old dirty fingered, corrupt, cheating, lying, stealing, black hearted, selfish, conniving, worthless Phil Gramm -- as we like to call him, jokingly, in Texas. We simply think that it is, indeed, a small world after all, and one in which Phil simply keeps running into people he's helped out, and who want to help him out in turn.
Monday, October 07, 2002
Remora
The chatter between members of the governing classes, up to June of this year, had been that Lula da Silva, the labor candidate for president in Brazil, had to be defeated. The threats became as thuggish as the manicured set gets. Here's what George Soros had to say:
According to Rossi's reporting, published on June 8th in a major Brazilian daily newspaper, Folha de S. Paulo, the markets believe that Luiz In�cio Lula da Silva (the leftist candidate, of the Workers Party, or PT, who is well ahead in the polls) will default on the debt payments if elected. Thus, says Soros, the markets are already betting against Brazil, specifically against the Brazilian currency, the real. If Lula indeed wins in the two rounds of the elections, scheduled to happen on October 6 and 27, the financial situation would be so dramatic that he wouldn't have any option other than defaulting on the debt.
Faced with the intrinsic totalitarianism of such prophecy, Soros acknowledged it, and added: "In
Ancient Rome, only Romans voted. In modern global capitalism, only Americans vote, Brazilians do not."
Soros, much celebrated for the beautiful sentiments about civil society with which he often perfumes the air, gets down to brass tacks here. Even vampires who read John Locke, at the end of the day, want their quota of vein.
However, a change occured after that interview. One wonders if there was a sense that one had been, well, a little too bold. The new line is that Lula is a poodle leftist, in the Tony Blair mould. Indeed, this is a good bet: in the U.S. in the nineties, and in Europe right now, a vote for the left almost guarantees economic policy from the right. The technocrats of the left are bored with labor. They are definitely bored with the urban poor, and their intractable problems -- best to solve them through massive police sweeps. What the technocrats of the left like best are to be interviewed for the Financial Times, and praised for their "bravery" in standing up to (otherwise known as betraying) their constituencies.
This is the line taken by Franklin Foers in The New Republic (an article that is not, alas, on-line) After explaining that Wall Street is "freaked" about the prospect of Lula, Foers provides the reassuring contrarian note:
"The markets have cause for displeasure: None of Brazil's three candidates are fervent devotees of the Washington Consensus. But their fears of Lula are out of date. The IMF bailout conditions $24 billion worth of loans on budget surpluses, severely limiting any future president's inclination toward reckless spending. What's more, Lula isn't significantly more protectionist or anti-globalization than his competitors. In fact, unlike Gomes and Serra, who are scrambling to move beyond their center-right bases by pandering to working-class resentments, Lula is moving to the center in a bid to win over skeptical middle-class voters. Ironically, the onetime radical may be the best hope for neoliberalism in Brazil."
Well, yesterday was the first step in Lula's probable ascent to the presidency. Here's the NYT:
"Mr. da Silva had never won more than a quarter of the first-round vote in three previous attempts at the presidency. Though he forced a runoff in his first try, in 1989, voters in the past have always been suspicious of his party's socialist platform and questioned his qualifications for office. For this campaign, however, Mr. da Silva revamped both his image and his program. He backed away from earlier threats to repudiate Brazil's foreign debt and to break with international lending organizations like the International Monetary Fund, emphasizing instead measures that would allow Latin America's largest country to export more and therefore generate more jobs and growth.
Mr. Serra, in contrast, as the candidate of the multiparty coalition that has governed this nation of 175 million for nearly eight years, has had to bear the burden of popular dissatisfaction with rising unemployment and a stalled economy. He has also been seriously weakened by disarray within the government camp and by and his own lack of charisma compared to Mr. da Silva."
One of the questions that has to be hanging here is: how is one to deal with an international financial system that did what it did in Argentina? That is, found a system of inefficiencies and left a desert? If it wasn't obvious before, by now the end of history thesis so beloved of the globalization crowd has been stripped of its pompous Hegelian subtext and laid bare for what it is: a collection note from a debt collector. Argentine debt, looked at in the light of day (a block of hours much deplored by the Vampirish set), has a somewhat freakish appearance -- what on earth induced the international lenders to loan out that much, and what on earth induced the government to take that much? Obviously, it was a way of paying for the New Deal State while installing the Chilean state. While, in the U.S., eight trillion dollars can evaporate in three years (as they have, in the markets) and the cars just keep on selling, Argentina doesn't have that scale. Whether the U.S. will continue to have the leverage of scale is a question the Soroses of the world don't want to ask right now. Brazil, in the eighties, famously leveraged its position as one of the grand debtors in much the way English dukes used to leverage their gambling debts at Harrolds. But if there is a capital strike against Brazil -- and the odds are pretty good that there will be one -- LI wonders if that gambit will work.
That is a sad note to end on. We aren't actually that pessimistic. We are rather cheered by Lula's victory. But our political anhedonia, right now, is nearly terminal.
The chatter between members of the governing classes, up to June of this year, had been that Lula da Silva, the labor candidate for president in Brazil, had to be defeated. The threats became as thuggish as the manicured set gets. Here's what George Soros had to say:
According to Rossi's reporting, published on June 8th in a major Brazilian daily newspaper, Folha de S. Paulo, the markets believe that Luiz In�cio Lula da Silva (the leftist candidate, of the Workers Party, or PT, who is well ahead in the polls) will default on the debt payments if elected. Thus, says Soros, the markets are already betting against Brazil, specifically against the Brazilian currency, the real. If Lula indeed wins in the two rounds of the elections, scheduled to happen on October 6 and 27, the financial situation would be so dramatic that he wouldn't have any option other than defaulting on the debt.
Faced with the intrinsic totalitarianism of such prophecy, Soros acknowledged it, and added: "In
Ancient Rome, only Romans voted. In modern global capitalism, only Americans vote, Brazilians do not."
Soros, much celebrated for the beautiful sentiments about civil society with which he often perfumes the air, gets down to brass tacks here. Even vampires who read John Locke, at the end of the day, want their quota of vein.
However, a change occured after that interview. One wonders if there was a sense that one had been, well, a little too bold. The new line is that Lula is a poodle leftist, in the Tony Blair mould. Indeed, this is a good bet: in the U.S. in the nineties, and in Europe right now, a vote for the left almost guarantees economic policy from the right. The technocrats of the left are bored with labor. They are definitely bored with the urban poor, and their intractable problems -- best to solve them through massive police sweeps. What the technocrats of the left like best are to be interviewed for the Financial Times, and praised for their "bravery" in standing up to (otherwise known as betraying) their constituencies.
This is the line taken by Franklin Foers in The New Republic (an article that is not, alas, on-line) After explaining that Wall Street is "freaked" about the prospect of Lula, Foers provides the reassuring contrarian note:
"The markets have cause for displeasure: None of Brazil's three candidates are fervent devotees of the Washington Consensus. But their fears of Lula are out of date. The IMF bailout conditions $24 billion worth of loans on budget surpluses, severely limiting any future president's inclination toward reckless spending. What's more, Lula isn't significantly more protectionist or anti-globalization than his competitors. In fact, unlike Gomes and Serra, who are scrambling to move beyond their center-right bases by pandering to working-class resentments, Lula is moving to the center in a bid to win over skeptical middle-class voters. Ironically, the onetime radical may be the best hope for neoliberalism in Brazil."
Well, yesterday was the first step in Lula's probable ascent to the presidency. Here's the NYT:
"Mr. da Silva had never won more than a quarter of the first-round vote in three previous attempts at the presidency. Though he forced a runoff in his first try, in 1989, voters in the past have always been suspicious of his party's socialist platform and questioned his qualifications for office. For this campaign, however, Mr. da Silva revamped both his image and his program. He backed away from earlier threats to repudiate Brazil's foreign debt and to break with international lending organizations like the International Monetary Fund, emphasizing instead measures that would allow Latin America's largest country to export more and therefore generate more jobs and growth.
Mr. Serra, in contrast, as the candidate of the multiparty coalition that has governed this nation of 175 million for nearly eight years, has had to bear the burden of popular dissatisfaction with rising unemployment and a stalled economy. He has also been seriously weakened by disarray within the government camp and by and his own lack of charisma compared to Mr. da Silva."
One of the questions that has to be hanging here is: how is one to deal with an international financial system that did what it did in Argentina? That is, found a system of inefficiencies and left a desert? If it wasn't obvious before, by now the end of history thesis so beloved of the globalization crowd has been stripped of its pompous Hegelian subtext and laid bare for what it is: a collection note from a debt collector. Argentine debt, looked at in the light of day (a block of hours much deplored by the Vampirish set), has a somewhat freakish appearance -- what on earth induced the international lenders to loan out that much, and what on earth induced the government to take that much? Obviously, it was a way of paying for the New Deal State while installing the Chilean state. While, in the U.S., eight trillion dollars can evaporate in three years (as they have, in the markets) and the cars just keep on selling, Argentina doesn't have that scale. Whether the U.S. will continue to have the leverage of scale is a question the Soroses of the world don't want to ask right now. Brazil, in the eighties, famously leveraged its position as one of the grand debtors in much the way English dukes used to leverage their gambling debts at Harrolds. But if there is a capital strike against Brazil -- and the odds are pretty good that there will be one -- LI wonders if that gambit will work.
That is a sad note to end on. We aren't actually that pessimistic. We are rather cheered by Lula's victory. But our political anhedonia, right now, is nearly terminal.
Friday, October 04, 2002
Today's post.
Dope.
No. Not today. The Enron news comes thick and fast, and you know how LI laps this stuff up -- it is our personal financial porno, wish fulfillment that overwhelms the senses. Etc. But isn't it the better portion to resist the snares of the devil, especially when the devil comes bearing such unbearable proofs of the correctness of one's world view?
Surely our world view is not all that correct. Surely there's something diabolic going on here.
We try to diversify our little posts when we can. Actually, we had planned a post on Marilyn Monroe this week. Over the weekend, we watched the Seven Year Itch with our friend, S. We also urged her to see Some Like It Hot -- which she did. She was impressed by Jack Lemmon in the latter, and she laughed at the former, but in neither did she find Ms. Monroe the "stradivarius of sex," as Norman Mailer once pronounced that ill fated woman. Our friend S. doesn't cotton to the "flighty blond" imago -- which would put the keebosh on appreciating Marilyn.
Ourselves -- well, when I was a little boy, with a hey, ho, nonny nonny ne, I used to watch Monroe movies on Channel 17 in Atlanta, Georgia. Of course, I was learning, like any true American adolescent, to connect the hormonal dots with the help of visual aids, and she was a nice visual aid. But I like to think that even then I had a budding, so to speak, sense of what movies were about. Cinematic possibility imported into my own life, that was what they seemed to be about. You watched a movie in a theater, and the very bigness of the screen, the scale of sound and sight, guided you outside of that viewing -- it gave you a sense of how you could manipulate your own scale in the world, a sense for the action of the sensibility on the deceptively inert appearance of things. So, for example, some like it hot gave me the idea that someday I could troop around with scantily dressed chorus girls; it even made me see the girls in the seventh grade as possibly scantily dressed chorus girls, given the right circumstances. This is important -- those who lack any intuition of how fantasy can bend the world are not more careful judges of what exists, but the worst judges -- they walk through a world of locks without keys.
Yet when I watched Seven Year Itch this weekend, on S.'s tiny tv, I experienced this odd thing, this thing I've been experiencing whenever I see a film that was made more than twenty years ago -- I am more interested in the things that existed then, and their evidence in the pans and takes, than I am, really, in the content of the film. To give you a for instance -- S. and I saw The Blues Brothers a couple of weeks ago. The plot of the film was even worse than I vaguely remembered. But what moved me almost to tears was the introductory shots, which showed Chicago from the air. Guess what? Chicago, at that time, still had patches of industry. There were factory chimneys spouting smoke. Just this little factum seemed so intensely interesting to me -- filled me with such a sense of loss, and of time itself -- that I didn't really follow the rest of the movie.
The Seven Year Itch, with its lubricious/silly jokes about straying husbands, and its New York City without a/c, did not thrust its facts on me with the same force. It was an imminently theatrical film. The fact that slowly, slowly filled me with that sense of loss was more a social fact -- the existence, even in caricature, of this kind of culture, this post-war prosperity, that has been so radically altered that it doesn't really exist any more. Yes, I get my Proustian kicks watching b&w films. S., who is so much younger than me, is immune to this nostalgia.
It is one of the gifts of middle age. Alas, the term middle age is so loaded with unfortunate connotations that my readers will probably take me to be meaning something deeply ironic. I'm not being ironic. You don't really understand the past, I think, until you reach middle age. That in itself makes it worth being forty-four.
Okay, since this does seem to be vaguely about Marilyn Monroe: on the Monroe front, we found several articles, each more ridiculous than the other -- this, too, is a tradition that stems from Mailer's Monroe biography. We quite like that bio, but there's rather a disconnect between intelligence and subject in the book -- reading it is like watching a nuclear reactor being attached to a tricycle, the high tech artifice and energy of the one having little to do with the elementary mechanics of the other. The prize for the most ridiculous hommage to Marilyn surely goes to Andrew O'Hagan's St. Marilyn, an article that appeared, all moist and coldcreamed, in the London Review of Books.
O'Hagan, like every writer on Monroe, seems impelled to put his arm over her shoulder. He starts out with a rather pat, and at the same time absurd, juxtaposition of St. Theresa and Marilyn Monroe. The connection here is that both leave relics... Well, undoubtedly, there are relics of saints and there are autographs, pearls, and chattels of dead stars that end up at auctions. But sainthood is not defined by the reliquary. I imagine you could make the argument that the believer's relationship with a saint is similar to the fan's relationship to a movie star, but I think the comparison is way to broad. It ignores way too many social relationships, including the role of the church. The kind of thrill the buyer of Marilyn's letters gets is not, I think, the same thrill experienced by making a pilgrimage to Lourdes.
He then shifts into the classic therapeutic approach to M.M. Odd how you can't write about M.M. without taking a side:
"Barbara Leaming's new book adds to a sense of Monroe as someone in constant struggle with fictionality and mental illness, with the demands of men, and with an overwhelming wish to be taken seriously as an actress. Monroe's mother blamed her daughter for being born, and the child grew up with a dark memory of people screaming in the hall, of departures and uncertainties, and of men taking advantage of her loneliness and dependence."
I wonder what men taking advantage of her loneliness and dependence means. Taking advantage seems to hint at having sex. And the thought behind that, of course, is that the woman surrendering that sexual treasure is, of course, giving a pure gift -- one that takes from her, and gives nothing back. A token, in fact, that signifies conquest. Well, the idea that M.M. was a martyr to the male brute's desires, a blond Olive Oyl, is not borne out by anything M.M. said. In fact, she seemed to enjoy sex quite a bit herself. O'Hagan's wording, here, slots all too easily into the madonna/whore logic Freud explored in his Three Essays on Sexuality.
Here's O'Hagan, being particularly dim, I think, on the period around the time of the Seven Year Itch:
It was Marilyn's misfortune to think that serious acting could save her from self-doubt. In fact it only exacerbated it. The Girl, though certainly choking and limiting as a character, was something she knew about, and it remained for her a very special and individual invention. But Leaming is bigger and better than any other biographer when it comes to describing Monroe's terror in the face of Twentieth Century Fox's view of her.
In 1955, after showing America and the world how to relax about sex by allowing her skirt to blow over her head in The Seven Year Itch, Monroe ran away to New York to become somebody else. But The Girl would always follow her. She threw a press conference to reveal 'the new Monroe':Cocktails were served for about an hour as guests awaited a 'new and different' Marilyn. Shortly after six, the front door opened and Marilyn blew in like a snowdrift. She was dressed from head to toe in white. A fluttery white mink coat covered a white satin sheath with flimsy, loose spaghetti straps. She wore satin high heels and white stockings. Her long, sparkling diamond earrings were on loan from Van Cleef & Arples.
Marilyn seemed disappointed when people asked what was new about her. 'But I have changed my hair!' she protested. Her hair did seem a shade or two lighter. Asked to describe the new colour, Marilyn replied in a child's voice: 'Subdued platinum.' The crowd received Marilyn with good-natured amusement. They responded as though she were one of her comical, ditzy blonde film characters? 'I have formed my own corporation so I can play the kind of roles I want,' Marilyn announced? She declared herself tired of sex roles and vowed to do no more. 'People have scope, you know,' said Marilyn. 'They really do.'"
He doesn't seem to connect this trope -- sexy comedianne wishing to be taken seriously -- with its long tradition in Hollywood, and M.M.'s probable awareness of it -- an awareness inscribed in The Seven Year Itch. As for the "terror" of being manipulated by the Studio publicity machine ... as for 'showing the world how to relax about sex..." Well, as we said earlier, M.M. has an extraordinary effect on writers. She makes them go off the road, over the river and into the trees, crashing all the way.
Dope.
No. Not today. The Enron news comes thick and fast, and you know how LI laps this stuff up -- it is our personal financial porno, wish fulfillment that overwhelms the senses. Etc. But isn't it the better portion to resist the snares of the devil, especially when the devil comes bearing such unbearable proofs of the correctness of one's world view?
Surely our world view is not all that correct. Surely there's something diabolic going on here.
We try to diversify our little posts when we can. Actually, we had planned a post on Marilyn Monroe this week. Over the weekend, we watched the Seven Year Itch with our friend, S. We also urged her to see Some Like It Hot -- which she did. She was impressed by Jack Lemmon in the latter, and she laughed at the former, but in neither did she find Ms. Monroe the "stradivarius of sex," as Norman Mailer once pronounced that ill fated woman. Our friend S. doesn't cotton to the "flighty blond" imago -- which would put the keebosh on appreciating Marilyn.
Ourselves -- well, when I was a little boy, with a hey, ho, nonny nonny ne, I used to watch Monroe movies on Channel 17 in Atlanta, Georgia. Of course, I was learning, like any true American adolescent, to connect the hormonal dots with the help of visual aids, and she was a nice visual aid. But I like to think that even then I had a budding, so to speak, sense of what movies were about. Cinematic possibility imported into my own life, that was what they seemed to be about. You watched a movie in a theater, and the very bigness of the screen, the scale of sound and sight, guided you outside of that viewing -- it gave you a sense of how you could manipulate your own scale in the world, a sense for the action of the sensibility on the deceptively inert appearance of things. So, for example, some like it hot gave me the idea that someday I could troop around with scantily dressed chorus girls; it even made me see the girls in the seventh grade as possibly scantily dressed chorus girls, given the right circumstances. This is important -- those who lack any intuition of how fantasy can bend the world are not more careful judges of what exists, but the worst judges -- they walk through a world of locks without keys.
Yet when I watched Seven Year Itch this weekend, on S.'s tiny tv, I experienced this odd thing, this thing I've been experiencing whenever I see a film that was made more than twenty years ago -- I am more interested in the things that existed then, and their evidence in the pans and takes, than I am, really, in the content of the film. To give you a for instance -- S. and I saw The Blues Brothers a couple of weeks ago. The plot of the film was even worse than I vaguely remembered. But what moved me almost to tears was the introductory shots, which showed Chicago from the air. Guess what? Chicago, at that time, still had patches of industry. There were factory chimneys spouting smoke. Just this little factum seemed so intensely interesting to me -- filled me with such a sense of loss, and of time itself -- that I didn't really follow the rest of the movie.
The Seven Year Itch, with its lubricious/silly jokes about straying husbands, and its New York City without a/c, did not thrust its facts on me with the same force. It was an imminently theatrical film. The fact that slowly, slowly filled me with that sense of loss was more a social fact -- the existence, even in caricature, of this kind of culture, this post-war prosperity, that has been so radically altered that it doesn't really exist any more. Yes, I get my Proustian kicks watching b&w films. S., who is so much younger than me, is immune to this nostalgia.
It is one of the gifts of middle age. Alas, the term middle age is so loaded with unfortunate connotations that my readers will probably take me to be meaning something deeply ironic. I'm not being ironic. You don't really understand the past, I think, until you reach middle age. That in itself makes it worth being forty-four.
Okay, since this does seem to be vaguely about Marilyn Monroe: on the Monroe front, we found several articles, each more ridiculous than the other -- this, too, is a tradition that stems from Mailer's Monroe biography. We quite like that bio, but there's rather a disconnect between intelligence and subject in the book -- reading it is like watching a nuclear reactor being attached to a tricycle, the high tech artifice and energy of the one having little to do with the elementary mechanics of the other. The prize for the most ridiculous hommage to Marilyn surely goes to Andrew O'Hagan's St. Marilyn, an article that appeared, all moist and coldcreamed, in the London Review of Books.
O'Hagan, like every writer on Monroe, seems impelled to put his arm over her shoulder. He starts out with a rather pat, and at the same time absurd, juxtaposition of St. Theresa and Marilyn Monroe. The connection here is that both leave relics... Well, undoubtedly, there are relics of saints and there are autographs, pearls, and chattels of dead stars that end up at auctions. But sainthood is not defined by the reliquary. I imagine you could make the argument that the believer's relationship with a saint is similar to the fan's relationship to a movie star, but I think the comparison is way to broad. It ignores way too many social relationships, including the role of the church. The kind of thrill the buyer of Marilyn's letters gets is not, I think, the same thrill experienced by making a pilgrimage to Lourdes.
He then shifts into the classic therapeutic approach to M.M. Odd how you can't write about M.M. without taking a side:
"Barbara Leaming's new book adds to a sense of Monroe as someone in constant struggle with fictionality and mental illness, with the demands of men, and with an overwhelming wish to be taken seriously as an actress. Monroe's mother blamed her daughter for being born, and the child grew up with a dark memory of people screaming in the hall, of departures and uncertainties, and of men taking advantage of her loneliness and dependence."
I wonder what men taking advantage of her loneliness and dependence means. Taking advantage seems to hint at having sex. And the thought behind that, of course, is that the woman surrendering that sexual treasure is, of course, giving a pure gift -- one that takes from her, and gives nothing back. A token, in fact, that signifies conquest. Well, the idea that M.M. was a martyr to the male brute's desires, a blond Olive Oyl, is not borne out by anything M.M. said. In fact, she seemed to enjoy sex quite a bit herself. O'Hagan's wording, here, slots all too easily into the madonna/whore logic Freud explored in his Three Essays on Sexuality.
Here's O'Hagan, being particularly dim, I think, on the period around the time of the Seven Year Itch:
It was Marilyn's misfortune to think that serious acting could save her from self-doubt. In fact it only exacerbated it. The Girl, though certainly choking and limiting as a character, was something she knew about, and it remained for her a very special and individual invention. But Leaming is bigger and better than any other biographer when it comes to describing Monroe's terror in the face of Twentieth Century Fox's view of her.
In 1955, after showing America and the world how to relax about sex by allowing her skirt to blow over her head in The Seven Year Itch, Monroe ran away to New York to become somebody else. But The Girl would always follow her. She threw a press conference to reveal 'the new Monroe':Cocktails were served for about an hour as guests awaited a 'new and different' Marilyn. Shortly after six, the front door opened and Marilyn blew in like a snowdrift. She was dressed from head to toe in white. A fluttery white mink coat covered a white satin sheath with flimsy, loose spaghetti straps. She wore satin high heels and white stockings. Her long, sparkling diamond earrings were on loan from Van Cleef & Arples.
Marilyn seemed disappointed when people asked what was new about her. 'But I have changed my hair!' she protested. Her hair did seem a shade or two lighter. Asked to describe the new colour, Marilyn replied in a child's voice: 'Subdued platinum.' The crowd received Marilyn with good-natured amusement. They responded as though she were one of her comical, ditzy blonde film characters? 'I have formed my own corporation so I can play the kind of roles I want,' Marilyn announced? She declared herself tired of sex roles and vowed to do no more. 'People have scope, you know,' said Marilyn. 'They really do.'"
He doesn't seem to connect this trope -- sexy comedianne wishing to be taken seriously -- with its long tradition in Hollywood, and M.M.'s probable awareness of it -- an awareness inscribed in The Seven Year Itch. As for the "terror" of being manipulated by the Studio publicity machine ... as for 'showing the world how to relax about sex..." Well, as we said earlier, M.M. has an extraordinary effect on writers. She makes them go off the road, over the river and into the trees, crashing all the way.
Thursday, October 03, 2002
Remora
Kurt Eichwald, NYT's man on the spot, pens one of those baffled by it all news analyses of Enron's business structure. He notices -- as man and dog tend to do, once their noses are rubbed in it -- the nature of the stuff before him, and gently cries, why, this is not gold dust!
He takes the Cuiaba project -- which we have commented about, back in January was it? -- as an example of a fools gold mislabeled the real stuff. Here's his summary:
"For example, among the examples of failed business dealings cited in the complaint is a power plant construction project in Cuiab�, Brazil. This effort, known as the Cuiab� project, was troubled from the inception, according to the complaint. It rapidly went $120 million over budget and had numerous risks and impediments to keep it from being profitable, the complaint says � problems that were well known throughout Enron.
"The Cuiab� project was so problematic," the complaint says, quoting a statement from an unidentified Enron employee who worked on the effort, "that no buyer would be interested in purchasing the project from Enron."
In the standard world of corporate endeavors, the results of the effort were easily predictable. The doomed project would have to be shut down and then written off, with the marketplace reacting to the stumble in a predictable fashion: Enron shares would drop, the company would remain in the doghouse for a few months, and perhaps a few heads would roll.
But with the partnership scheme described in the complaint, all of that was sidestepped. Instead, Enron shifted enough of the failed project to LJM to remove it from its books, in a transaction that appeared to be a sale. Through that transaction, Enron was able to recognize $65 million in income in the final half of 1999, when it was struggling to meet its financial projections."
Now, why would Enron do that?
The answer, dear reader, is that Enron was just responding to the kind of "entrepeneurial structure" people like Michael Jensen had advised in the 80s. Economists of the red meat school (you know, the ones who want to the poor to work harder in their maquilladoras over the river, so that eventually, as the soil is fertilized with their bones, accumulated over the generations, one of their great great grandchildren might enjoy the rare executive perk) -- yes, the governing classes' shock troop theorists, that is who we are talking about, in a word -- had promoted the idea that no amount was too great for the entrepeneurial exec to earn. Steve Jobs gets one billion dollars for last year? Why, he earned it. Larry Ellison walks off with seven hundred million dollars while his company wallows in shortfalls? He deserves it. These, of course, are the same troopers who we can count on to come out whenever the discussion turns towards raising the minimum wage. Heavens, that just hurts the poor!
So, what do you do? You establish a bonus structure that parallels your accounting structure. The latter is designed to make all deals seem immediately profitable, by various pathetic tricks. And that stimulates the greed gland (located south of the hypothalamus), because guess what? You get a nifty bonus on big deals like that.
Thus, one can only laugh when Eichenwald brings out the true blue market as darwinian force argument:
"But in the end, Enron and its executives were given a harsh lesson about the realities of market discipline. By failing to promptly take their medicine for the wrong-headed mistakes committed over the years, the executives allowed Enron's business problems to build up, hidden behind a thick curtain of obfuscation.Then, finally last year, when errors discovered in the partnerships required certain of them to be moved back onto Enron's books, the curtain began to part."
Right. What executives? Skilling? Out by June, 2001. Lay? Having used the company as a slot machine, by November, 2001, he'd gotten all he was going to get out of the beast. How about Thomas White, our secretary of the Army, and the presumed head of Enron's energy unit? Out by February, 2001, when his stock options were primo. The harsh lesson, here, is for the suckers, not the execs. Folks like the Enron employees who couldn't get their money out of the place when the accounting department froze their 401ks on a technicality.
So what is an exec to do if the rules of the candystore look like they are changing? Well, hit back, and sound the great themes of America, liberty and loot, uh, scratch that, justice for all. The FT has a report on the annual meeting of Pigs of America, uh, scratch that, the Business Council, an annual reunion of CEOs. This kind of gas is being vented at this event:
At the press conference to launch the event on Wednesday, he [Esrey, CEO of Sprint] and other members of the Council's committee pointed out that a combination of new legislation, tighter credit, depressed markets, and stricter regulation was stifling risk-taking at US companies."This is a climate that doesn't reward risk-taking - yet the fundamentals of business are to take prudent risks at the right time," said Carly Fiorina, chief executive of Hewlett-Packard. She said she was pleased that the group had completed its takeover of Compaq Computer already, because in the current environment "you're less likely to undertake bold moves even if you feel they're right".
Bill Harrison, chief executive of JP Morgan Chase, warned that attempts to reform Wall Street - led by Eliot Spitzer, New York attorney-general - might further weaken the sector. "I just hope we don't go too far with these things [so] that we damage what's made Wall Street great and what's made this country great."
What can one say about a JP Morgan man bitching about being investigated for penny ante stuff -- you know, bilking the greedy masses of billions of dollars and the like -- by this Spitzer fella?
Laughter in the dark, laughter in the dark.
Kurt Eichwald, NYT's man on the spot, pens one of those baffled by it all news analyses of Enron's business structure. He notices -- as man and dog tend to do, once their noses are rubbed in it -- the nature of the stuff before him, and gently cries, why, this is not gold dust!
He takes the Cuiaba project -- which we have commented about, back in January was it? -- as an example of a fools gold mislabeled the real stuff. Here's his summary:
"For example, among the examples of failed business dealings cited in the complaint is a power plant construction project in Cuiab�, Brazil. This effort, known as the Cuiab� project, was troubled from the inception, according to the complaint. It rapidly went $120 million over budget and had numerous risks and impediments to keep it from being profitable, the complaint says � problems that were well known throughout Enron.
"The Cuiab� project was so problematic," the complaint says, quoting a statement from an unidentified Enron employee who worked on the effort, "that no buyer would be interested in purchasing the project from Enron."
In the standard world of corporate endeavors, the results of the effort were easily predictable. The doomed project would have to be shut down and then written off, with the marketplace reacting to the stumble in a predictable fashion: Enron shares would drop, the company would remain in the doghouse for a few months, and perhaps a few heads would roll.
But with the partnership scheme described in the complaint, all of that was sidestepped. Instead, Enron shifted enough of the failed project to LJM to remove it from its books, in a transaction that appeared to be a sale. Through that transaction, Enron was able to recognize $65 million in income in the final half of 1999, when it was struggling to meet its financial projections."
Now, why would Enron do that?
The answer, dear reader, is that Enron was just responding to the kind of "entrepeneurial structure" people like Michael Jensen had advised in the 80s. Economists of the red meat school (you know, the ones who want to the poor to work harder in their maquilladoras over the river, so that eventually, as the soil is fertilized with their bones, accumulated over the generations, one of their great great grandchildren might enjoy the rare executive perk) -- yes, the governing classes' shock troop theorists, that is who we are talking about, in a word -- had promoted the idea that no amount was too great for the entrepeneurial exec to earn. Steve Jobs gets one billion dollars for last year? Why, he earned it. Larry Ellison walks off with seven hundred million dollars while his company wallows in shortfalls? He deserves it. These, of course, are the same troopers who we can count on to come out whenever the discussion turns towards raising the minimum wage. Heavens, that just hurts the poor!
So, what do you do? You establish a bonus structure that parallels your accounting structure. The latter is designed to make all deals seem immediately profitable, by various pathetic tricks. And that stimulates the greed gland (located south of the hypothalamus), because guess what? You get a nifty bonus on big deals like that.
Thus, one can only laugh when Eichenwald brings out the true blue market as darwinian force argument:
"But in the end, Enron and its executives were given a harsh lesson about the realities of market discipline. By failing to promptly take their medicine for the wrong-headed mistakes committed over the years, the executives allowed Enron's business problems to build up, hidden behind a thick curtain of obfuscation.Then, finally last year, when errors discovered in the partnerships required certain of them to be moved back onto Enron's books, the curtain began to part."
Right. What executives? Skilling? Out by June, 2001. Lay? Having used the company as a slot machine, by November, 2001, he'd gotten all he was going to get out of the beast. How about Thomas White, our secretary of the Army, and the presumed head of Enron's energy unit? Out by February, 2001, when his stock options were primo. The harsh lesson, here, is for the suckers, not the execs. Folks like the Enron employees who couldn't get their money out of the place when the accounting department froze their 401ks on a technicality.
So what is an exec to do if the rules of the candystore look like they are changing? Well, hit back, and sound the great themes of America, liberty and loot, uh, scratch that, justice for all. The FT has a report on the annual meeting of Pigs of America, uh, scratch that, the Business Council, an annual reunion of CEOs. This kind of gas is being vented at this event:
At the press conference to launch the event on Wednesday, he [Esrey, CEO of Sprint] and other members of the Council's committee pointed out that a combination of new legislation, tighter credit, depressed markets, and stricter regulation was stifling risk-taking at US companies."This is a climate that doesn't reward risk-taking - yet the fundamentals of business are to take prudent risks at the right time," said Carly Fiorina, chief executive of Hewlett-Packard. She said she was pleased that the group had completed its takeover of Compaq Computer already, because in the current environment "you're less likely to undertake bold moves even if you feel they're right".
Bill Harrison, chief executive of JP Morgan Chase, warned that attempts to reform Wall Street - led by Eliot Spitzer, New York attorney-general - might further weaken the sector. "I just hope we don't go too far with these things [so] that we damage what's made Wall Street great and what's made this country great."
What can one say about a JP Morgan man bitching about being investigated for penny ante stuff -- you know, bilking the greedy masses of billions of dollars and the like -- by this Spitzer fella?
Laughter in the dark, laughter in the dark.
Monday, September 30, 2002
Remora
The unwinding
LI recommends a Schopenhauerian article in the Economist today. War, depression, and a moronic leader -- it sounds like Austria in 1935, but no, my good buds, no. It is our own beloved superpower, or hyperpower, or mononucleus macronuclear power, the US of A, which seems destined for a bad period. Although we aren�t totally convinced by this kind of talk � after all, during the last bad period, 1991, there was talk of the collapse of US banking. The better bet is that we will eke out this time. But odds wouldn�t be odds if there wasn�t a chance of the losing end:
"The unwinding of America's economic and financial imbalances has barely begun. Share prices are still overvalued by many measures. Companies still need to prune much more excess capacity. Most worryingly, debts still loom dangerously large. Although much of the increase in reported profits in the late 1990s was illusory, the increase in corporate debt to finance that unprofitable investment was horribly real. Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, an investment bank, estimates that American corporate balance sheets are more stretched than at any time during the past half-century.
"American households' net worth is likely to shrink again this year, for the third year running, after a long, uninterrupted rise since the second world war. If lower share prices cause households to increase their saving sharply, America could be pushed back into recession. Even if saving rises more gradually, the economy is headed for several years of below-trend growth. A weaker dollar would help to cushion the economy, but only by squeezing growth in other countries. The rest of the world, which benefited so handsomely from America's speculative binge, will now have to share its hangover."
Isn't that a lovely word, "unwinding"? It has the crisp techno-beauty of one of those words so cleverly collected by Don Delillo � an artificial flower of rhetoric. All those snappy terms that derive distantly from the impression managers, the think tank, the game theorists. Unwinding should remind us of yarn, and homemakers, and cats; oddly enough, it evokes none of those things. My guess is that unwinding comes from a more clockwork world, one in which the key can go in the slot and uncoil the mechanism. We don�t know when "unwinding a position" became a wall street phrase of art, although we�ve looked around. Where are the lexicographers of tomorrow? Here�s a puzzle for you.
Swift uses a prototype of the phrase in "The tale of a tub;"
"However, that neither the world nor our selves, may any longer suffer by such misunderstandings, I have been prevailed on, after much importunity from my friends, to travel in a complete and laborious dissertation upon the prime productions of our society, which, beside their beautiful externals, for the gratification of superficial readers, have darkly and deeply couched under them the most finished and refined systems of all sciences and arts; as I do not doubt to lay open by untwisting or unwinding, and either to draw up by exantlation, or display by incision."
LI knows that Wall Street does have its litterateurs. However, we doubt that the term came from Swift, however nicely this would fit our sense of the, uh, impostures of high finance
The unwinding
LI recommends a Schopenhauerian article in the Economist today. War, depression, and a moronic leader -- it sounds like Austria in 1935, but no, my good buds, no. It is our own beloved superpower, or hyperpower, or mononucleus macronuclear power, the US of A, which seems destined for a bad period. Although we aren�t totally convinced by this kind of talk � after all, during the last bad period, 1991, there was talk of the collapse of US banking. The better bet is that we will eke out this time. But odds wouldn�t be odds if there wasn�t a chance of the losing end:
"The unwinding of America's economic and financial imbalances has barely begun. Share prices are still overvalued by many measures. Companies still need to prune much more excess capacity. Most worryingly, debts still loom dangerously large. Although much of the increase in reported profits in the late 1990s was illusory, the increase in corporate debt to finance that unprofitable investment was horribly real. Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, an investment bank, estimates that American corporate balance sheets are more stretched than at any time during the past half-century.
"American households' net worth is likely to shrink again this year, for the third year running, after a long, uninterrupted rise since the second world war. If lower share prices cause households to increase their saving sharply, America could be pushed back into recession. Even if saving rises more gradually, the economy is headed for several years of below-trend growth. A weaker dollar would help to cushion the economy, but only by squeezing growth in other countries. The rest of the world, which benefited so handsomely from America's speculative binge, will now have to share its hangover."
Isn't that a lovely word, "unwinding"? It has the crisp techno-beauty of one of those words so cleverly collected by Don Delillo � an artificial flower of rhetoric. All those snappy terms that derive distantly from the impression managers, the think tank, the game theorists. Unwinding should remind us of yarn, and homemakers, and cats; oddly enough, it evokes none of those things. My guess is that unwinding comes from a more clockwork world, one in which the key can go in the slot and uncoil the mechanism. We don�t know when "unwinding a position" became a wall street phrase of art, although we�ve looked around. Where are the lexicographers of tomorrow? Here�s a puzzle for you.
Swift uses a prototype of the phrase in "The tale of a tub;"
"However, that neither the world nor our selves, may any longer suffer by such misunderstandings, I have been prevailed on, after much importunity from my friends, to travel in a complete and laborious dissertation upon the prime productions of our society, which, beside their beautiful externals, for the gratification of superficial readers, have darkly and deeply couched under them the most finished and refined systems of all sciences and arts; as I do not doubt to lay open by untwisting or unwinding, and either to draw up by exantlation, or display by incision."
LI knows that Wall Street does have its litterateurs. However, we doubt that the term came from Swift, however nicely this would fit our sense of the, uh, impostures of high finance
Saturday, September 28, 2002
Remora
Kurds and ways
Christopher Hitchens has, since 9/11, rather fancied himself the Don Quixote of the Left, jousting with the anti-war contingent, rallying the troops around feminism, secularism, and democracy. Well, beyond the posturing natural to Hitchens, there is something to his perception of the anti-war left -- you don't have to look far before you find rather stupid analogies between, say, Saddam Hussein's use of nerve gas and lynchings in the U.S. South. The stupidity resides in the fact that there were mechanisms in the state to operate against the lynching spree -- and eventually, creakily, did. Genocide past neither justifies genocide present nor, necessarily, bars a nation from acting militarily. One can take a stand against any nation acting militarily at all, or one can take a stand against particular military actions, but the dumbest of all stands, LI thinks, is that which requires complete purity of nationhood (perhaps for a thousand years) before a nation is allowed to engage another. Until then, one supposes, the military force has to be content with sharpening knives and shining its buttons. Hitchens, criticizing such politics, is in good company. Marx saw how necessary the Napoleonic wars were in carrying the ideals of the French revolution across Europe, and lamented that Germany was never really conquered by the French. However, the modified lefty point seems to me quite plausible: if the actions of a nation have been morally stained in the recent past (say, the moral stain of selling the ingredients for chemical weapons, or condoning their use - that's pretty staining) in regard to a particular other nation, then it is quite right to doubt whether the former nation is morally qualified to proclaim itself justified in intervening in the affairs of the latter nation. Or, to speak with less cotton in my mouth, Iraqis have pretty good reasons to think that they are going to be manipulated, killed, and otherwise displaced for no good end, except, perhaps, the enrichment of some oil companies and the pleasure their deaths will bring to Ariel (or is it Caliban?) Sharon.
LI has been on the side of using military force against Al Qaeda. But count LI in the peace camp as far as Iraq goes. Hitchens has two columns in the nation in which he goes into the Kurdish side of the upcoming war. We want to comment at length about one of those columns -- Appointment in Samarra -- so we aren't going to quote it, as is usually our custom. To make sense of the three points that follow, probably you should go to the Hitchens column first. And now, without further ado:
Questions for Hitchens!
1. The 'devolved" Kurdish state. Devolution might work with Scotland, a region that has existed for three hundred years within the greater framework of British law and statehood, but it is hard to understand what it would mean for the Kurds.
If, indeed, we accept that the Kurds, like the Palestinians, deserve some kind of state, we have to be careful not to surrender to romantic illusions either about the means that might make this possible or the state that might result. Hitchens ignores the real political maneuvering in Northern Iraq during the last ten years. If he were more honest, he would at least allude to such evidences of Kurdish war-lordism as Masoud Barzani
's KDP Alliance with Saddam Hussein in 1996, which was aimed at destroying his Kurdish opponent, the PUK. We also know that Kurdish militias, far from buttressing the liberal dream of a secular, democratic state, have shown, in the past ten years, a mix of tendencies. One pattern is to revert to ideologies of Islamic extremism, or to act in ways that are pure banditry. Against this one can set the current governance of Northern Iraq, which by all accounts is generally one of tolerance. Hitchens can wish away recent history by selectively attending to liberal Kurdish groups, but such a move is fatal to the intelligent analysis of the Kurdish situation. Does Hitchens really think that those Islamicist factions in Northern Iraq are somehow going to vanish if Hussein is attacked? Remember, these factions are basically aligned with the kind of state the Taliban inaugurated - the kind of state Hitchens has attacked as fascist.
2. This brings up our second question. As liberal Americans, we of course would like to see a strong secular state in Northern Iraq, one that would possess structures for the peaceful transfer of power among different factions; one that would respect the human rights of minorities; and one that would contrive barriers to the wholesale looting of national wealth, which is as endemic to warlord prone areas of the world as it is to CEO-centric corporations. Now, by an accident, a safe haven has been carved out in Northern Iraq where these institutions, although often battered, seem to be growing. Would a war that deposed Saddam Hussein really be to the advantage of the growth of this type of state? I would suggest that the best course is to continue to keep the pressure on Hussein, to disarm him, to inspect him, to encourage popular revolt against him - but not to crush him through military force. Hitchens might say that retaining Saddam Hussein means, every day, imprisoning the people of Iraq. But all means of liberation aren't equal. Given the weakness of Hussein's forces, Northern Iraq is in no immediate danger of falling once again to the Republican Guard. It acts as a strong attractor, a model, for Iraqi discontent. Outside intelligence has been noticeably poor at predicting the downfall of dictators. I'd think the internal collapse of Hussein's regime is a much better goal to aim for. Frankly, there is no reason to think that the Americans won't prop up a military man to rule as a satrap in conquered Iraq. They've not only done this before: in Pakistan, they are colluding at it right now.
3. Finally, I find the implied dismissal of Turkish interest both unfair and historically misplaced. The safe haven in North Iraq exists by courtesy of the use of Turkish air strips, and was suggested by the Turkish government itself, in 1993, in response to the wave of Kurdish refugees. While it is true that the Turkish government's war against the PKK, the Kurdish guerilla group, was waged with maximum brutality, it is also true that the PKK responded in kind. It is also true that the PKK's ideology, a mixture of Mao and Mohammed, was a charlatan politics; that it evolved into a typical mix of twentieth century crime and brute political force, accruing money through trading drugs and arms, and wiping out any sign of Kurdish opposition; and that it never received the support of even a substantial minority of Turkish Kurds. It is a mistake to think that the situation in Turkey is anything like the situation in Iraq. There are billionaire Turkish Kurds; there are Kurdish presses in Istanbul; there is a high mix of Kurds in the Turkish military. The question of discrimination, which is a valid issue in Turkey, shouldn't be confused with the issue of separation. Like the Mayan farmers in Chiapas, Kurds might be oppressed by discriminations in the power structure in existence right now, but their grievances are peacefully resolvable, with no injury to the state of Turkey as a whole.
Naturally, Turkey can't countenance a hostile Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. Whether Kurdish factions can resist the dubious romantic satisfaction of encouraging violence in Turkey should definitely be a condition for further steps towards Kurdish autonomy (of whatever kind) in Northern Iraq. Far better to preserve the present, fragile situation, in which non-violent organizations can form, than to hope that peace arise out of the chaos of war.
Kurds and ways
Christopher Hitchens has, since 9/11, rather fancied himself the Don Quixote of the Left, jousting with the anti-war contingent, rallying the troops around feminism, secularism, and democracy. Well, beyond the posturing natural to Hitchens, there is something to his perception of the anti-war left -- you don't have to look far before you find rather stupid analogies between, say, Saddam Hussein's use of nerve gas and lynchings in the U.S. South. The stupidity resides in the fact that there were mechanisms in the state to operate against the lynching spree -- and eventually, creakily, did. Genocide past neither justifies genocide present nor, necessarily, bars a nation from acting militarily. One can take a stand against any nation acting militarily at all, or one can take a stand against particular military actions, but the dumbest of all stands, LI thinks, is that which requires complete purity of nationhood (perhaps for a thousand years) before a nation is allowed to engage another. Until then, one supposes, the military force has to be content with sharpening knives and shining its buttons. Hitchens, criticizing such politics, is in good company. Marx saw how necessary the Napoleonic wars were in carrying the ideals of the French revolution across Europe, and lamented that Germany was never really conquered by the French. However, the modified lefty point seems to me quite plausible: if the actions of a nation have been morally stained in the recent past (say, the moral stain of selling the ingredients for chemical weapons, or condoning their use - that's pretty staining) in regard to a particular other nation, then it is quite right to doubt whether the former nation is morally qualified to proclaim itself justified in intervening in the affairs of the latter nation. Or, to speak with less cotton in my mouth, Iraqis have pretty good reasons to think that they are going to be manipulated, killed, and otherwise displaced for no good end, except, perhaps, the enrichment of some oil companies and the pleasure their deaths will bring to Ariel (or is it Caliban?) Sharon.
LI has been on the side of using military force against Al Qaeda. But count LI in the peace camp as far as Iraq goes. Hitchens has two columns in the nation in which he goes into the Kurdish side of the upcoming war. We want to comment at length about one of those columns -- Appointment in Samarra -- so we aren't going to quote it, as is usually our custom. To make sense of the three points that follow, probably you should go to the Hitchens column first. And now, without further ado:
Questions for Hitchens!
1. The 'devolved" Kurdish state. Devolution might work with Scotland, a region that has existed for three hundred years within the greater framework of British law and statehood, but it is hard to understand what it would mean for the Kurds.
If, indeed, we accept that the Kurds, like the Palestinians, deserve some kind of state, we have to be careful not to surrender to romantic illusions either about the means that might make this possible or the state that might result. Hitchens ignores the real political maneuvering in Northern Iraq during the last ten years. If he were more honest, he would at least allude to such evidences of Kurdish war-lordism as Masoud Barzani
's KDP Alliance with Saddam Hussein in 1996, which was aimed at destroying his Kurdish opponent, the PUK. We also know that Kurdish militias, far from buttressing the liberal dream of a secular, democratic state, have shown, in the past ten years, a mix of tendencies. One pattern is to revert to ideologies of Islamic extremism, or to act in ways that are pure banditry. Against this one can set the current governance of Northern Iraq, which by all accounts is generally one of tolerance. Hitchens can wish away recent history by selectively attending to liberal Kurdish groups, but such a move is fatal to the intelligent analysis of the Kurdish situation. Does Hitchens really think that those Islamicist factions in Northern Iraq are somehow going to vanish if Hussein is attacked? Remember, these factions are basically aligned with the kind of state the Taliban inaugurated - the kind of state Hitchens has attacked as fascist.
2. This brings up our second question. As liberal Americans, we of course would like to see a strong secular state in Northern Iraq, one that would possess structures for the peaceful transfer of power among different factions; one that would respect the human rights of minorities; and one that would contrive barriers to the wholesale looting of national wealth, which is as endemic to warlord prone areas of the world as it is to CEO-centric corporations. Now, by an accident, a safe haven has been carved out in Northern Iraq where these institutions, although often battered, seem to be growing. Would a war that deposed Saddam Hussein really be to the advantage of the growth of this type of state? I would suggest that the best course is to continue to keep the pressure on Hussein, to disarm him, to inspect him, to encourage popular revolt against him - but not to crush him through military force. Hitchens might say that retaining Saddam Hussein means, every day, imprisoning the people of Iraq. But all means of liberation aren't equal. Given the weakness of Hussein's forces, Northern Iraq is in no immediate danger of falling once again to the Republican Guard. It acts as a strong attractor, a model, for Iraqi discontent. Outside intelligence has been noticeably poor at predicting the downfall of dictators. I'd think the internal collapse of Hussein's regime is a much better goal to aim for. Frankly, there is no reason to think that the Americans won't prop up a military man to rule as a satrap in conquered Iraq. They've not only done this before: in Pakistan, they are colluding at it right now.
3. Finally, I find the implied dismissal of Turkish interest both unfair and historically misplaced. The safe haven in North Iraq exists by courtesy of the use of Turkish air strips, and was suggested by the Turkish government itself, in 1993, in response to the wave of Kurdish refugees. While it is true that the Turkish government's war against the PKK, the Kurdish guerilla group, was waged with maximum brutality, it is also true that the PKK responded in kind. It is also true that the PKK's ideology, a mixture of Mao and Mohammed, was a charlatan politics; that it evolved into a typical mix of twentieth century crime and brute political force, accruing money through trading drugs and arms, and wiping out any sign of Kurdish opposition; and that it never received the support of even a substantial minority of Turkish Kurds. It is a mistake to think that the situation in Turkey is anything like the situation in Iraq. There are billionaire Turkish Kurds; there are Kurdish presses in Istanbul; there is a high mix of Kurds in the Turkish military. The question of discrimination, which is a valid issue in Turkey, shouldn't be confused with the issue of separation. Like the Mayan farmers in Chiapas, Kurds might be oppressed by discriminations in the power structure in existence right now, but their grievances are peacefully resolvable, with no injury to the state of Turkey as a whole.
Naturally, Turkey can't countenance a hostile Kurdish state in Northern Iraq. Whether Kurdish factions can resist the dubious romantic satisfaction of encouraging violence in Turkey should definitely be a condition for further steps towards Kurdish autonomy (of whatever kind) in Northern Iraq. Far better to preserve the present, fragile situation, in which non-violent organizations can form, than to hope that peace arise out of the chaos of war.
Thursday, September 26, 2002
Remora
The flame is on under CFO magazine's 99 CFO of the year --- everybody's favorite, Andrew Fastow! Yes, Enron's man with the plan -- the plan to loot the company's resources for his own benefit -- is edging close to the bonfire of the Vanities currently being lit in a court in Houston. This WP article is clearly a prosecutor's ploy,
but it does include one interesting detail for the Enron-maniac: the focus on Braveheart, the deal whereby Enron sold its potential profits to a Canadian bank in order to realize a sum in its books for 2001, coming up with a 100 million dollar profit. This deal is so incredible that it certainly needs to be examined -- and the heads of the execs at the Canadian company that made it need to be examined twice as hard. Only Enron would make a deal selling its potential profit to a third party, in order to mark down an immediate profit. In '99, CFO caught the great man himself explaining his tricks:
"When Andrew S. Fastow, the 37-year-old CFO of Enron Corp., boasts that "our story is one of a kind," he's not kidding. In just 14 years, Enron has grown from a heavily regulated domestic natural-gas pipeline business to a fully integrated global energy company with thriving activities in natural gas, electricity, infrastructure development, marketing and trading, energy financing, and risk management. And much of that growth has been fueled by unique financing techniques pioneered by Fastow.
"When I came here in 1990, Enron was a company with a $3.5 billion market capitalization," says Fastow. "Today, we're around $35 billion, and that's without issuing a whole lot of equity. We've increased shareholder value, grown the balance sheet, maintained a stable outlook from the rating agencies, and achieved a low cost of capital."
In fact, when energy stock analysts look for paradigm companies to vaunt, they point resolutely in the direction of Houston-based Enron, with $31 billion in revenues last year. And when they seek to explain how Enron has remade itself so completely, they point to "remarkably innovative financing." Says Ted A. Izatt, senior vice president at Lehman Brothers Inc. in New York: "Thanks to Andy Fastow, Enron has been able to develop all these different businesses, which require huge amounts of capital, without diluting the stock price or deteriorating its credit quality-- both of which actually have gone up. He has invented a groundbreaking strategy."
As Raymond Chandler might say, that's cute as a pair of tarantula pyjamas. Inventing those groundbreaking strategies for hiding huge amounts of capital -- hey, a round of applause right here!
If the prosecutors have any sense, they have sharpened their knives for the head of Enron's Broadband division, Ken Rice. The royal road to the conviction of Jeff Skilling might well lie through Mr. Rice, an amiable lout, by all accounts, who made off with 76 million dollars in cashed out stock options. A man who never, at any time, understood fiber optic cable, which is what his division was supposedly about. Luckily, he was only involved in it as its president - most of his billable time, at least according to Robert Bryce's book on Enron, he spent racing motorcycles.
Although you might think the piggy bank is broken, the new CEO of Chapter 11 Enron is still poking around for loot. Maybe it is something about the name, or maybe it is something about Houston business culture, but according to the Houston Chronicle,
"Stephen Cooper wants to hire 15 more managers from Zolfo Cooper, in a move that could earn him a rich reward. In a request filed with the bankruptcy court Tuesday, Enron asked to pay the restructuring firm founded by Stephen Cooper $864,000 a year per manager, the same rate as 15 Zolfo directors already with Enron." Cooper has apparently decided that his firm should staff Enron's skeletal crew, where they rub shoulders with highly compensated lawyers and such. And that, incidentally, he will receive money both from the company which he is running, Enron, and the firm he was running, Zolfo. Sweet, a deal like that. I mean, how do you squeeze more juice out of a dead carcass? See, Enron is pioneering entrepeneurial bankruptcy -- are we happy now?
This brings us round to yesterday's post. If you will remember, fair reader, we were discussing John Cassidy's New Yorker article, The Greed Cycle. One thing especially impressed LI about that article: the place of Michael Jensen in it. Jensen, Cassidy claims, was the academic godfather of the amazing inflation in top executive compensation packages. Jensen is currently hatching an academic paper to explain the collapse of Enron that blames it on -- get this -- the Wall Street bubble mentality. Why -- the universal solvent of explanations, now, that bubble. Once upon a time, the conservative view was that there are no bubbles -- this was, after all, the orthodoxy of efficient markets theory. Time moves on, however, and as it has become apparent that something has to be to blame for the crash -- and as it becomes apparent that the clash laid bare the irrationality of radical free market doctrine -- there's been a noticeable shift in that plank of the doctrine. Suddenly, there are bubbles -- and they are all the fault of Clinton! How convenient.
According to Cassidy, Jensen's idea is that Enron had to do what it did to maintain its stock prices because of pressure from Wall Street jockeys. It is the familiar story of trying to meet higher and higher expectations, and at some point going to the shadow side in order to do so.
Well, that is, to put not too fine a word upon it, bull shit.
Enron had to maintain its stock at a high level because much of its dealing depended on the stock being at that price. That guaranteed credit. Why was the need for credit so pressing? Because cash flow was so radically out of synch with claimed earnings. This occured because Enron made a systematic attempt, under Jeff Skilling, to institute mark to market accounting, a financial instrument by which it could aggregate future earnings as present earnings. Why did it do this? Well, among other things, such an accounting system could justify huge bonuses for execs. These bonuses were not postponed until the real profit was realized -- since in the vast majority of the deals Enron pursued, profit either never appeared, or was eaten up by costs. In fact, in the vast majority of those deals, including those being made by the thousands at Enron's famous energy trader's desk, Enron was losing money. So it was not Wall Street expectations that caused Enron to engage in the massive distortion of its financial position, but the need to justify grossly inflated compensations -- which of course brings the ball home into Jensen's court, doesn't it?
Jensen, who is working for something called Monitor, has posted a version of his version on the site. Here's the first three grafs -- and a word to the wise: notice that the "problem", as Jensen carefully designs it, is "fixed" by a courageous CEO. Jensen is the type of guy any CEO would be proud to have in his court -- a natural born syncophant:
Once, companies gave whispers and informal advisories to favoured analysts of what to expect in coming earnings announcements. Then the conversations became more elaborate, engendering a kind of twisted logic. No longer were analysts only trying to understand a company so as to predict what it might earn. The analysts' forecasts themselves became the centre of discussions. The forecasts no longer represented a financial by-product of the company's strategy but came to drive that strategy.
Yet as the case of Enron suggests, when companies scramble too hard to meet unrealistic forecasts by analysts they often take highly risky value-destroying bets. The process - euphemistically referred to as "earnings guidance" - is a high-stakes game, with management seeking to hit the targets set by analysts and being punished severely if they miss.
But a few courageous chief executive officers have wisely decided to put an end to the game by saying "no". Managing Wall Street's expectations may be a decades-old game but Barry Diller of USA Networks and Jim Kilts, Gillette's CEO, have decided to end it."
Jensen is a typical Chicago economist. He uses mathematical models to achieve results that he wants -- such as the model that shows why executives, as agents of the shareholders, must be compensated in such a way that their "interests are aligned with the company." Unlike, say, secretaries and technicians, I guess. When this model, in the real world, produces bad results -- when it is tested, that is, and found wanting, because of an insufficient attention to other, structural variables -- he reaches immediately for psychological terms. In other words: cue the mind when the going gets tough. That's always a good strategy to detract from your pisspoor mathematical models. Thus, his suggestion that Enron executives, hitting their targets, are driven by "egotism:" "High share prices stoked already amply endowed managerial egos.." Psychology intrudes when, embarrassingly, rational self-interest is really the parameter at stake. If compensation is set up to award performance without any index for performance -- if, that is, compensation is set up in the absense of those constraints that come with a competitive job market -- then guess what? performance will be skewed to justify compensation. This happens over and over again -- merger and acquisition is substituted for entrepeneurship, accounting shenanigans for true cost cutting, and pensions are looted in place of products being innovated. You would have to be a fool -- or an economist -- not to see that something in the system must be causing this systematic effect.
Discussion of corporate performance and its relation to compensation is on a truly childish level in the business press. Take General Electric. LI has seen, compulsively repeated, justifications of Welch's swollen compensation package by reference to how vastly GE grew under his leadership. No attention is paid, in this analysis, to the growth of other, similarly structured companies during the same period, or the patterns of organizational adjustment common to all of them. In other words, no argument is made that Welch added some unique value that, in the boom that began in 1982, distinguished his operations in some special way. As an instance of Welch's genius, measured by capitalization, take GE Credit, which contributed significantly to GE's profit in the last ten years. Was this some unique contribution of Welch's? By no means. Disintermediating from orthodox financial institutions -- ie banks -- is a common pattern in American industry. If I truly wanted to bore my readers, I would allude to Alfred Steinherr's exhaustive treatment of this in Derivatives: the Wild Beast of Finance. GM, Ford and Sears have all done it, and it wasn't due to the genius of CEOs. It was due to the opportunity presented, accidentally, by the confluence of two events: pools of capital that came into these companies from various sources (like pensions) that could more profitably be used as a financing instrument, and the peculiarities of the American financial structure due to regulations deriving from the Glass-Steagall act. Does anybody really want me to go into this? No. But the fact is, a pattern is found in various similarly capitalized companies that strongly implies no one CEO was the innovator in this area. So when the market soared, in the long boom from 82-2000, guess what? Those companies started overflowing with apparent money, as they "managed" financial assets. Of course, the flow depended, to a large extent, on two things: the equity bubble, and the enlargement of financial services, like loans to customers. Well, the equities bubble collapses, and the loans begin to bite back as interest rates lowered, customers defaulted, and returns in other areas of company activity slowed. Welch hopped off before the full bust hit, but his final days, riding the Honeywell fiasco, might well tell us what his CEO-ship would look like now if he had stayed on.
So, Welch is paid genius bonuses for non-genius work. Competent, even excellent some years, but not great -- and certainly not something to give him compensation equivalent to one of the founding capitalist fathers, like Carnegie. Yet I have never seen an article in the financial press make this simple comparative point. The point needs to be made because the question should be: could GE have acquired its financial position cheaper -- ie, with a cheaper leadership? This is, of course, taboo for the CEO apologist, and the multitudes that labor to create the uber-management myth.
The flame is on under CFO magazine's 99 CFO of the year --- everybody's favorite, Andrew Fastow! Yes, Enron's man with the plan -- the plan to loot the company's resources for his own benefit -- is edging close to the bonfire of the Vanities currently being lit in a court in Houston. This WP article is clearly a prosecutor's ploy,
but it does include one interesting detail for the Enron-maniac: the focus on Braveheart, the deal whereby Enron sold its potential profits to a Canadian bank in order to realize a sum in its books for 2001, coming up with a 100 million dollar profit. This deal is so incredible that it certainly needs to be examined -- and the heads of the execs at the Canadian company that made it need to be examined twice as hard. Only Enron would make a deal selling its potential profit to a third party, in order to mark down an immediate profit. In '99, CFO caught the great man himself explaining his tricks:
"When Andrew S. Fastow, the 37-year-old CFO of Enron Corp., boasts that "our story is one of a kind," he's not kidding. In just 14 years, Enron has grown from a heavily regulated domestic natural-gas pipeline business to a fully integrated global energy company with thriving activities in natural gas, electricity, infrastructure development, marketing and trading, energy financing, and risk management. And much of that growth has been fueled by unique financing techniques pioneered by Fastow.
"When I came here in 1990, Enron was a company with a $3.5 billion market capitalization," says Fastow. "Today, we're around $35 billion, and that's without issuing a whole lot of equity. We've increased shareholder value, grown the balance sheet, maintained a stable outlook from the rating agencies, and achieved a low cost of capital."
In fact, when energy stock analysts look for paradigm companies to vaunt, they point resolutely in the direction of Houston-based Enron, with $31 billion in revenues last year. And when they seek to explain how Enron has remade itself so completely, they point to "remarkably innovative financing." Says Ted A. Izatt, senior vice president at Lehman Brothers Inc. in New York: "Thanks to Andy Fastow, Enron has been able to develop all these different businesses, which require huge amounts of capital, without diluting the stock price or deteriorating its credit quality-- both of which actually have gone up. He has invented a groundbreaking strategy."
As Raymond Chandler might say, that's cute as a pair of tarantula pyjamas. Inventing those groundbreaking strategies for hiding huge amounts of capital -- hey, a round of applause right here!
If the prosecutors have any sense, they have sharpened their knives for the head of Enron's Broadband division, Ken Rice. The royal road to the conviction of Jeff Skilling might well lie through Mr. Rice, an amiable lout, by all accounts, who made off with 76 million dollars in cashed out stock options. A man who never, at any time, understood fiber optic cable, which is what his division was supposedly about. Luckily, he was only involved in it as its president - most of his billable time, at least according to Robert Bryce's book on Enron, he spent racing motorcycles.
Although you might think the piggy bank is broken, the new CEO of Chapter 11 Enron is still poking around for loot. Maybe it is something about the name, or maybe it is something about Houston business culture, but according to the Houston Chronicle,
"Stephen Cooper wants to hire 15 more managers from Zolfo Cooper, in a move that could earn him a rich reward. In a request filed with the bankruptcy court Tuesday, Enron asked to pay the restructuring firm founded by Stephen Cooper $864,000 a year per manager, the same rate as 15 Zolfo directors already with Enron." Cooper has apparently decided that his firm should staff Enron's skeletal crew, where they rub shoulders with highly compensated lawyers and such. And that, incidentally, he will receive money both from the company which he is running, Enron, and the firm he was running, Zolfo. Sweet, a deal like that. I mean, how do you squeeze more juice out of a dead carcass? See, Enron is pioneering entrepeneurial bankruptcy -- are we happy now?
This brings us round to yesterday's post. If you will remember, fair reader, we were discussing John Cassidy's New Yorker article, The Greed Cycle. One thing especially impressed LI about that article: the place of Michael Jensen in it. Jensen, Cassidy claims, was the academic godfather of the amazing inflation in top executive compensation packages. Jensen is currently hatching an academic paper to explain the collapse of Enron that blames it on -- get this -- the Wall Street bubble mentality. Why -- the universal solvent of explanations, now, that bubble. Once upon a time, the conservative view was that there are no bubbles -- this was, after all, the orthodoxy of efficient markets theory. Time moves on, however, and as it has become apparent that something has to be to blame for the crash -- and as it becomes apparent that the clash laid bare the irrationality of radical free market doctrine -- there's been a noticeable shift in that plank of the doctrine. Suddenly, there are bubbles -- and they are all the fault of Clinton! How convenient.
According to Cassidy, Jensen's idea is that Enron had to do what it did to maintain its stock prices because of pressure from Wall Street jockeys. It is the familiar story of trying to meet higher and higher expectations, and at some point going to the shadow side in order to do so.
Well, that is, to put not too fine a word upon it, bull shit.
Enron had to maintain its stock at a high level because much of its dealing depended on the stock being at that price. That guaranteed credit. Why was the need for credit so pressing? Because cash flow was so radically out of synch with claimed earnings. This occured because Enron made a systematic attempt, under Jeff Skilling, to institute mark to market accounting, a financial instrument by which it could aggregate future earnings as present earnings. Why did it do this? Well, among other things, such an accounting system could justify huge bonuses for execs. These bonuses were not postponed until the real profit was realized -- since in the vast majority of the deals Enron pursued, profit either never appeared, or was eaten up by costs. In fact, in the vast majority of those deals, including those being made by the thousands at Enron's famous energy trader's desk, Enron was losing money. So it was not Wall Street expectations that caused Enron to engage in the massive distortion of its financial position, but the need to justify grossly inflated compensations -- which of course brings the ball home into Jensen's court, doesn't it?
Jensen, who is working for something called Monitor, has posted a version of his version on the site. Here's the first three grafs -- and a word to the wise: notice that the "problem", as Jensen carefully designs it, is "fixed" by a courageous CEO. Jensen is the type of guy any CEO would be proud to have in his court -- a natural born syncophant:
Once, companies gave whispers and informal advisories to favoured analysts of what to expect in coming earnings announcements. Then the conversations became more elaborate, engendering a kind of twisted logic. No longer were analysts only trying to understand a company so as to predict what it might earn. The analysts' forecasts themselves became the centre of discussions. The forecasts no longer represented a financial by-product of the company's strategy but came to drive that strategy.
Yet as the case of Enron suggests, when companies scramble too hard to meet unrealistic forecasts by analysts they often take highly risky value-destroying bets. The process - euphemistically referred to as "earnings guidance" - is a high-stakes game, with management seeking to hit the targets set by analysts and being punished severely if they miss.
But a few courageous chief executive officers have wisely decided to put an end to the game by saying "no". Managing Wall Street's expectations may be a decades-old game but Barry Diller of USA Networks and Jim Kilts, Gillette's CEO, have decided to end it."
Jensen is a typical Chicago economist. He uses mathematical models to achieve results that he wants -- such as the model that shows why executives, as agents of the shareholders, must be compensated in such a way that their "interests are aligned with the company." Unlike, say, secretaries and technicians, I guess. When this model, in the real world, produces bad results -- when it is tested, that is, and found wanting, because of an insufficient attention to other, structural variables -- he reaches immediately for psychological terms. In other words: cue the mind when the going gets tough. That's always a good strategy to detract from your pisspoor mathematical models. Thus, his suggestion that Enron executives, hitting their targets, are driven by "egotism:" "High share prices stoked already amply endowed managerial egos.." Psychology intrudes when, embarrassingly, rational self-interest is really the parameter at stake. If compensation is set up to award performance without any index for performance -- if, that is, compensation is set up in the absense of those constraints that come with a competitive job market -- then guess what? performance will be skewed to justify compensation. This happens over and over again -- merger and acquisition is substituted for entrepeneurship, accounting shenanigans for true cost cutting, and pensions are looted in place of products being innovated. You would have to be a fool -- or an economist -- not to see that something in the system must be causing this systematic effect.
Discussion of corporate performance and its relation to compensation is on a truly childish level in the business press. Take General Electric. LI has seen, compulsively repeated, justifications of Welch's swollen compensation package by reference to how vastly GE grew under his leadership. No attention is paid, in this analysis, to the growth of other, similarly structured companies during the same period, or the patterns of organizational adjustment common to all of them. In other words, no argument is made that Welch added some unique value that, in the boom that began in 1982, distinguished his operations in some special way. As an instance of Welch's genius, measured by capitalization, take GE Credit, which contributed significantly to GE's profit in the last ten years. Was this some unique contribution of Welch's? By no means. Disintermediating from orthodox financial institutions -- ie banks -- is a common pattern in American industry. If I truly wanted to bore my readers, I would allude to Alfred Steinherr's exhaustive treatment of this in Derivatives: the Wild Beast of Finance. GM, Ford and Sears have all done it, and it wasn't due to the genius of CEOs. It was due to the opportunity presented, accidentally, by the confluence of two events: pools of capital that came into these companies from various sources (like pensions) that could more profitably be used as a financing instrument, and the peculiarities of the American financial structure due to regulations deriving from the Glass-Steagall act. Does anybody really want me to go into this? No. But the fact is, a pattern is found in various similarly capitalized companies that strongly implies no one CEO was the innovator in this area. So when the market soared, in the long boom from 82-2000, guess what? Those companies started overflowing with apparent money, as they "managed" financial assets. Of course, the flow depended, to a large extent, on two things: the equity bubble, and the enlargement of financial services, like loans to customers. Well, the equities bubble collapses, and the loans begin to bite back as interest rates lowered, customers defaulted, and returns in other areas of company activity slowed. Welch hopped off before the full bust hit, but his final days, riding the Honeywell fiasco, might well tell us what his CEO-ship would look like now if he had stayed on.
So, Welch is paid genius bonuses for non-genius work. Competent, even excellent some years, but not great -- and certainly not something to give him compensation equivalent to one of the founding capitalist fathers, like Carnegie. Yet I have never seen an article in the financial press make this simple comparative point. The point needs to be made because the question should be: could GE have acquired its financial position cheaper -- ie, with a cheaper leadership? This is, of course, taboo for the CEO apologist, and the multitudes that labor to create the uber-management myth.
Wednesday, September 25, 2002
Remora
Notes from all over
BW offers a "scourging" of the business press for its lickspittle attitude towards the New Economy boys during the bubble years. Readers of LI have already been here -- of course, they are all secretly sneaking glances at this weblog and ripping us off! The brutes! Isn't it stifling in this cabin? Where's my bundle of ivory... The snakes! The snakes!
Uh, forgive us, a touch of that old tropical fever, you know.
Anyway, Ciro Scotti winds into a denunciation of the biz press from the very odd angle of Pat Buchanan's rhetoric. Scotti borrows Buchanan's phrase about Bush -- that he is a corporation bellhop. While this is about as nice an image as you can expect on the hustings nowadays, I don't see it as being so insightful that Scotti needs to press it. And though Scotti wishes to come off as suitably tough and disgusted in the column, Mr. Take no prisoners, he actually --- takes no prisoners. That is, he names no names, but contents himself with generally derogating the young. Young guys, infatuated with young dot-commers, are to blame for everything. We advise you not to buy that story. The credulity of the business press derived from their general Reaganite faith in deregulation and the power of the markets, in themselves, to produce utopian outcomes. The business press suffered from a structural deficit of scepticism which was not confined to young tech enthusiasts. Blinded by rhetoric, and attached to a particularly insolent version of the managerial class -- the class indoctrinated, since the 80s, with the idea that their greediest impulses were synonymous with good business -- the business press has suffered a collapse in credibility that the managers of that press still don't understand. We recommend that Mr. Scotti read a few of our previous posts, instead of old Pat Buchanan speeches: our Glassman nominee of July 23 was Nelson Schwartz, and on August 2 we named James Glassman himself (although the latter is, we admit, a pretty obvious call -- it is like calling Bozo a clown). We've thought of pursuing some other journalists, notably Geoffrey Colvin, the Welch apologist at Fortune Magazine whose puff piece on Welch (with a heading that has the true, bullying ring of a General MacArthur explaining his Korean strategy: "VALUE DRIVEN Welch's Decision: The Inside Story. Most advisors told Jack Welch to shut up and tough out the news reports. He didn't. Here's why") is in the line of his general attitude towards Welch. Down on your knees about sums it up. Eventually we will do that. LI's motto is: what if they held an inquisition and nobody came? Because, of course, this is where we release our inner Torquemada.
Since we are going over old posts and new business articles, we read John Cassidy's New Yorker article, The Greed Cycle, yesterday, and we're impressed with it -- as apparently a lot of people have been. It is not, unfortunately, on line. Here's a preview of it at the Connection. The kicker at the end of it is Paul Volcker coming out for abolishing stock options. What attracted interest in the piece, however, was the seemingly rational explanation of how executive pay suffered the fortunate elephantiasis that now routinely produces Nicks tickets for the exec and wastepaper baskets from France for his mistress. Althought I have heard the statistic a thousand times, apparently Cassidy's discovery that that the Fortune 500 CEO earns 500 times more than the average employee he CEO-s has gotten spread about. I've heard the figure misquoted on NPR this morning (by an oddly cheerful commentator who defended Jack Welch) and seen it in editorials.
We have ambiguous feelings about Cassidy: his articles on Marx and Hayek were fascinating, but he, too, seemed to swallow much of the new economy propaganda during the bubble years. The core of the article is about the academic justification for changes in the compensation structure of the executive class from the seventies (when the corporation structure was pretty much as described in Galbraith's New Industrial State) to the nineties, and the part played in that by academic gun Michael Jensen. We want to read Jensen's '91 piece in the Harvard Business Review (which Cassidy quotes for its inspirational line about not compensating the CEO like a bureaucrat -- oh my no, you have to compensate him like an entrepeneur! like a movie star!) for an upcoming dissection of same. Suffice it to say that Cassidy takes up the issue of compensation by referring, ever so discretely, to the matter of competition in the executive labor market. Jensen, a Chicago alum, should, of course, have been a true fan of competition, but his work showed that the exec market was different, due to what the executive did. It was more like paying a contractor than paying an employee. We think that this is a fatally mistaken analogy. And we also think that the unspoken class bias in the Chicago school, which invariably lays the onus of competition in the labor markets on the poor or the middle class, and invariably sees the augmentation of the wealth of the wealthy as an automatic good, must be pointed to -- again and again.
Notes from all over
BW offers a "scourging" of the business press for its lickspittle attitude towards the New Economy boys during the bubble years. Readers of LI have already been here -- of course, they are all secretly sneaking glances at this weblog and ripping us off! The brutes! Isn't it stifling in this cabin? Where's my bundle of ivory... The snakes! The snakes!
Uh, forgive us, a touch of that old tropical fever, you know.
Anyway, Ciro Scotti winds into a denunciation of the biz press from the very odd angle of Pat Buchanan's rhetoric. Scotti borrows Buchanan's phrase about Bush -- that he is a corporation bellhop. While this is about as nice an image as you can expect on the hustings nowadays, I don't see it as being so insightful that Scotti needs to press it. And though Scotti wishes to come off as suitably tough and disgusted in the column, Mr. Take no prisoners, he actually --- takes no prisoners. That is, he names no names, but contents himself with generally derogating the young. Young guys, infatuated with young dot-commers, are to blame for everything. We advise you not to buy that story. The credulity of the business press derived from their general Reaganite faith in deregulation and the power of the markets, in themselves, to produce utopian outcomes. The business press suffered from a structural deficit of scepticism which was not confined to young tech enthusiasts. Blinded by rhetoric, and attached to a particularly insolent version of the managerial class -- the class indoctrinated, since the 80s, with the idea that their greediest impulses were synonymous with good business -- the business press has suffered a collapse in credibility that the managers of that press still don't understand. We recommend that Mr. Scotti read a few of our previous posts, instead of old Pat Buchanan speeches: our Glassman nominee of July 23 was Nelson Schwartz, and on August 2 we named James Glassman himself (although the latter is, we admit, a pretty obvious call -- it is like calling Bozo a clown). We've thought of pursuing some other journalists, notably Geoffrey Colvin, the Welch apologist at Fortune Magazine whose puff piece on Welch (with a heading that has the true, bullying ring of a General MacArthur explaining his Korean strategy: "VALUE DRIVEN Welch's Decision: The Inside Story. Most advisors told Jack Welch to shut up and tough out the news reports. He didn't. Here's why") is in the line of his general attitude towards Welch. Down on your knees about sums it up. Eventually we will do that. LI's motto is: what if they held an inquisition and nobody came? Because, of course, this is where we release our inner Torquemada.
Since we are going over old posts and new business articles, we read John Cassidy's New Yorker article, The Greed Cycle, yesterday, and we're impressed with it -- as apparently a lot of people have been. It is not, unfortunately, on line. Here's a preview of it at the Connection. The kicker at the end of it is Paul Volcker coming out for abolishing stock options. What attracted interest in the piece, however, was the seemingly rational explanation of how executive pay suffered the fortunate elephantiasis that now routinely produces Nicks tickets for the exec and wastepaper baskets from France for his mistress. Althought I have heard the statistic a thousand times, apparently Cassidy's discovery that that the Fortune 500 CEO earns 500 times more than the average employee he CEO-s has gotten spread about. I've heard the figure misquoted on NPR this morning (by an oddly cheerful commentator who defended Jack Welch) and seen it in editorials.
We have ambiguous feelings about Cassidy: his articles on Marx and Hayek were fascinating, but he, too, seemed to swallow much of the new economy propaganda during the bubble years. The core of the article is about the academic justification for changes in the compensation structure of the executive class from the seventies (when the corporation structure was pretty much as described in Galbraith's New Industrial State) to the nineties, and the part played in that by academic gun Michael Jensen. We want to read Jensen's '91 piece in the Harvard Business Review (which Cassidy quotes for its inspirational line about not compensating the CEO like a bureaucrat -- oh my no, you have to compensate him like an entrepeneur! like a movie star!) for an upcoming dissection of same. Suffice it to say that Cassidy takes up the issue of compensation by referring, ever so discretely, to the matter of competition in the executive labor market. Jensen, a Chicago alum, should, of course, have been a true fan of competition, but his work showed that the exec market was different, due to what the executive did. It was more like paying a contractor than paying an employee. We think that this is a fatally mistaken analogy. And we also think that the unspoken class bias in the Chicago school, which invariably lays the onus of competition in the labor markets on the poor or the middle class, and invariably sees the augmentation of the wealth of the wealthy as an automatic good, must be pointed to -- again and again.
Tuesday, September 24, 2002
Remora
Trickle Up
The conventional wisdom -- which is only shorthand for, the chatter among the governing class -- is that the upcoming election is going to be a Republican fest. The focus, now, is firmly on Iraq, and Bush is the maestro who has put this all together.
Well, the governing classes do govern, so one would think that they would know about such things. Elections, after all, are to be manipulated in such a way that there is no disturbance in the well ordered diffusion of power among the people who already have it, and no doubt feel they deserve it.
But isn't it possible, LI would like to know -- speaking out of turn, in his best Oliver Twist wants some more gruel tones -- isn't it slightly possible that the populace will look at the events of the past year in terms of their deteriorating economic situation? A story in the WP about the latest data on income and poverty brings up this point. The census bureau reports that income inequality is again on the rise, that median household incomes are declining, and that more people have officially become poor.
"This report signals a significant reversal of what had been a very positive trend in terms of income and poverty," said Jared Bernstein, senior economist at the union-backed Economic Policy Institute in Washington. "It also underscores the point that the recession was deeper than many had thought."
Other data indicates that the decline in household income came largely as a result of falling employment and loss of overtime hours, offsetting continued gains in hourly wages.
In terms of class breakdown, only households with incomes above $150,000 were able to post gains, with the greatest losses in percentage terms occurring at the bottom of the income ladder, the report showed."
Perhaps the G.C., living as it does mostly on the East Coast, is more sheltered than usual from these figures. Apparently the income lost has been heaviest in the Midwest and the West.
"Geographically, incomes also fell the most in the Midwest (3.7 percent) and the West (2.3 percent), reflecting the recession's heavy impact on manufacturing in the high tech sectors. Household incomes actually increased 1.7 percent in the Northeast."
This is obviously a stealth recession, but as the market falls, and as it becomes apparent that the Bush economic plan, like Enron's bonuses, is oriented solely towards lavishing perks on those who have already obtained, by various obscene tricks, lavish perks, there will be a backlash. Republicans are reportedly sitting pretty right now, thinking that Iraq will be rubbed in the faces of the Dems. The Dems are nervous, and have adopted a robotic attitude of yes-sir to the odious commander in chief and his henchmen. But maybe they will gain a little spine from the November results.
LI has to have a little hope, after all.
Trickle Up
The conventional wisdom -- which is only shorthand for, the chatter among the governing class -- is that the upcoming election is going to be a Republican fest. The focus, now, is firmly on Iraq, and Bush is the maestro who has put this all together.
Well, the governing classes do govern, so one would think that they would know about such things. Elections, after all, are to be manipulated in such a way that there is no disturbance in the well ordered diffusion of power among the people who already have it, and no doubt feel they deserve it.
But isn't it possible, LI would like to know -- speaking out of turn, in his best Oliver Twist wants some more gruel tones -- isn't it slightly possible that the populace will look at the events of the past year in terms of their deteriorating economic situation? A story in the WP about the latest data on income and poverty brings up this point. The census bureau reports that income inequality is again on the rise, that median household incomes are declining, and that more people have officially become poor.
"This report signals a significant reversal of what had been a very positive trend in terms of income and poverty," said Jared Bernstein, senior economist at the union-backed Economic Policy Institute in Washington. "It also underscores the point that the recession was deeper than many had thought."
Other data indicates that the decline in household income came largely as a result of falling employment and loss of overtime hours, offsetting continued gains in hourly wages.
In terms of class breakdown, only households with incomes above $150,000 were able to post gains, with the greatest losses in percentage terms occurring at the bottom of the income ladder, the report showed."
Perhaps the G.C., living as it does mostly on the East Coast, is more sheltered than usual from these figures. Apparently the income lost has been heaviest in the Midwest and the West.
"Geographically, incomes also fell the most in the Midwest (3.7 percent) and the West (2.3 percent), reflecting the recession's heavy impact on manufacturing in the high tech sectors. Household incomes actually increased 1.7 percent in the Northeast."
This is obviously a stealth recession, but as the market falls, and as it becomes apparent that the Bush economic plan, like Enron's bonuses, is oriented solely towards lavishing perks on those who have already obtained, by various obscene tricks, lavish perks, there will be a backlash. Republicans are reportedly sitting pretty right now, thinking that Iraq will be rubbed in the faces of the Dems. The Dems are nervous, and have adopted a robotic attitude of yes-sir to the odious commander in chief and his henchmen. But maybe they will gain a little spine from the November results.
LI has to have a little hope, after all.
Friday, September 20, 2002
Remora
LI has been desperately searching for something else to write about besides the upcoming war. The reason, of course, is that the war has become naturalized in American politics -- there are no parties that oppose it; like Winter, or the next storm, it is simply coming. This sense of onset -- of a thing that is impervious to human will, even as it is foreseeably disastrous to human beings -- is crucial to power as it is envisioned by dreamers of total authority. Total authority, after all, is a piece of nature. Death, flood, storm, lightning -- the bit players in mad Lear's dance on the heath -- these, once associated, as though by necessity, with the "leader', insinuate themselves into the mood of dissent, turning dissent from the expectation of persuasion to the easy desperation of emotional expression. So dissenters turn to invective and alienating names -- Bush as fascist, or the like. When the opposition indulges wholeheartedly in caricature, it loses its force as opposition. Better to play Lear's fool -- to make that narrow passage between outrageous and salient comments.
Robert Fiske, in the Independent, has some interesting comments on the weapons inspectors -- the supposed dupes of whose works the likes of Cheney (in his incarnation as V.P., not in his incarnation as the Iraq-friendly CEO of Haliburtan) is so scornful. The direction of their dupehood is given a spin by Fiske.
"But for now, the Americans have been sandbagged. It will take at least 25 days to put the UN inspection team together, another 60 for their preliminary assessment � always assuming they are given "unfettered" access to all Iraqi government facilities -- then another 60 days for further inspections. In other words, George Bush's latest war has been delayed by more than five months. Saddam, of course, must have his own worries. Back in 1996, the Iraqis were already accusing the UN inspectorate of working with the Israelis.
Major Scott Ritter, Iraq's nemesis-turned-saviour, was indeed � as an inspector � regularly travelling to Tel Aviv to consult Israeli intelligence. Then Saddam accused the UN inspectors of working for the CIA. And he was right. The United States, it emerged, was using the UN's Baghdad offices to bug Iraq's government communications. And once the inspectors were withdrawn in 1998 and the US and Britain launched "Operation Desert Fox", it turned out that virtually every one of the bombing targets had been visited by UN inspectors over the previous six months. Far from being an inspectorate, the UN lads � though they didn't all know it � had been acting as forward air controllers, drawing up an American hit list rather than monitoring compliance with UN resolutions."
Bush is going to get a fearful opposition to go on record supporting a war in spite of UN inspectors, with the really silly mantra that the UN goal is disarmament, and that the U.S. will be the instrument of that goal in spite of the U.N. The silliness resides in the fact that the two sides are certainly not separate. As the Bush people know, if S.H. did "disarm," the claim would have to be verified by -- arms inspection. In fact, we all know that. The beserk tilt against logic itself, and the demand for encouragement from the Democrats, is a sad spectacle quite in keeping with the beginnings of the Bush regime: from usurpation to tin star militarism. Haven't we seen this Western before?
LI has been desperately searching for something else to write about besides the upcoming war. The reason, of course, is that the war has become naturalized in American politics -- there are no parties that oppose it; like Winter, or the next storm, it is simply coming. This sense of onset -- of a thing that is impervious to human will, even as it is foreseeably disastrous to human beings -- is crucial to power as it is envisioned by dreamers of total authority. Total authority, after all, is a piece of nature. Death, flood, storm, lightning -- the bit players in mad Lear's dance on the heath -- these, once associated, as though by necessity, with the "leader', insinuate themselves into the mood of dissent, turning dissent from the expectation of persuasion to the easy desperation of emotional expression. So dissenters turn to invective and alienating names -- Bush as fascist, or the like. When the opposition indulges wholeheartedly in caricature, it loses its force as opposition. Better to play Lear's fool -- to make that narrow passage between outrageous and salient comments.
Robert Fiske, in the Independent, has some interesting comments on the weapons inspectors -- the supposed dupes of whose works the likes of Cheney (in his incarnation as V.P., not in his incarnation as the Iraq-friendly CEO of Haliburtan) is so scornful. The direction of their dupehood is given a spin by Fiske.
"But for now, the Americans have been sandbagged. It will take at least 25 days to put the UN inspection team together, another 60 for their preliminary assessment � always assuming they are given "unfettered" access to all Iraqi government facilities -- then another 60 days for further inspections. In other words, George Bush's latest war has been delayed by more than five months. Saddam, of course, must have his own worries. Back in 1996, the Iraqis were already accusing the UN inspectorate of working with the Israelis.
Major Scott Ritter, Iraq's nemesis-turned-saviour, was indeed � as an inspector � regularly travelling to Tel Aviv to consult Israeli intelligence. Then Saddam accused the UN inspectors of working for the CIA. And he was right. The United States, it emerged, was using the UN's Baghdad offices to bug Iraq's government communications. And once the inspectors were withdrawn in 1998 and the US and Britain launched "Operation Desert Fox", it turned out that virtually every one of the bombing targets had been visited by UN inspectors over the previous six months. Far from being an inspectorate, the UN lads � though they didn't all know it � had been acting as forward air controllers, drawing up an American hit list rather than monitoring compliance with UN resolutions."
Bush is going to get a fearful opposition to go on record supporting a war in spite of UN inspectors, with the really silly mantra that the UN goal is disarmament, and that the U.S. will be the instrument of that goal in spite of the U.N. The silliness resides in the fact that the two sides are certainly not separate. As the Bush people know, if S.H. did "disarm," the claim would have to be verified by -- arms inspection. In fact, we all know that. The beserk tilt against logic itself, and the demand for encouragement from the Democrats, is a sad spectacle quite in keeping with the beginnings of the Bush regime: from usurpation to tin star militarism. Haven't we seen this Western before?
Wednesday, September 18, 2002
Remora
Commoditizing exec compensation: a modest proposal
The news about Oracle comes, in LI's opinion, at just the right time. Larry Ellison should be a poster boy for bad corporate behavior. His total compensation package came in at number one in the Forbes CEO pay list. How did he win the greed sweepstakes? By taking home a cool 706 million dollars in stock options that he exercised. Ellison has a little gimmick he plays -- he paid himself, officially, a dollar in salary last year. Well, who needs a salary when your company dilutes its stock to the extent recorded by Mercury News
"Oracle CEO Ellison collected $706 million after exercising stock options and immediately selling the shares in January 2001. The gain meant Ellison set a record in business history for realized annual compensation -- which excludes the value of unexercised options. He received no salary, bonus or other pay last year. Oracle stock fell 61 percent to $15.30 during the fiscal year ended May 2001."
We just wrote a little review for the National Post about an Enron book. It hasn't been published yet. We excized a last paragraph considering extensively the underconsidered reason that executive total compensation has exploded: the insulated nature of the job market in upper management. It is a bit of a joke calling upper management a job market -- it seems more like the Big Fix.
Instead of seeking a market solution -- in other words, how do you make executive culture more competitive -- and letting that drive compensation downward, the idea that executives are something 'special' prevails among compensation reformers. The latest reform is reported this morning in the NYT
"A panel of business leaders proposed changes yesterday in the way corporations pay their top executives. Included in the changes are the prior disclosure of executive stock sales and the uniform treatment of stock options as expenses.
The panel, the Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise, was convened in June by the Conference Board, a research group based in New York. The group joined a long list of organizations offering recommendations on overhauling the way corporations govern themselves."
The panel's suggestions are good:
"Other proposals announced yesterday included a recommendation that companies seek shareholders' approval before stock options are repriced and that executives hold shares for a longer period before selling. In addition, the group recommended that compensation committees of corporate boards, not management, retain and direct the activities of outside consultants."
But they merely hint at what is needed to break the monopolistic practices that structure the interlocking interests of corporate boards, top executives, and 'consultants.' What is needed, with execs, was what was needed with electricity, natural gas, and metals: a way of commoditizing them, trading them, and hedging against exec compensation volatility. Is LI suggesting a futures market in executive compensation? Well, something like that. We need to make those compensation packages transparent; we need a way to index them; and we need to use that index to make executives compete among each other for positions, rather than having the holders of positions compete for the executives. It is as simple as that. The way in which corporations compete for executive talent makes sense if, indeed, the corporation is in a relatively new field -- such as PCs, in the late eighties. But as the field matures, prices for those executives should go down. Furthermore, those compensation packages shouldn't lift the compensation awarded to executives in more mature fields. Just that has been happening, however. One of the forces that drives Mergers and Acquisitions is the incentive, among the management class, to create something like a new field, and to then justify inflated compensation as the product of an unstable management situation. This is one of the reasons that M&As are a notoriously bad bet -- historically, they have a well known tendency to create underperforming companies.
However, don't expect LIs suggestion -- or any suggestion that we let the magic of the market-place intrude into the magic kingdoms of CEO-land -- to ever be taken seriously. That is, until boards of directors become real jobs, instead of part time honorariums, and those boards then begin to eye the incipient indexes that already exist -- the annual CEO salary list by Forbes, for instance -- and use it as an opportunity to cut exec cost.
Commoditizing exec compensation: a modest proposal
The news about Oracle comes, in LI's opinion, at just the right time. Larry Ellison should be a poster boy for bad corporate behavior. His total compensation package came in at number one in the Forbes CEO pay list. How did he win the greed sweepstakes? By taking home a cool 706 million dollars in stock options that he exercised. Ellison has a little gimmick he plays -- he paid himself, officially, a dollar in salary last year. Well, who needs a salary when your company dilutes its stock to the extent recorded by Mercury News
"Oracle CEO Ellison collected $706 million after exercising stock options and immediately selling the shares in January 2001. The gain meant Ellison set a record in business history for realized annual compensation -- which excludes the value of unexercised options. He received no salary, bonus or other pay last year. Oracle stock fell 61 percent to $15.30 during the fiscal year ended May 2001."
We just wrote a little review for the National Post about an Enron book. It hasn't been published yet. We excized a last paragraph considering extensively the underconsidered reason that executive total compensation has exploded: the insulated nature of the job market in upper management. It is a bit of a joke calling upper management a job market -- it seems more like the Big Fix.
Instead of seeking a market solution -- in other words, how do you make executive culture more competitive -- and letting that drive compensation downward, the idea that executives are something 'special' prevails among compensation reformers. The latest reform is reported this morning in the NYT
"A panel of business leaders proposed changes yesterday in the way corporations pay their top executives. Included in the changes are the prior disclosure of executive stock sales and the uniform treatment of stock options as expenses.
The panel, the Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise, was convened in June by the Conference Board, a research group based in New York. The group joined a long list of organizations offering recommendations on overhauling the way corporations govern themselves."
The panel's suggestions are good:
"Other proposals announced yesterday included a recommendation that companies seek shareholders' approval before stock options are repriced and that executives hold shares for a longer period before selling. In addition, the group recommended that compensation committees of corporate boards, not management, retain and direct the activities of outside consultants."
But they merely hint at what is needed to break the monopolistic practices that structure the interlocking interests of corporate boards, top executives, and 'consultants.' What is needed, with execs, was what was needed with electricity, natural gas, and metals: a way of commoditizing them, trading them, and hedging against exec compensation volatility. Is LI suggesting a futures market in executive compensation? Well, something like that. We need to make those compensation packages transparent; we need a way to index them; and we need to use that index to make executives compete among each other for positions, rather than having the holders of positions compete for the executives. It is as simple as that. The way in which corporations compete for executive talent makes sense if, indeed, the corporation is in a relatively new field -- such as PCs, in the late eighties. But as the field matures, prices for those executives should go down. Furthermore, those compensation packages shouldn't lift the compensation awarded to executives in more mature fields. Just that has been happening, however. One of the forces that drives Mergers and Acquisitions is the incentive, among the management class, to create something like a new field, and to then justify inflated compensation as the product of an unstable management situation. This is one of the reasons that M&As are a notoriously bad bet -- historically, they have a well known tendency to create underperforming companies.
However, don't expect LIs suggestion -- or any suggestion that we let the magic of the market-place intrude into the magic kingdoms of CEO-land -- to ever be taken seriously. That is, until boards of directors become real jobs, instead of part time honorariums, and those boards then begin to eye the incipient indexes that already exist -- the annual CEO salary list by Forbes, for instance -- and use it as an opportunity to cut exec cost.
Monday, September 16, 2002
Dope
The politics of war and popularity has been one of the great perils of democracy since Pitt the Younger played the patriot card in 1793. �We cannot arrange with our enemy in the present conjuncture, without abandoning the interest of mankind,� Burke wrote, in his �Letters �on the Proposals for Peace with the Regicide Directory of France,� which was Burke�s way of having it two ways: he simulated a moral interest such that the state could not refuse it, while pretending to decry any who would try to force the state to serve ideological interests. The latter was the letter of his indictment of the French revolutionaries � he claimed that they committed crimes in the name of an abstraction. Notice that the abstraction for which the French Revolutionaries were committing crimes was: the interest of mankind. Burke�s objections to the French Revolution became de facto state doctrine under Pitt - which is when the odd delusion was forged that the British empire was not simply a way of aggrandizing British interest, but was instead, mystically, in the interests of the subdued. This, of course, is the True Doctrine of the Neo-Con believers. The case Burke made carried the burden of legitimacy throughout the British-French conflict, up to 1815, and wrought havoc on the rights of Englishmen, as well as on their money.
This two-fold legitimation of war, which seeks to engraft its justification into the very tissue of the state�s legitimacy, is the path used to make any who oppose war unpatriotic, or enemies of the state. It�s a very fine maneuver, and it is being used now by the Bush regime to shift the boundaries of the war debate: it is no longer about the need for it, but the time we will have it. The social ostracism of the peace party is the practical correlate to the inevitability of war, the last few month�s media Muzak: a pervasive perversion of real reasons which operates much like Muzak, that pervasive perversion of real music, to obstruct thought. So those nations which might oppose our Iraqi action are discredited in sometimes laughable acts of propaganda. In the Sunday NYT, for instance, there was an article about the close ties between Iraq and France � ties that were, of course, cut during the Gulf war. There was even a graf showing the nations that traded with Iraq, and the arms they supplied, from Russia to France. Hey ho, however: there was no place there for the U.S. or the U.K. We�ve already published a partial inventory of products that went to Iraq from the U.S., taken from Jentleson�s book. Our sardonic laughter about the chart was increased by the fact that the Sunday NYT also published an article about businesses using misleading charts to disguise their true financial state.
:While other academic research over the last decade has established that financial charts are often designed to paint a rosier corporate picture than the numbers warrant, a study by Deanna Oxender Burgess, an accounting professor at Florida Gulf Coast University, goes a step further. It examined the effect of the chart design on readers of annual reports, who are mainly investors, stock analysts and shareholders.
"Dr. Burgess found that even slight distortions in a chart changed readers' perceptions of the information. "The danger is that people believe there's more growth than there really is or that performance isn't as poor, which could influence investment decisions," said Dr. Burgess, who conducted focus groups with 80 stockbrokers, bankers, accountants and business students."
Slight distortions in a chart � like the exclusion of two nations that, at one time, were making money on shipping those substances and technologies to Iraq that they now use to justify �regime change?� That's what I call a slight distortion.
Sometimes, coincidence really is the best artist.
The politics of war and popularity has been one of the great perils of democracy since Pitt the Younger played the patriot card in 1793. �We cannot arrange with our enemy in the present conjuncture, without abandoning the interest of mankind,� Burke wrote, in his �Letters �on the Proposals for Peace with the Regicide Directory of France,� which was Burke�s way of having it two ways: he simulated a moral interest such that the state could not refuse it, while pretending to decry any who would try to force the state to serve ideological interests. The latter was the letter of his indictment of the French revolutionaries � he claimed that they committed crimes in the name of an abstraction. Notice that the abstraction for which the French Revolutionaries were committing crimes was: the interest of mankind. Burke�s objections to the French Revolution became de facto state doctrine under Pitt - which is when the odd delusion was forged that the British empire was not simply a way of aggrandizing British interest, but was instead, mystically, in the interests of the subdued. This, of course, is the True Doctrine of the Neo-Con believers. The case Burke made carried the burden of legitimacy throughout the British-French conflict, up to 1815, and wrought havoc on the rights of Englishmen, as well as on their money.
This two-fold legitimation of war, which seeks to engraft its justification into the very tissue of the state�s legitimacy, is the path used to make any who oppose war unpatriotic, or enemies of the state. It�s a very fine maneuver, and it is being used now by the Bush regime to shift the boundaries of the war debate: it is no longer about the need for it, but the time we will have it. The social ostracism of the peace party is the practical correlate to the inevitability of war, the last few month�s media Muzak: a pervasive perversion of real reasons which operates much like Muzak, that pervasive perversion of real music, to obstruct thought. So those nations which might oppose our Iraqi action are discredited in sometimes laughable acts of propaganda. In the Sunday NYT, for instance, there was an article about the close ties between Iraq and France � ties that were, of course, cut during the Gulf war. There was even a graf showing the nations that traded with Iraq, and the arms they supplied, from Russia to France. Hey ho, however: there was no place there for the U.S. or the U.K. We�ve already published a partial inventory of products that went to Iraq from the U.S., taken from Jentleson�s book. Our sardonic laughter about the chart was increased by the fact that the Sunday NYT also published an article about businesses using misleading charts to disguise their true financial state.
:While other academic research over the last decade has established that financial charts are often designed to paint a rosier corporate picture than the numbers warrant, a study by Deanna Oxender Burgess, an accounting professor at Florida Gulf Coast University, goes a step further. It examined the effect of the chart design on readers of annual reports, who are mainly investors, stock analysts and shareholders.
"Dr. Burgess found that even slight distortions in a chart changed readers' perceptions of the information. "The danger is that people believe there's more growth than there really is or that performance isn't as poor, which could influence investment decisions," said Dr. Burgess, who conducted focus groups with 80 stockbrokers, bankers, accountants and business students."
Slight distortions in a chart � like the exclusion of two nations that, at one time, were making money on shipping those substances and technologies to Iraq that they now use to justify �regime change?� That's what I call a slight distortion.
Sometimes, coincidence really is the best artist.
Friday, September 13, 2002
Dope
Words written in anger. LI finds this incredible: writers are treated so badly by the media that it either stupifies us, forces us to quit, or demoralizes us beyond repair. This is the second time in the last five days that LI has had to go without food for a day. The reason? No money in the bank. The reason: One company has deliberately floated me -- not paid me -- for work I turned in in June, and that was published in July. One company has "lost" my invoice -- this makes the second time in the last month. For that company, I have reviewed approximately ten to fifteen books in the last five weeks. Result: I am living by leeching on my friends. Leeching only goes so far, however. So, today, I didn't have the money to buy ten dollars worth of groceries from the clerk, who makes more than me, and who is paid biweekly. The time divide is the major divide in this country: a company can take its time about paying you, in spite of the contracts they have you sign in order to spin your work off without you gaining a penny by it, and they can do this repeatedly, and they can do this without penalty. This has happened with Lefty magazines; it has happened with national newspapers. You wouldn't think so, but this is true.The writer cannot make the same bargain with the grocer, the landlord, or the electric company. These are my expenses this week: 30.00 for groceries. 5.00 for a meal -- a big treat for me, going out and getting a sandwich! 4.00 for coffees. I would like to see anybody survive on what I am forced to, with chronic, unexplained shortfalls making me truly unable to say that I can eat tomorrow. In the literal sense, I can't. I will find some body, I hope, who can take me out. Hurray.
This is the life of a beast.
This is the system that makes life beastly. I am living in nineteenth century squalor. I am imprisoned in my conditions, and no amount of labor seems to help. I am being driven mad by this. Literally.
I can howl and scream, I can beat my skinny belly, but nothing, nothing changes.
What to do?
Words written in anger. LI finds this incredible: writers are treated so badly by the media that it either stupifies us, forces us to quit, or demoralizes us beyond repair. This is the second time in the last five days that LI has had to go without food for a day. The reason? No money in the bank. The reason: One company has deliberately floated me -- not paid me -- for work I turned in in June, and that was published in July. One company has "lost" my invoice -- this makes the second time in the last month. For that company, I have reviewed approximately ten to fifteen books in the last five weeks. Result: I am living by leeching on my friends. Leeching only goes so far, however. So, today, I didn't have the money to buy ten dollars worth of groceries from the clerk, who makes more than me, and who is paid biweekly. The time divide is the major divide in this country: a company can take its time about paying you, in spite of the contracts they have you sign in order to spin your work off without you gaining a penny by it, and they can do this repeatedly, and they can do this without penalty. This has happened with Lefty magazines; it has happened with national newspapers. You wouldn't think so, but this is true.The writer cannot make the same bargain with the grocer, the landlord, or the electric company. These are my expenses this week: 30.00 for groceries. 5.00 for a meal -- a big treat for me, going out and getting a sandwich! 4.00 for coffees. I would like to see anybody survive on what I am forced to, with chronic, unexplained shortfalls making me truly unable to say that I can eat tomorrow. In the literal sense, I can't. I will find some body, I hope, who can take me out. Hurray.
This is the life of a beast.
This is the system that makes life beastly. I am living in nineteenth century squalor. I am imprisoned in my conditions, and no amount of labor seems to help. I am being driven mad by this. Literally.
I can howl and scream, I can beat my skinny belly, but nothing, nothing changes.
What to do?
Wednesday, September 11, 2002
Remora
September 11. LI was not going to post today. But then we thought, reading the NYT, and various media, that it might be a good idea to post today. After all, this is the week that Bush has chosen to press forward with his war against Iraq, with his address to the United Nations. And we were surprised to see Bush's comments on the NYT op-ed page -- surprised because we didn't expect to see a Washington Times guy like Bush appearing in same space used by Susan Sontag Monday.
So we decided, one year later, to take a look at Sontag's much condemned response to 9/11. It was easy to find on the web. A NYU finance professor has even taken the trouble to combine Sontag's 9/10 piece in the Times and the New Yorker piece. Here's the first paragraph, the one that drew down the wrath of the heavens last year:
"The disconnect between last Tuesday's monstrous dose
of reality and the self-righteous drivel and outright deceptions being peddled by public figures and TV commentators is startling & depressing. The voices licensed to follow the event seem to have joined together in a campaign to infantilize the public. Where is the acknowledgment that this was not a "cowardly" attack on "civilization" or "liberty" or "humanity" or "the free world" but an attack on the world's self-proclaimed superpower; undertaken as a consequence of specific American alliances and actions? How many citizens are aware of the ongoing American bombing of Iraq? And if the word "cowardly" is to be used, it might be more aptly applied to those who kill from beyond the range of retaliation, high in the sky, than to those willing to die themselves in order to kill others. In the matter of courage (a morally neutral virtue): whatever may be said of the perpetrators of Tuesday's slaughter, they were not cowards. "
It was part of the disconnect from reality that much of the controversy about this graf had to do with whether or not the hijackers were or were not cowardly. The controversy seems, in retrospect, bizarre. On the one hand, to undertake to kill yourself in a cause can be construed as brave. On the other hand, to undertake to kill others without warning in a cause to which they are not clearly, if at all, connected can be construed as cowardly. It depends, obviously, on which end of the action you look at. In the end, I'd say that the story of war in this century is about the systematic displacement of all of the elements that were once engaged in the semantic field of "bravery." It is a field that fell to the technology of distance. Bombing Iraq is, indeed, another example in the endless story of 20th century fighting -- it is impervious to descriptions of cowardice and bravery. Once cowardice wins wars, and bravery loses them, the virtues begin to lose their luster.
That Bush would reach, instinctively, for the "coward" appelation had to do with forestalling criticism of his own regard for his skin, that day -- criticism that has been so reversed that we are now assured that the President nearly fought with his pilots to take Air Force one immediately to D.C., so brave a hero is he. This is blatantly untrue, and to the extent that Sontag takes on the press for "impression management," she is precisely right. That Sontag, a literary critic, fell for Bush's description of the act and the invitation to descriptions derived from an irrelevant system of virtues -- that in fact she doesn't make the elementary analysis of the coward trope that she, a good Barthesian, could easily have done -- gives us a measure of how confusing -- how stricken -- the period after 9/11 was. Criticism isn't simply opposition, and that, of course, was the whole problem with Sontag's piece.
The other thing to note, after a year, is that Sontag's numerous conservative critics -- who called her various names, like filthy, quisling, etc. -- now essentially agree with her that the whole thing was about Iraq. This would be funny, if it wasn't so not-funny. Of course, what we provisionally know, after a year of probing the Al Quaeda network, is that it wasn't at all about Iraq. It was about Saudi Arabia, first. It was about the perception that still lives, in the Arab world, among certain leaders, that the U.S. is a paper tiger -- a perception that arose from the bombing of the Marine Barracks in Lebanon in 83, and the subsequent American retreat from Lebanon. And if what has been reported about the preaching in the "radical" mosques in Hamburg is correct, it was about "Jewry" -- a soiled, disgusting theme that we are all too familiar with. The WP has an article, today, with the dime novel title, Hamburg's Cauldron of Terror, which quotes a typical sermon of the kind that, apparently, nourished Mohammed Atta's soul:
"The Al Quds mosque opened in 1993 and became a center for incendiary views. "The Jews and crusaders must have their throats slit," said Imam Mohammed bin Mohammed al Fizazi in a pre-Sept. 11 sermon, which was videotaped.
Such preaching has continued. The Post last month purchased a video at the Al Quds mosque in which an Islamic preacher, identified as Sheik Azid al Kirani, shouts out a call for mortal combat against "Jews, Israel and all unbelievers."
There is little common ground between the purveyors of this kind of Islamic ultramontanism and Iraq. There's good reason that none of the hijackers were Iraqi -- the issue between the U.S. and Iraq is definitely not at the center of the thinking of people like Atta, who detest the thought of secular Arabic power. "How many citizens are aware of the ongoing American bombing of Iraq?", Sontag justly asks. What she implies, however, is, distressingly, a view that has become very orthodox in right wing circles: the Middle East is one uniform mass, in which the differences between, say, Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein melt down to a feeble few. This view is just plain wrong: its falsity can be spelled out in body counts.
September 11. LI was not going to post today. But then we thought, reading the NYT, and various media, that it might be a good idea to post today. After all, this is the week that Bush has chosen to press forward with his war against Iraq, with his address to the United Nations. And we were surprised to see Bush's comments on the NYT op-ed page -- surprised because we didn't expect to see a Washington Times guy like Bush appearing in same space used by Susan Sontag Monday.
So we decided, one year later, to take a look at Sontag's much condemned response to 9/11. It was easy to find on the web. A NYU finance professor has even taken the trouble to combine Sontag's 9/10 piece in the Times and the New Yorker piece. Here's the first paragraph, the one that drew down the wrath of the heavens last year:
"The disconnect between last Tuesday's monstrous dose
of reality and the self-righteous drivel and outright deceptions being peddled by public figures and TV commentators is startling & depressing. The voices licensed to follow the event seem to have joined together in a campaign to infantilize the public. Where is the acknowledgment that this was not a "cowardly" attack on "civilization" or "liberty" or "humanity" or "the free world" but an attack on the world's self-proclaimed superpower; undertaken as a consequence of specific American alliances and actions? How many citizens are aware of the ongoing American bombing of Iraq? And if the word "cowardly" is to be used, it might be more aptly applied to those who kill from beyond the range of retaliation, high in the sky, than to those willing to die themselves in order to kill others. In the matter of courage (a morally neutral virtue): whatever may be said of the perpetrators of Tuesday's slaughter, they were not cowards. "
It was part of the disconnect from reality that much of the controversy about this graf had to do with whether or not the hijackers were or were not cowardly. The controversy seems, in retrospect, bizarre. On the one hand, to undertake to kill yourself in a cause can be construed as brave. On the other hand, to undertake to kill others without warning in a cause to which they are not clearly, if at all, connected can be construed as cowardly. It depends, obviously, on which end of the action you look at. In the end, I'd say that the story of war in this century is about the systematic displacement of all of the elements that were once engaged in the semantic field of "bravery." It is a field that fell to the technology of distance. Bombing Iraq is, indeed, another example in the endless story of 20th century fighting -- it is impervious to descriptions of cowardice and bravery. Once cowardice wins wars, and bravery loses them, the virtues begin to lose their luster.
That Bush would reach, instinctively, for the "coward" appelation had to do with forestalling criticism of his own regard for his skin, that day -- criticism that has been so reversed that we are now assured that the President nearly fought with his pilots to take Air Force one immediately to D.C., so brave a hero is he. This is blatantly untrue, and to the extent that Sontag takes on the press for "impression management," she is precisely right. That Sontag, a literary critic, fell for Bush's description of the act and the invitation to descriptions derived from an irrelevant system of virtues -- that in fact she doesn't make the elementary analysis of the coward trope that she, a good Barthesian, could easily have done -- gives us a measure of how confusing -- how stricken -- the period after 9/11 was. Criticism isn't simply opposition, and that, of course, was the whole problem with Sontag's piece.
The other thing to note, after a year, is that Sontag's numerous conservative critics -- who called her various names, like filthy, quisling, etc. -- now essentially agree with her that the whole thing was about Iraq. This would be funny, if it wasn't so not-funny. Of course, what we provisionally know, after a year of probing the Al Quaeda network, is that it wasn't at all about Iraq. It was about Saudi Arabia, first. It was about the perception that still lives, in the Arab world, among certain leaders, that the U.S. is a paper tiger -- a perception that arose from the bombing of the Marine Barracks in Lebanon in 83, and the subsequent American retreat from Lebanon. And if what has been reported about the preaching in the "radical" mosques in Hamburg is correct, it was about "Jewry" -- a soiled, disgusting theme that we are all too familiar with. The WP has an article, today, with the dime novel title, Hamburg's Cauldron of Terror, which quotes a typical sermon of the kind that, apparently, nourished Mohammed Atta's soul:
"The Al Quds mosque opened in 1993 and became a center for incendiary views. "The Jews and crusaders must have their throats slit," said Imam Mohammed bin Mohammed al Fizazi in a pre-Sept. 11 sermon, which was videotaped.
Such preaching has continued. The Post last month purchased a video at the Al Quds mosque in which an Islamic preacher, identified as Sheik Azid al Kirani, shouts out a call for mortal combat against "Jews, Israel and all unbelievers."
There is little common ground between the purveyors of this kind of Islamic ultramontanism and Iraq. There's good reason that none of the hijackers were Iraqi -- the issue between the U.S. and Iraq is definitely not at the center of the thinking of people like Atta, who detest the thought of secular Arabic power. "How many citizens are aware of the ongoing American bombing of Iraq?", Sontag justly asks. What she implies, however, is, distressingly, a view that has become very orthodox in right wing circles: the Middle East is one uniform mass, in which the differences between, say, Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein melt down to a feeble few. This view is just plain wrong: its falsity can be spelled out in body counts.
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